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PREFACE
On May 25, 1961, this nation made a commitment:
to land men on the Moon before the end of the decade.
On July 20, 1969, the commitment was met. American
astronauts left the following message on the lunar sur-
face: "Here men from the planet Earth first set foot
upon the Moon, July 1969 A.D. We came in peace for
all mankind."
The achievement belongs to all mankind. _ut those
that made it possible deserve our special thanks.
First, there are three especially brave men -- Neil
Armstrong, Mike Collins, and Buzz Aldrin. They were
backed up by thousands of men and women in NASA, in
other government agencies, in industry and in uni-
versities, and in the Congress. All of them were
dedicated to the cause of Apollo, and they proved that
with skill and the desire to succeed -- above all, with
dedication -- we as a nation can indeed meet the most
difficult tasks we set for ourselves.
George M. Low
Acting Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
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I. SUMMARY
Thepurposeof the Apollo II missionwasto land menon the lunar surface andto
return themsafely to earth. Themembersof the crewwereNeil A. Armstrong,Commander;
MichaelCollins, CommandModulePilot; andEdwinE. Aldrin, Jr., LunarModulePilot.
Thespacevehicle waslaunchedfrom KennedySpaceCenter, Florida, at 8:32:00 a.m.
e.s.t., July 16, 1969. Theactivities during earth orbit checkout, translunar injection,
transposition anddocking, spacecraft ejection, andtranslunar coast weresimilar to
those of the previousmission, a lunar orbit rendezvousflight. Only onemidcourse
correction, performedat approximately27 hoursg.e.t., wasreauired during translunar
coast.
Thespacecraft wasinserted into lunar orbit at approximately76 hoursg.e.t., and
the circularization maneuverwasperformedtwo revolutions later. Initial checkoutof
the lunar modulesystemswassatisfactory, and after a plannedrest period, the Commander
andLunarModulePilot enteredthe lunar moduleto prepare for descent.
Thetwo spacecraftwere undockedat approximatelyI00 hours g.e.t., followed by
separation of the commandandservice modulesfrom the lunar module. Descentorbit in-
sertion wasperformedat approximately101-I/2 hours g.e.t., andpowereddescentto the
lunar surface beganapproximately1 hour later. Operationof the guidanceanddescent
propulsion systemswasnominal. Thelunar modulewasmaneuveredmanuallyto a landing
approximatelyII00 feet downrangefrom the nominallanding point during the final
2-I/2 minutesof descent. Thespacecraft landedin the Seaof Tranquility at
102:45:40g.e.t. Thelanding coordinateswerelatitude 0°41'15" Nand longitude 23°26'
Duringthe first 2 hourson the lunar surface, the two crewmenperformeda postlanding
checkoutof all lunar modulesystems. Afterward, they ate their first mealon the moon
andelected to performthe surfaceoperations earlier than planned.
E.
Considerable time was deliberately devoted to checkout and donning of the back-
mounted portable life support and oxygen purge systems. The Commander egressed through
the forward hatch and deployed an equipment module in the descent stage. A camera in
this module provided live television coverage of the Commander descending the ladder to
the surface, with first contact made at 109:24:15 g.e.t. (9:56:15 p.m.e.s.t., July 20,
1969). The Lunar Module Pilot egressed soon thereafter, and both crewmen used the ini-
tial period on the surface to become acclimated to the reduced gravity and unfamiliar
surface conditions. A contingency sample was taken from the surface, and the television
camera was deployed so that most of the lunar module was included in its view field.
The crew activated the scientific experiments, which included a solar wind detector, a
passive seismometer, and a laser retroreflector. The Lunar Module Pilot evaluated his
ability to operate and move about and was able to translate rapidly and with confidence.
Forty-seven pounds of lunar surface material were collected to be returned for analysis.
The surface exploration was concluded in the allotted time of 2-I/2 hours, and the crew
reentered the lunar module at 111-I/2 hours g.e.t.
Ascent preparation was conducted efficiently, and the ascent stage lifted off the
surface at 124-I/4 hours g.e.t. A nominal firing of the ascent engine placed the vehicle
into a 48- by 9-mile orbit. After a rendezvous sequence similar to that of Apollo I0,
the two spacecraft were docked at 128 hours g.e.t. Following transfer of the crew, the
ascent stage was jettisoned, and the command and service modules were prepared for trans-
earth injection.
The return flight started with a 150-second firing of the service propulsion engine
during the 31st lunar revolution at 135-I/2 hours g.e.t. As in the translunar flight,
only one midcourse correction was required, and passive thermal control was exercised
for mostof the transearth coast. Inclementweathernecessitatedmovingthe landing
point 215miles downrange. Theentry phasewasnormal, andthe commandmodulelanded
in the Pacific Oceanat 195-I/4 hoursg.e.t. Thelanding coordinates, as determined
from the onboardcomputer,were latitude 13019' N andlongitude 169o09' W.
After landing, the crewdonnedbiological isolation garments. Thecrewwasthen
retrieved by helicopter andtaken to the primary recoveryship, U.S.S.Hornet. Thecrew
andthe lunar material sampleswereplaced in the MobileQuarantineFacility for trans-
port to the LunarReceivingLaboratoryin Houston,Texas. Thecommandmodulewastaken
aboardthe U.S.S.Hornet approximately3 hours after landing.
With the completionof the Apollo II mission, the national objective, landing men
on the moonand returning themsafely to earth before the endof the decade,hadbeen
accomplished.
2. INTRODUCTION
TheApollo II missionwas the llth in a series of flights using Apollo flight hard-
wareandwasthe first lunar landing mission of the Apollo Program. It wasalso the fifth
mannedflight of the commandandservice modulesandthe third mannedflight of the lunar
module. Thepurposeof the missionwasto performa mannedlunar landing andto return
the mensafely to earth. A history of the Apollo flights is presentedin appendixA.
Becauseof the excellent performanceof the entire spacecraft, only the systemsper-
formancethat significantly differed from that of previousmissions is reported. The
ascent, descent, andlanding portions of the missionare reported in section 5, andthe
lunar surface activities are reported in section II.
In this report, all actual times are given as elapsedtime from rangezero (g.e.t.),
which is established as the integral secondbefore lift-off. Rangezero for this mission
was13:32:00G.m.t., July 16, 1969. All referencesto mileagedistance are in nautical
miles.
3. tlISSIONDESCRIPTION
TheApollo II mission accomplishedthe basic mission of the Apollo Program,that
is, to land two menon the lunar surfaceand return themsafely to earth. As a part of
this first lunar landing, three basic experimentpackagesweredeployed,lunar material
sampleswerecollected, andsurface photographsweretaken. Twoof the experimentswere
a part of the early Apollo scientific experimentpackagethat wasdevelopedfor deploy-
menton the lunar surface. Thesequenceof eventsandthe flight plan of the Apollo II
mission are shownin table 3-I andfigure 3-I, respectively.
TheApollo II spacevehicle waslaunchedonJuly 16, 1969,at 8:32 a.m.e.s.t., as
planned. Thespacecraft andthe S-IVBwereinserted into a 100.7- by 99.2-mile earth
parking orbit. After a 2-1/2-hour checkoutperiod, the spacecraft/S-IVBcombinationwas
injected into the translunar phaseof the mission. Trajectory parametersafter the
translunar injection firing werenearly perfect, with the velocity within 1.6 ft/sec of
that planned. Onlyoneof the four options for midcoursecorrections during the trans-
lunar phasewasexercised. This correction, whichwasmadewith the service propulsion
systemat approximately26-I/2 hours, provideda 20.9-ft/sec velocity change. During
the remainingperiods of free-attitude flight, passivethermal control wasusedto
maintain spacecraft temperatureswithin desired limits. TheCommanderandLunarModule
Pilot transferred to the lunar moduleduring the translunar phaseto makean initial
inspection and to prepare the lunar modulefor a systemscheckin lunar orbit.
Thespacecraft wasinserted into a 60- by 169.7-mile lunar orbit at approximately
76hours. Fourhours later, a lunar orbit circularization maneuverwasperformedto
place the spacecraft in a 65.7- by 53.8-mile orbit. 'The Lunar Module Pilot entered the
lunar module at approximately 81 hours for the initial power-up and systems checks.
After the planned sleep period was completed at 93-I/2 hours, the crew donned their
suits, transferred to the lunar module, and made final preparations for descent to the
lunar surface. The lunar module was undocked on time at approximately I00 hours. After
the exterior of the lunar module had been inspected from the command module, a
separation maneuver was performed with the service module reaction control system.
A descent orbit insertion maneuver was performed by the descent propulsion system
at 101-I/2 hours. Trajectory parameters following this maneuver were as planned, and
powered descent initiation was on time at 102-I/2 hours. The descent maneuver lasted
approximately 12 minutes, with engine shutdown occurring almost simultaneously with
touchdown in the Sea of Tranquility. Tile coordinates of the actual landing point were
latitude 0°41'15 '' i_ and longitude 23°26 ' E, compared with the planned landing point of
latitude 0°43'53 '' i_ and longitude 23°38'51 '' E. Tilese coordinates are referenced to
Lunar Map ORG-II-6(IO0), first edition, dated December 1967.
A 2-hour postlanding checkout was completed, followed by a partial power-down of
the spacecraft. A crew rest period was planned to precede the extravehicular activity
for exploration of the lunar surface. However, the crew elected to perform the extra-
vehicular portion of the mission prior to the sleep period because they were not overly
tired and were adjusting easily to the I/6-g environment. After the crew donned their
portable life support systems and completed the required checkouts, the Commander
egressed at approximately 109 hours. Prior to descending the ladder, the Commander de-
ployed an equipment module in the descent stage. The television camera located in the
equipment module operated satisfactorily and provided live television coverage of the
Commander's descent to the lunar surface. The Commander co]lected the contingency lunar
material samples. Approximately 20 minutes later, the Lunar Module Pilot egressed, and
dual exploration of the lunar surface began.
During the exploration period, the television camera was deployed, and the
American flag was raised on the lunar surface. The solar wind experiment also was
deployed for later retrieval. Both crewmen evaluated their mobility on the lunar sur-
face, deployed the passive seismic and laser retroreflector experiments, collected
approximately 47 pounds of lunar material, and obtained photographic documentation of
their activities and the conditions around them. The crewmen reentered the lunar module
after approximately 2 hours 14 minutes of exploration.
After an 8-hour rest period, the crew began preparations for ascent. Lift-off from
the lunar surface occurred on time at 124:22:00.8. The spacecraft was inserted into a
48.0- by 9.4-mile orbit, from which a rendezvous sequence similar to that for the
previous mission was successfully performed.
Approximately 4-I/2 hours after lunar module ascent, the command and service mod-
ules completed a docking maneuver. The ascent stage was jettisoned in lunar orbit,
and the command and service modules were prepared for transearth injection at
135-I/2 hours.
The activities during transearth coast were similar to those during translunar
flight. The service module was separated from the command module 15 minutes before
reaching the entry interface altitude of 400 000 feet. After an automatic entry se-
quence and landing system deployment, the command module landed in the Pacific Ocean
at 195-I/2 hours. The postlanding procedures that involved the primary recovery ship
U.S.S. Hornet included precautions to avoid back-contamination by any lunar organisms,
and the crew and samples were placed in quarantine.
After reaching the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, the spacecraft, crew, and samples
entered the Lunar Receiving Laboratory quarantine area for continuation of the post-
landing observation and analyses. No evidence of abnormal medical reactions was ob-
served, and the crew and spacecraft were released from quarantine on August lO, 1969.
TABLE 3-[.- SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event Time,
hr:min:sec
Range zero - 13:32:00 G.m.t., July 16, 1969
Lift-off
S-IC outboard engine cut-off
S-II engine ignition (command)
Launch escape tower jettison
S-II engine cut-off
S-IVB engine ignition (command)
S-IVB engine cut-off
Translunar injection maneuver
Command and service module/S-IVB separation
00:00:00.6
00:02:41.7
00:02:43.0
00:03:17.9
00:09:08.3
00:09:12.2
00:II:39.3
a02:44:16.2
03:]7:04.6
First docking
Spacecraft ejection
Separation maneuver (from S-IVB)
First midcourse correction
Lunar orbit insertion
Lunar orbit circularization
Undocking
Separation maneuver (from)unar module)
Descent orbit insertion
Powered descent initiation
Lunar landing
Egress (hatch opening)
Ingress (hatch closing)
Lunar lift-off
Coelliptic sequence initiation
Constant differential height maneuver
Terminal phase initiation
Docking
Ascent stage jettison
Separation maneuver (from ascent stage)
Transearth injection maneuver
Second midcourse correction
Command module/service module separation
Entry interface
Landing
03:24:03.1
04:16:59.1
a04:40:01.8
a26:44:58.6
a75:49:50.4
a80:II:36.8
lO0:12:00
a700:39:52.9
alOl:36:14
ai02:33:05
I02:45:39.9
I09:07:33
III:39:13
a124:22:00.8
a125:19:35
a126:17:49.6
a127:03:51.8
128:03:00
130:09:31.2
a130:30:01
a135:23:42.3
a150:29:57.4
194:49:12.7
195:03:05.7
195:18:35
aEngine ignition time.
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Figure 3-I.- Flight plan activities.
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4. PILOTS' REPORT
Prelaunch Activities
All prelaunch systems operations and checks were completed on time and without dif-
ficulty. The configuration of the environmental control system included operation of the
secondary glycol loop and provided comfortable cockpit temperature conditions.
Launch
Lift-off occurred precisely on time with ignition accompanied by a low rumbling noise
and moderate vibration that increased significantly at the moment of holddown release.
The vibration magnitudes decreased appreciably at the time tower clearance was verified.
The yaw, pitch, and roll guidance-program sequences occurred as expected. No unusual
sounds or vibrations were noted during passage through the region of maximum dynamic
pressure, and the angle of attack remained near zero. The S-IC/S-II staging sequence
occurred smoothly and at the expected time.
The entire S-II stage flight was remarkably smooth and quiet, and the launch escape
tower and boost protective cover were jettisoned normally. The mixture-ratio shift of
the J2 engine in the S-II stage was accompanied by a noticeable acceleration decrease.
The S-II/S-IVB staging sequence occurred smoothly and approximately at the predicted
time. The S-IVB insertion trajectory was completed without incident, and the automatic
guidance shutdown yielded an insertion-orbit ephemeris, from the command module com-
puter, of 102.1 by 103.9 miles. Communications between the crewmembers and the Manned
Space Flight Network were excellent throughout all launch stages.
Earth Orbit Coast and Translunar Injection
The insertion checklist was completed, and a series of spacecraft systems checks
disclosed no abnormalities. All tests of the navigation equipment, including alinements
and drift checks, were satisfactory. The service module reaction control thrusters were
fired in the minimum-impulse mode and were verified by telemetry.
No abnormalities were noted during preparation for translunar injection. Initiation
of translunar injection was accompanied by the proper onboard indications, and the S-IVB
propellant tanks were repressurized on schedule.
The S-IVB stage reignited on time at 2:44:16 without ignition or guidance transients.
An apparent 0.5 ° to 1.5 ° pitch-attitude error on the attitude indicators was not con-
firmed by the command module computer, which indicated that the attitude and the attitude
rate duplicated the reference trajectory precisely. (See "Guidance, flavigation, and Con-
trol" in section 8.) The guided cut-off yielded a velocity very close to that expected,
as indicated by the onboard computer. The entry monitor system further confirmed that
the forward velocity error for the translunar injection maneuver was within 3.3 ft/sec.
Transposition and Docking
The digital autopilot was used for the transposition maneuver scheduled to begin
20 seconds after spacecraft separation from the S-IVB. The time delay was to allow the
command and service modules to drift approximately 70 feet prior to thrusting back toward
the S-IVB. The separation and the beginning of transposition were on time. To assure a
pitchup maneuver for better visibility through the hatch window, pitch axis control was
retained in a manual mode until after a pitchup rate of approximately 1 deg/sec was
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attained. Control wasthen given to the digital autopilot to continue the combined
pitch/roll maneuver.However,the autopilot stoppedpitching up at this point, andit
wasnecessaryto reestablish manualcontrol. (See"Guidance,Navigation, andControl"
in section 8 for morediscussion of the autopilot.) This control cycle wasrepeated
several times before the autopilot continuedthe transposition maneuver. Consequently,
additional time and reaction control fuel (18 poundsabovethe preflight nominal)were
required, andthe spacecraft reacheda maximumseparation distance of at least I00 feet
from the S-IVB.
Thesubsequentclosing maneuversweremadenormally underdigital autopilot control
by using a 2-deg/secrate and0.5° deadbandcontrol mode. Contactwasmadeat an esti-
mated0.I ft/sec, without side velocity, but with a small roll misalinement. Subsequent
tunnel inspection revealeda roll index angleof 2.0° and a contact markon the drogue
4 inches long. Lunarmoduleextraction wasnormal.
TranslunarCoast
TheS-IVBwastargeted to achieve a translunar injection cut-off velocity 6.5 ft/sec
in excess of that required to place the spacecraft on the desired free-return trajectory.
This overspeed was then cancelled by a service propulsion correction of 20 ft/sec at
23 minutes after spacecraft ejection.
Two periods of cislunar midcourse navigation, using the command module computer pro-
gram (P23), were planned and executed. The first determination, at 6 hours, was primar-
ily to establish the apparent horizon altitude for optical marks in the computer. The
first determination was begun at a distance of approximately 30 000 miles; while the
second determination, at 24 hours, was designed to establish the optical bias errors
accurately. Excess time and fuel were expended during the first period because of dif-
ficulty in locating the substellar point of each star. Ground-supplied gimbal angles
were used rather than those from the onboard computer. This technique was devised be-
cause computer solutions are unconstrained about the optics shaft axis; therefore, the
computer is unable to predict if the lunar module structure might block the line of sight
to the star. The ground-supplied angles prevented the lunar module structure from oc-
culting the star, but were not accurate in locating the precise substeilar point, as evi-
denced by the fact that the sextant reticle pattern was not parallel to the horizon.
Additional maneuvers were required to achieve a parallel reticle pattern near the point
of horizon-star superposition.
The second period of navigation measurements was less difficult, largely because
the earth appeared much smaller, and trim maneuvers to the substellar point could be
made much more quickly and economically.
The digital autopilot was used to initiate the passive thermal control mode at a
positive roll rate of 0.3 deg/sec, with the positive longitudinal axis of the spacecraft
pointed toward the ecliptic r;orth Pole during translunar coast. (The ecliptic South Pole
was the direction used during transearth coast.) After the roll rate had been estab-
lished, thruster firing was prevented by turning off all 16 switches for the service
module thrusters. In general, this method was highly successful in that it maintained a
satisfactory spacecraft attitude for long periods of time and allowed the crew to sleep
without fear of either entering gimbal lock or encountering unacceptable thermal con-
ditions. However, a procedural refinement in the form of a new computer routine is re-
quired to make the operation foolproof from an operator's viewpoint. 1 On several occa-
sions and for several different reasons, an incorrect computer-entry procedure was used,
IEditor's note: A new routine (routine 64) was available for Apollo 12.
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resulting in a slight wasteof reaction control propellants. Satisfactory platform
alinements(programP52, option 3) using the optics in the resolvedmodeandmediumspeed
werepossible during rotation at 0.3 deg/sec.
LunarOrbit Insertion
A 6-minuteservice propulsion maneuverwasperformed,andthe spacecraftwasinserted
into a 169.9- by 60.9-mile orbit, as determinedby the onboardcomputer. Procedurally,
this firing wasthe sameas all the other service propulsion maneuvers,except that it
wasstarted by using the bankB propellant valves instead of the bankA valves. The
steering of the dockedspacecraftwasexceptionally smooth,andthe control of the applied
velocity changewasextremelyaccurate, as evidencedby the fact that residuals wereonly
0.I ft/sec in all axes.
Thecircularization maneuverwastargeted for a 66- by 54-mile orbit, a changefrom
the 60-mile circular orbit whichhadbeenexecutedin previous lunar flights. Thefiring
wasnormally accomplishedby using the bankA propellant valves only, andthe onboard
solution of the orbit was66.1 by 54.4 miles. Theellipticity of this orbit wassupposed
to disappearslowly becauseof irregularities in the lunar gravitational field, such that
the commandmodulewouldbe in a 60-mile circular orbit at the time of rendezvous. How-
ever, the onboardestimate of the orbit during the rendezvouswas63.2 by 56.8 miles,
indicating that the ellipticity decayrate wasless than expected. As a result, the
rendezvousmaneuversolutions differed from the preflight estimates.
LunarModuleCheckout
Twoentries weremadeinto the lunar moduleprior to the final activation on the day
of landing. Thefirst entry wasmadeat approximately57hours g.e.t, on the daybefore
lunar orbit insertion. Television andstill cameraswere usedto documentthe hatch
probeand drogueremovalandthe initial entry into the lunar module. Thecommandmodule
oxygenhoseswere usedto provide circulation in the lunar modulecabin. A leisurely
inspection period confirmedthe proper positioning of all circuit breaker andswitch set-
tings andof all stowageitems. All cameraswerecheckedfor proper operation.
DescentPreparation
Lunar module.- The crew was awakened according to the flight plan schedule. The
liquid cooling garments and biomedical harnesses were donned. In anticipation of the
donning, these items had been unstowed and prepositioned the evening before. Following
a hearty breakfast, the Lunar Module Pilot transferred into the lunar module to accomp-
lish initial activation before returning to the command module for suiting. This stag-
gered suiting sequence served to expedite the final checkout and resulted in only two
crewmembers being in the command module during each suiting operation.
The sequence of activities was essentially the same as that developed for Apollo I0,
with only minor refinements. Numerous Manned Space Flight Network simulations and train-
ing sessions, including suited operations of this mission phase, ensured the completion
of this exercise within the allotted time. As in all previous entries into the lunar
module, the repressurization valve produced a loud "bang" when it was positioned to CLOSE
or AUTO and when the cabin regulator was off. Transfer of power from the command module
to the lunar module and then electrical power system activation were completed on
schedule.
The primary glycol loop was activated approximately 30 minutes early, with a slow
but immediate decrease in glycol temperature. The activation continued to progress
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smoothly30 to 40minutesaheadof schedule. With the Commanderentering the lunar mod-
ule early, the LunarModulePilot hadmorethan twice the normally allotted time to don
his pressuresuit in the commandmodule.
Theearly power-upof the lunar modulecomputerand inertial measurementunit enabled
the groundto calculate the fine gyro torquing angles for alining the lunar moduleplat-
form to the commandmoduleplatform before the loss of communicationson the lunar far
side. This early alinementaddedmorethan an hour to the plannedtime available for
analyzing the drift of the lunar moduleguidancesystem.
After suiting, the LunarModulePilot enteredthe lunar module,the drogueandprobe
wereinstalled, andthe hatchwasclosed. During the ascent-battery checkout, the vari-
ations in voltage produceda noticeable pitch andintensity variation in the already loud
noise of the glycol pump. Suit-loop pressure integrity andcabin regulator repressuri-
zation checkswereaccomplishedwithout difficulty. Activation of the abort guidance
systemproducedonly oneminor anomaly. An illuminated portion of oneof the data read-
out numericsfailed, and this failure resulted in someambiguity in data readout. (See
"ElectroluminescentSegmenton Display Inoperative" in section 16.)
Following commandmodulelandmarktracking, the lunar modulewasmaneuveredto ob-
tain steerable antennaacquisition, andstate vectors wereuplinked into the primary
guidancecomputer. Thelanding-geardeploymentwasevidencedby a slight jolt to the
spacecraft. Thereaction control system,the descentpropulsion system,and the rendez-
vousradar systemwereactivated andcheckedout. Requiredpressurization wascon-
firmed both audibly andby instrumentreadout.
Theabort guidancesystemcalibration wasaccomplishedat the preplannedspacecraft
attitude. As the commandandservice modulesmaneuveredboth spacecraft to the undocking
attitude, a final switch andcircuit breakerconfiguration checkwasaccomplished,fol-
lowedby donningof helmetsandgloves.
Commandmodule.-Activities after lunar orbit circularization were routine, with the
time _marily for photographingthe lunar surface. Theactivation of the
lunar modulein preparation for descentwas, from the viewpoint of the CommandModule
Pilot, a well-organized andfairly leisurely period. During the abort guidancesystem
calibration, the commandmodulewasmaintainedat a fixed attitude for several minutes
without firing thrusters. It waseasyto stabilize the spacecraft with minimum-impulse
control prior to the required period; therefore, no thruster firings wereneededfor at
least I0 minutes.
Theprobe, drogue,and hatchall functioned perfectly; andthe operations of closing
out the tunnel, preloading the probe, andcockingthe latches weredoneroutinely. Pre-
vious practice with installation andremovalof the probeanddrogueduring translunar
coast wasmosthelpful.
Twoperiods of orbital navigation (programP22)were scheduledwith the lunar module
attached. Thefirst, at 83 hours, consistedof five markson the Crater Kampin the
FoamingSea. Thetechniqueusedwasto approachthe target area in an inertial attitude
hold mode,with the X-axis being roughly horizontal to the target whenthe spacecraft
reachedanelevation angle of 35° from the target, at whichpoint a pitch-downof approx-
imately 0.3 deg/secwasbegun. This technique,whichwasnecessaryto assurea
2-1/2-minutemarkperiod distributed evenly near the zenith, wasperformedwithout
difficulty.
Thesecondnavigation exercise wasperformedon the following day, shortly prior to
separation from the lunar module. A series of five markswastaken on a small crater on
the inner north wall of crater 130. Thepreviously describedtechniquewasused,except
that two forward-firing thrusters (oneyawandonepitch) wereinhibited to preclude
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thrust impingement on the deployed rendezvous-radar and steerable antennas. The reduced
pitch authority doubled the time required (to approximately 3 seconds when using accel-
eration command) to achieve a O.3-deg/sec pitch-down rate. Because the Command Module
Pilot was in the lower equipment bay, where rate instrumentation is not available, it
was necessary in both cases to achieve the pitch rate by timing the duration of
acceleration-command hand controller inputs.
To prevent the two spacecraft from slipping and hence upsetting the docked lunar
module platform alinement, roll thruster firings were inhibited after the probe preload
until the tunnel had been vented to approximately l psi. Only single roll jet authority
was used after the !-psi point was reached and until the tunnel pressure became zero.
Undocking and Separation
Particular care was exercised in the operation of both spacecraft throughout the
undocking and separation sequences to ensure that the lunar module guidance computer
maintained an accurate knowledge of position and velocity.
The undocking action imparted a velocity of 0.4 ft/sec to the lunar module, as
measured by the lunar module primary guidance system. The abort guidance system dis-
agreed with the primary system by approximately 0.2 ft/sec, which is well within the
preflight limit. The velocity was nulled, since the primary system was assumed to be
correct. The command module undocking velocity was maintained until the desired inspec-
tion distance of 40 feet was reached. At this distance, the command module velocity was
visually nulled with respect to the lunar module.
A visual inspection by the Command Module Pilot during a lunar module 360 ° yaw ma-
neuver confirmed proper landing-gear extension. The lunar module maintained position
with respect to the command module at relative rates believed to be less than O.l ft/sec.
To enter the planned equiperiod separation orbit, the 2.5-ft/sec radially downward sep-
aration maneuver was performed at approximately lOO-I/2 hours with the command and
service modules.
Lunar Module Descent
The first optical alinement of the inertial platfonm, in preparation for descent
orbit insertion, was accomplished shortly after entering darkness and following separa-
tion. The torquing angles were approximately 0.3 ° , indicating either an error in the
docked alinement or platform drift. A rendezvous-radar lock was achieved manually, and
the radar boresight coincided with that of the crew optical sight. Radar range was sub-
stantiated by the vhf ranging in the command module.
Descent orbit insertion.- The descent orbit insertion maneuver was performed with
the descent engine in the manual throttle configuration. Ignition at the minimum-
throttle setting was smooth, with no noise or sensation of acceleration. After 15 sec-
onds, the thrust level was advanced to 40 percent, as planned. Throttle response was
smooth and free of oscillations. The guided cut-off left residuals of less than 1 ft/sec
in each axis. The X- and Z-axis residuals were reduced to zero by using the reaction
control system. The computer-determined ephemeris was 9.I by 57.2 miles, as compared
with the predicted value of 8.5 by 57.2 miles. The abort guidance system confirmed that
the magnitude of the maneuver was correct, An additional evaluation was performed by
using the rendezvous radar to check the relative velocity between the two spacecraft at
6 and 7 minutes subsequent to the maneuver. These velocity values corresponded to the
predicted data within 0.5 ft/sec.
Alinement and navigation checks.- Just prior to powered descent, the angle between
the line'o# sight to the sun and a Selected axis of the inertial platform was compared
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with the onboardcomputerprediction of that angle, andthis comparisonprovideda check
on inertial platform drift. Threesuchmeasurementswereall within the specified tol-
erance, but the 0.08° spreadbetweenthemwassomewhatlarger than expected.
Visual checksof down-rangeandcross-rangeposition indicated that ignition for the
powereddescentfiring wouldoccurat approximatelythe correct location over the lunar
surface. Basedonmeasurementsof the line-of-sight rate of landmarks,the estimatesof
altitudes convergedon a predicted altitude of 52 000feet at ignition. Thesemeasure-
mentswereslightly degradedbecauseof a I0° to 15° yawbias maintainedto improvecom-
municationsmargins.
Powereddescent.- Ignition for powereddescentoccurredon time at the minimum
thrust_e enginewasautomatically advancedto the fixed-throttle point (max-
imumthrust) after 26seconds. Visual position checksindicated the spacecraftwas2 or
3 secondsearly over a knownlandmark,but with little cross-rangeerror. A yawmaneuver
to a faceupposition wasinitiated at an altitude of about45 900feet approximately
4 minutesafter ignition. Thelanding radar beganreceiving altitude data immediately.
Thealtitude difference, as displayed from the radar andthe computer,wasapproximately
2800feet.
At 5 minutes16 secondsafter ignition, the first of a series of computeralarms
indicated a computeroverloadcondition. Thesealarmscontinuedintermittently for more
than 4 minutes, andalthough continuation of the trajectory waspermissible, monitoring
of the computerinformation display wasoccasionally precluded. (See "ComputerAlarms
Di;ring Descent"in section 16.)
Attitude-thruster firings wereheardduring eachmajor attitude maneuverand inter-
mittently at other times. Thrust reduction of the descentpropulsion systemoccurred
nearly on time (plannedat 6 minutes24 secondsafter ignition) andcontributed to the
prediction that the landing wouldprobablybedownrangeof the intendedpoint, inasmuch
as the computerhadnot beencorrected for the observeddown-rangerror.
Thetransfer to the final-approach-phaseprogram(P64)occurredat the predicted
time. After the pitch maneuverandthe radar antennaposition change,the control system
wastransferred from the automaticto the attitude hold mode,andcontrol responsechecked
in pitch and roll. Automaticcontrol was restored after the pitch andyawerrors had
beenreducedto zero.
After it becameclear that an automaticdescentwouldterminate in a boulder field
surroundinga large sharp-rimmedcrater, manualcontrol wasagain assumed,andthe range
wasextendedto avoid the unsatisfactory landing area. Therate-of-descent throttle
control mode(programP66)wasentered in the computerto reducethe altitude rate so as
to maintain sufficient height for landing-site surveillance.
Both the down-rangeandthe cross-rangepositions wereadjusted to permit final
descentin a small, relatively level area boundedby a boulder field to the north and
by sizable craters to the east andsouth. Surfaceobscuration causedby blowingdust
wasapparentat I00 feet andbecameincreasingly severeas the altitude decreased. Al-
thoughvisual determinationof horizontal velocity, attitude, andaltitude rate werede-
graded,cues for thesevariables wereadequatefor landing. Landingconditions are
estimatedto havebeen1 or 2 ft/sec left, 0 ft/sec forward, and1 ft/sec down;no evi-
denceof vehicle instability at landing wasobserved.
CommandModuleSolo Activities
TheCommandModulePilot consolidatedall knowndocumentationrequirementsfor a
single volume,knownas the CommandModulePilot Solo Book,whichwasvery useful and
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took the place of a flight plan, a rendezvousbook, an updatesbook, a contingencyextra-
vehicular checklist, andso forth. Normally, this bookwasanchoredto the CommandMod-
ule Pilot by a clip attachedto the endof his helmettie-downstrap. Thesleep period
wastimed to coincide with that of the lunar modulecrewso that radio silence could be
observed. TheCommandModulePilot hadcompletetrust in the various systemsexperts on
duty in the Mission Control Centerandtherefore wasable to sleep soundly.
Themethodusedfor target acquisition (programP22)while the lunar modulewason
the surface varied considerably from the methodusedwhenthe spacecraftweredocked.
Theoptical alinementsight reticle wasplacedon the horizon image,and the resulting
spacecraft attitude wasmaintainedmanuallyat the orbital rate in the minimum-impulse
control mode. Oncestabilized, the spacecraft maintainedthis attitude long enoughto
allow the CommandModulePilot to moveto the lower equipmentbayand take marks. He
could also movefrom the equipmentbay to the hatchwindowin a few secondsto cross-
checkthe attitude. In general, this methodof operation wassatisfactory.
Despite the fact that the CommandModulePilot hadseveral uninterrupted minutes
eachtime he passedover the lunar module,he could neversee the spacecraft on the sur-
face. Hewasable to scanan area of approximately1 squaremile on eachpass, and
groundestimatesof lunar moduleposition varied by several miles from pass to pass. It
is doubtful that the CommandModulePilot wasever looking precisely at the lunar module;
hemorelikely wasobservingan adjacentarea. Althoughit wasnot possible to assess
the ability to see the lunar modulefrom 60miles, it wasapparentthere wereno flashes
of specular light to attract the CommandModulePilot's attention.
Thevisibility throughthe sextant wasgoodenoughto allow the CommandModulePilot
to acquire the lunar module(in flight) at distancesof morethan I00 miles. However,
the lunar modulewaslost in the sextant field of view just prior to powereddescentini-
tiation (120-mile range) andwasnot regaineduntil after ascent insertion (at an approx-
imate rangeof 250miles), whenit appearedas a blinking light in the night sky.
In general, morethan enoughtime wasavailable to monitor systemsandperformall
necessaryfunctions in a leisurely fashion, exceptduring the rendezvousphase. During
that 3-hour period whenhundredsof computerentries, as well as numerousmarksandother
manualoperations, wererequired, the CommandModulePilot had little time to devoteto
analyzing anyoff-nominal rendezvoustrends as they developedor to copewith anysystems
malfunctions. Fortunately, no additional attention to these details wasrequired.
LunarSurfaceOperations
Postlandin 9 checkout.- The postlanding checklist was completed as planned. Venting
of the descent oxidizer tanks was begun almost immediately. When the oxidizer tank pres-
sure was vented to between 40 and 50 psi, fuel was vented to the same pressure level.
Apparently, the pressure indications received on the ground were somewhat higher, and
they increased with time. (See "High Fuel Interface Pressure after Landing" in sec-
tion 16.) At ground request, the valves were reopened, and the tanks were vented to
15 psi.
Platform alinement and preparation for early lift-off were completed on schedule
without significant problems. The mission timer malfunctioned and displayed an impossi-
ble number that could not be correlated with any specific failure time. After several
unsuccessful attempts to recycle this timer, it was turned off for II hours to cool. The
timer was turned on for ascent, and it operated properly and performed satisfactorily for
the remainder of the mission. (See "Mission Timer Stopped" in section 16.)
Egress preparation.- The crew had given considerable thought to the advantage of
beginning the extravehicular activity as soon as possible after landing instead of
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following the flight plan scheduleandhaving the surface operations betweentwo rest
periods. The initial rest period was planned to allow flexibility in the event of un-
expected difficulty with postlanding activities. These difficulties did not materialize.
The crewmen were not overly tired, and no problem was experienced in adjusting to the
I/6-g environment. Based on these facts, the decision was made at 104:40:00 to proceed
with the extravehicular activity prior to the first rest period.
Preparation for extravehicular activity began at 106:11:00. The estimate of the
preparation time proved to be optimistic. In simulations, 2 hours had been found to be
a reasonable allocation; however, everything had also been laid out in an orderly manner
in the cockpit, and only those items involved in the extravehicular activity were present.
In actual use, checklists, food packets, monoculars, and other items interfered with an
orderly preparation. All these items required some thought as to their possible inter-
ference or use in the extravehicular activity. This interference resulted in exceeding
the time line estimate by a considerable amount. Preparation for egress was conducted
slowly, carefully, and deliberately, and future missions should be planned and conducted
with the same philosophy. The extravehicular activity preparation checklist was adequate
and was followed closely. However, minor items that required a decision in real time or
that had not been considered before flight required more time than anticipated.
An electrical connector on the cable that connects the remote control unit to the
portable life support system gave some trouble in mating. (See "Mating of Remote Control
Unit to Portable Life Support System" in section 16.) This problem had been encountered
occasionally with the same equipment before flight. At least I0 minutes were required
in order to connect each unit, and at one point it was thought the connection would not
be successfully completed.
Considerable difficulty was experienced with voice communications when the extra-
vehicular transceivers were used inside the lunar module. At times, communications be-
tween the ground and the lunar module were good, but at other times they were garbled
for no obvious reason. Outside the vehicle, no appreciable communications problems oc-
curred. Upon ingress from the surface, conmunications difficulties recurred, but under
different conditions. That is, the voice dropouts to the ground were not repeatable in
the same manner.
Depressurization of the lunar module was one aspect of the mission that had never
been completely performed on the ground. In the various altitude chamber tests of the
spacecraft and the extravehicular mobility unit, a complete set of authentic conditions
was never present. The depressurization of the lunar module through the bacteria filter
took much longer than had been anticipated. The indicated cabin pressure did not go
below 0.I psi, and some concern was experienced in opening the forward hatch against this
residual pressure. The hatch appeared to bend on initial opening, and small particles
appeared to be blown out around the hatch when the seal was broken. (See "Slow Cabin
Decompression" in section 16.)
Lunar module egress.- Simulation work in both the water immersion facility and the
I/6-g environment in an airplane was reasonably accurate in preparing the crew for lunar
module egress. Body positioning and arching-the-back techniques were performed in exit-
ing the hatch, and no unexpected problems were experienced. The forward platform was
more than adequate to allow changing the body position from that used in egressing the
hatch to that required for getting on the ladder. The first ladder step was somewhat
difficult to see and required caution and forethought. In general, the hatch, porch,
and ladder operations were not particularly difficult and caused little concern. Oper-
ations on the platform could be performed without losing body balance, and adequate ma-
neuvering room was available.
The initial operation of the lunar equipment conveyor in lowering the camera was
satisfactory, but after the straps had become covered with lunar surface material, a
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problemarose in transporting the equipmentbackinto the lunar module. Dust from this
equipmentfell backonto the lower crewmemberandinto the cabin andseemedto bind the
conveyorso that considerableforce wasrequired in order to operate the conveyor. Al-
ternatives in transporting equipmentinto the lunar modulehad beensuggestedbefore
flight, andalthough noopportunity wasavailable to evaluate these techniques, the al-
ternatives might havebeenan improvementover the conveyor.
Surface exploration.- Work in the I/6-g environment was a pleasant experience. Ad-
aptation to movement was not difficult, and movement seemed to be natural. Certain spe-
cific peculiarities, such as the effect of the mass as compared to the lack of traction,
can be anticipated; but complete familiarization need not be pursued.
The most effective means of walking seemed to be the lope that evolved naturally.
The fact that both feet were occasionally off the ground at the same time, plus the fact
that the feet did not return to the surface as rapidly as on earth, required some antic-
ipation before an attempt to stop. Noticeable resistance was provided by the suit, al-
though movement was not difficult.
On future flights, crewmembers may want to consider kneeling in order to work with
their hands. Getting to and from the kneeling position would be no problem, and being
able to do more work with the hands would increase productive capability.
Photography with the Hasselblad cameras on the remote control unit mounts produced
no problems. The first panorama was taken while the camera was hand-held; however, the
camera was much easier to operate while on the mount. The handle on the camera was ad-
equate, and few pictures were triggered inadvertently.
The solar wind experiment was easily deployed. As with the other operations involv-
ing lunar surface penetration, it was possible to penetrate the lunar surface material
only approximately 4 or 5 inches. The experiment mount was not quite as stable as de-
sired, but it stayed erect.
The television system presented no difficulty except that the cord was continually
in the way. At first, the white cord showed up well, but it soon became covered with
dust and was therefore more difficult to see. The cable had a "set" from being coiled
around the reel, and it would not lie completely flat on the surface. Even when it was
flat, however, a foot could still slide under it, and the Contnander became entangled
several times. (See "Television Cable Retained Coiled Shape" in section 16.)
Collecting the bulk sample required more time than anticipated because the modular-
equipment-stowage-assembly table was in deep shadow, and collecting samples in that area
was far less desirable than taking those in the sunlight. It was also desirable to take
samples as far as possible from the exhaust plume and propellant contamination. An
attempt was made to include a hard rock in each sample, and approximately 20 trips were
required to fill the box. As in simulations, the difficulty of scooping up the material
without throwing it out as the scoop became free created some problem. It was almost
impossible to collect a full scoop of material, and the task required approximately
double the planned time.
Several of the operations would have been easier in sunlight. Although it was pos-
sible to see in the shadows, time had to be allowed for dark adaptation when walking
from the sunlight into the shadow. On future missions, a yaw maneuver just prior to
landing would be advantageous so that the descent stage work area would be in sunlight.
The scientific experiment package was easily deployed manually, and some time was
saved as a result. The package was easy to manage, but finding a level area was diffi-
cult. A good horizon reference was not available, and in the I/6-g environment, physical
cues were not as effective as in a one-g environment. Therefore, the selection of a
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deploymentsite for the experimentscaused some problems. The experiments were placed in
an area between shallow craters in surface material which had the same consistency as the
surrounding area and which was expected to be stable. Considerable effort was required
to change the slope of one of the experiments. It was not possible to lower the equip-
ment by merely forcing it down, and it was necessary to move the experiment back and
forth to scrape away the excess surface material.
No abnormal conditions were noted during the lunar module inspection. The insula-
tion on the secondary struts had been damaged from the heat, but the primary struts were
only singed or covered with soot. There was much less damage than on the examples that
had been seen before flight,
Obtaining the core tube sample presented some difficulty. It was impossible to
force the tube more than 4 or 5 inches into the surface material, yet the material pro-
vided insufficient resistance to hold the extension handle in the upright position. Since
the handle had to be held upright, both hands could not be used on the hammer. In addi-
tion, the resistance of the suit made it difficult to steady the core tube and swing the
hammer with any great force. The hammer actually missed several times. The amount of
force used was sufficient to make dents in the handle, but the core tube could be driven
only to a depth of approximately 6 inches. Extraction offered little or virtually no
resistance. Two samples were taken. Insufficient time remained to take the documented
sample, although as wide a variety of rocks as possible was selected in the remaining
time.
The performance of the extravehicular mobility unit was excellent. Neither crewman
felt any thermal discomfort. The Commander used the minimum cooling mode for most of
the surface operation. The Lunar Module Pilot switched to the maximum diverter valve
position immediately after sublimator startup and operated at maximum position for
42 minutes before switching to the intermediate position. The Lunar Module Pilot's
switch remained in the intermediate position for the duration of the extravehicular ac-
tivity. The thermal effect of shadowed areas in comparison to sunlit areas was not de-
tectable inside the suit.
The crewmen were kept physically cool and comfortable, and the ease of performing
in the ]/6-g enviroment indicated that tasks requiring greater physical exertion may be
undertaken on future flights. The Commander experienced some physical exertion while
transporting the sample return container to the lunar module, but his physical limit had
not been approached.
Lunar module ingress.- Ingress to the lunar module produced no problems. The capa-
bility to do a vertical jump was used to an advantage in making the first step up the
ladder. By doing a deep knee bend, then springing up the ladder, the Commander was able
to guide his feet to the third step. Movements in the I/6-g environment were slow enough
to allow deliberate foot placement after the jump. The ladder was somewhat slippery from
the powdery surface material, but not dangerously so.
As previously stated, mobility on the platform was adequate for developing alternate
methods of transferring equipment from the surface. The hatch opened easily, and the
ingress technique developed before flight was satisfactory. At a point about halfway
through the hatch, a concerted effort to arch the back was required in order to keep the
forward end of the portable life support system low enough to clear the hatch. Little
exertion was associated with transition to a standing position.
Because of the bulk of the extravehicular mobility unit, caution had to be exercised
to avoid bumping into switches, circuit breakers, and other controls while moving around
the cockpit. One circuit breaker was in fact broken as a result of contact (section 16).
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Equipmentjettison wasperformedas planned, andthe time takenbefore flight in
determiningthe items not required for lift-off waswell spent. Considerableweight re-
duction andincrease in spacewasrealized. Discardingthe equipmenthroughthe hatch
wasnot difficult, andonly oneitem remainedon the platform. Thepost-ingress checklist
procedureswereperformedwithout difficulty; the checklist waswell-planned andwasfol-
lowedprecisely.
Lunar rest period.- The rest period was almost completely unsatisfactory. The hel-
mets and gloves were worn to relieve subconscious anxiety about a loss of cabin pressure,
and they presented no problem. But noise, lighting, and a lower-than-desired temperature
were annoying. The suits were uncomfortably cool, even with the waterflow disconnected.
Oxygen flow was finally cut off, and the helmets were removed, but the noise from the
glycol pumps was then loud enough to interrupt sleep. The window shades did not com-
pletely block out light, and the cabin was illuminated by a combination of light passing
through the shades, warning lights, and display lighting. The Commander rested on the
ascent engine cover and was bothered by the light entering through the telescope. The
Lunar Module Pilot estimated that he slept fitfully for perhaps 2 hours, and the Comnander
did not sleep at all, even though body positioning was not a problem. Because of the re-
duced gravity, the positions on the floor and on the engine cover were both quite
comfortable.
Launch Preparation
Alining the platform before lift-off was complicated by the limited number of stars
available. Because of sun and earth interference, only two detents effectively remained
from which to select stars. Accuracy is greater for stars close to the center of the
field, but none were available at this location. A gravity/one-star alinement was suc-
cessfully performed. A manual averaging technique was used to sample five successive
cursor readings and then five spiral readings. The result was then entered into the com-
puter. This technique appeared to be easier than taking and then entering five separate
readings, Torquing angles were close to 0.7 ° in all three axes and indicated that the
platform drifted. 2
After the alinement, the navigation program was entered. It is recommended that
future crews update the abort guidance system with the primary guidance state vector at
this point and then use the abort guidance system to determine the command module loca-
tion. The primary guidance system cannot be used to determine the command module range
and range rate, and the radar will not lock on until the command module is within a
400-mile range. As this range is approached, the abort guidance system provides valid
data,
A cold-fire reaction control system check and an abort guidance system calibration
were performed, and the ascent pad was taken. Approximately 45 minutes prior to lift-
off, another platform alinement was performed. The landing-site alinement option at
ignition was used for lift-off. The torquing angles for this alinement were approxi-
mately 0.09 ° .
In accordance with ground instructions, the rendezvous radar was placed in the an-
tenna SLEW position with the circuit breakers off for ascent to avoid recurrence of the
alarms experienced during a descent.
Both crewmembers had forgotten to watch for the small helium pressure decrease in-
dication that the Apollo I0 crew experienced when the ascent tanks were pressurized, and
2Editor's note: However, platform drift was within specification limits.
25
the crewinitially believed that only one tank hadbeenpressurized. This oversight was
temporary,but it delayedthe crewverification of properpressurization of both tanks.
Ascent
Thepyrotechnic noisesat descentstage separationwere loud, but ascent-engine
ignition was inaudible. Theyawandpitch maneuversweresmooth. Thepitch- androll-
attitude limit cycles wereas expectedandwerenot accompaniedby physiological diffi-
culitieso Boththe primary and the abort guidancesystemsindicated the ascent to be a
duplicate of the plannedtrajectory. Theguidedcut-off yielded residuals of less than
2 ft/sec; and the inplane componentswerenulled to within 0.I ft/sec with the reaction
control system. Throughouthe trajectory, the groundtrack could be visually verified,
although a pitch attitude confirmation by useof the horizon in the overheadwindowwas
difficult becauseof the horizon lighting condition.
Rendezvous
At orbital insertion, the primary guidancesystemshowedan orbit of 47.3 by
9.5 miles, as comparedto the abort guidancesystemsolution of 46.6 by 9.5 miles.
Since radar range-ratedata werenot available, the MannedSpaceFlight Networkquickly
confirmedthat the orbital insertion wassatisfactory.
In the preflight planning, stars hadbeenchosenthat wouldbe in the field of view
andthat wouldrequire a minimumamountof maneuveringto get throughalinementandback
in plane. This maintenanceof a nearly fixed attitude wouldpermit the radar to be
turned on andthe acquisition conditions to be designatedso that marksfor a coelliptic
sequenceinitiation solution wouldbe immediatelyavailable. During the simulations,
these preselectedstars hadnot beencorrectly located relative to the horizon, andtime
andfuel werewastedin first maneuveringto thesestars, then failing to markon them,
andfinally maneuveringto an alternate pair. Evenwith these problems,the alinement
wasfinished approximately28 minutesbefore the coelliptic sequenceinitiation, andit
waspossible to proceedwith radar lock-on.
All four sources for the coelliptic sequence initiation solution agreed to within
0.2 ft/sec, an accuracy that had never been observed before. The Commander elected to
use the primary guidance solution without any out-of-plane thrusting.
The coelliptic sequence initiation maneuver was accomplished by using the plus Z
thrusters, and the radar lock-on was maintained throughout the firing. Continued navi-
gation tracking by both spacecraft indicated a plane-change maneuver of approximately
2.5 ft/sec, but the crew elected to defer this small correction until terminal phase
initiation. The small out-of-plane velocities that existed between the spacecraft orbits
indicated a highly accurate lunar surface alinement. As a result of the higher-than-
expected ellipticity of the command module orbit, backup chart solutions were not possi-
ble for the first two rendezvous maneuvers, and the constant-differential height maneuver
had a higher-than-expected vertical component. The computers in both spacecraft agreed
closely on the maneuver values, and the lunar module primary guidance computer solution
was executed by using the minus X thrusters.
During the coelliptic phase, radar tracking data were inserted into the abort guid-
ance system to obtain an independent intercept guidance solution. The primary guidance
solution was 6-I/2 minutes later than planned. However, the intercept trajectory was
nominal, with only two small midcourse corrections of l.O and 1.5 ft/sec. The line-of-
sight rates were low, and the planned braking schedule was used to reach a station-
keeping position.
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In the process of maneuvering the lunar module to the docking attitude, while at the
same time avoiding direct sunlight in the forward windows, the platform inadvertently
reached gimbal lock. The docking was completed by using the abort guidance system for
attitude control.
Command Module Docking
Predocking activities in the command module were normal in all respects, as was
docking up to the point of probe capture. After the Command Module Pilot ascertained
that a successful capture had occurred, as indicated by "barberpole" indicators, the
CMC-FREE switch position was used and one retract bottle fired. A right yaw excursion
of approximately 15 ° took place immediately for 1 or 2 seconds. The Command Module Pilot
went back to the CMC-AUTO switch position and made hand-controller inputs to reduce the
angle between the two vehicles to zero, At docking, thruster firings occurred unexpect-
edly in the lunar module when the retract mechanism was actuated, and attitude excursions
of up to 15° were observed. The lunar module was manually realined. While this maneuver
was in progress, all 12 docking latches fired, and docking was completed successfully.
(See "Guidance, Navigation, and Control" in section 8.)
Following docking, the tunnel was cleared, and the probe and drogue were stowed in
the lunar module. The items to be transferred to the command module were cleaned by
using a vacuum brush attached to the lunar module suit return hose. The suction was low,
and as a result, the process was rather tedious. The sample return containers and film
magazines were placed in appropriate bags to complete the transfer, and the lunar module
was configured for jettison according to the checklist procedure.
Transearth Injection
The time between docking and transearth injection was more than adequate to clean
all equipment contaminated with lunar surface material and to return it to the command
module for stowage so that the necessary preparations for transearth injection could be
made. The transearth injection maneuver, the last service propulsion engine firing of
the flight, was nominal. The only difference between the transearth maneuver and pre-
vious firings was that without the docked lunar module, the start transient was apparent.
Transearth Coast
During transearth coast, faint spots or scintillations of light were observed within
the command module cabin. These phenomena became apparent after the Commander and the
3
Lunar Module Pilot became dark-adapted and relaxed.
3Editor's note: The source or cause of the light scintillations is as yet unknown.
One explanation involves primary cosmic rays with energies in the range of billions of
electron volts bombarding an object in outer space. The theory assumes that numerous
heavy and high-energy cosmic particles penetrate the command module structure, causing
heavy ionization inside the spacecraft. When liberated electrons recombine with ions,
photons in the visible portion of the spectrum are emitted. If a sufficient number of
photons is emitted, a dark-adapted observer can detect the photons as a small spot or a
streak of light. Two simple laboratory experiments were conducted to substantiate the
theory, but no positive results were obtained in a 5-psi pressure environment because a
high enough energy source was not available to create the radiation at that pressure.
This level of radiation does not present a crew hazard.
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Only onemidcoursecorrection, a reaction control systemfiring of 4.8 ft/sec, was
required during transearth coast. In general, the transearth coast period wascharacter-
ized by a general relaxation on the part of the crew, with plenty of time available to
samplethe excellent variety of food packetsandto take photographsof the shrinking
moonandthe growingearth.
Entry
Because of the presence of thunderstorms in the primary recovery area (1285 miles
down range from the entry interface of 400 000 feet), the targeted landing point was
moved to a range of 1500 miles from the entry interface. This change required the use
of computer program P65 (skip-up control routine) in the computer, in addition to those
programs used for the planned shorter range entry. This change caused the crew some
apprehension because such entries had rarely been practiced in preflight simulations.
However, during the entry, these parameters remained within acceptable limits. The entry
was guided automatically and was nominal in all respects. The first acceleration pulse
reached approximately 6.5g, and the second reached 6.0g.
Recovery
Upon landing, the T8-knot surface wind filled the parachutes and immediately rotated
the command module into the apex down (stable II) flotation position prior to parachute
release. Moderate wave-induced oscillations accelerated the uprighting sequence, which
was completed in less than 8 minutes. No difficulties were encountered in completing the
postlanding checklist.
The biological isolation garments were donned inside the spacecraft. Crew transfer
into the raft was followed by hatch closure and by decontamination of the spacecraft and
crewmembers by means of germicidal scrubdown.
Helicopter pickup was performed as planned, but visibility was substantially de-
graded because of moisture condensation on the biological isolation garment faceplate.
The helicopter transfer to the aircraft carrier was performed as quickly as could be
expected, but the temperature increase inside the suit was uncomfortable. Transfer from
the helicopter into the mobile quarantine facility completed the voyage of Apollo II.
28
5. LUNARDESCENTANDASCENT
DescentTrajectory Logic
The lunar descent trajectory, shown in figure 5-I, began with a descent orbit inser-
tion maneuver targeted to place the spacecraft into a 60- by 8.2-mile orbit with the
pericynthion longitude located approximately 260 miles up range from the landing site.
Powered descent, shown in figure 5-2, was initiated at pericynthion and continued through
landing.
The powered descent trajectory was designed with factors considered such as optimum
propellant usage, navigation uncertainties, landing-radar performance, terrain uncer-
tainties, and crew visibility restrictions. The basic premise during trajectory design
was to maintain near-optimum use of propellant during initial braking and to provide a
standard final approach from which the landing area could be assessed and a desirable
landing location selected. The onboard guidance capability allowed the crew to redesig-
nate the desired landing position in the computer for automatic execution or, if late in
the trajectory, to take over manually and fly the lunar module to the desired point. To
provide these descent characteristics, compatibility between the automatic and manually
controlled trajectories was required, as well as acceptable flying quality under manual
control. Because of guidance dispersions, site-selection uncertainties, visibility
restrictions, and undefined surface irregularities, measures were taken to provide the
crew adequate flexibility in the terminal-approach technique, with the principal limita-
tion being descent propellant quantity.
The major phases of powered descent are the braking phase (which terminates at an
altitude of 7700 feet), the approach or visibility phase (to an altitude of approximately
500 feet), and the final landing phase. Three separate computer programs, one for each
phase, in the primary guidance system execute the desired trajectory such that the vari-
ous position, velocity, acceleration, and visibility constraints are satisfied. These
programs provide an automatic guidance and control capability for the lunar module from
powered descent initiation to landing. The braking phase program (P63) is initiated
approximately 40 minutes before the descent engine ignition and controls the lunar module
until the final approach phase program (P64) is automatically entered to provide proper
trajectory conditions and optimum landing-site visibility.
If desired, during a nominal descent, the crew may select the manual landing phase
program (P66) prior to completion of the final approach phase program (P64). If the
manual landing phase program (P66) is not entered, the automatic landing phase program
(P65) will be entered automatically when the time to go equals 12 seconds (at an altitude
of approximately 150 feet). The automatic landing phase program (P65) initiates an
automatic descent by nulling the horizontal velocity relative to the surface and main-
taining the rate of descent at 3 ft/sec. The manual landing phase program (P66) is
initiated when the crew changes the position of the primary guidance mode control switch
from automatic to attitude-hold and then actuates the rate-of-descent control switch.
Spacecraft attitude changes are then controlled manually by the crew; the descent engine
throttle is under computer control; and the Commander can introduce l-ft/sec increments
into the descent rate by using the rate-of-descent switch.
To assure proper operation of the onboard systems throughout the descent phase,
maximum use was made (both on board and on the ground) of all data, system responses,
and cues, based on the spacecraft position with respect to the designated lunar features.
The two onboard guidance systems provided the crew with a continuous check of selected
navigation parameters. Comparisons were made on the ground between data from each of
the onboard systems and comparable information derived from tracking data. A powered
flight processor was used to simultaneously reduce Doppler tracking data from three or
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moregroundstations and to calculate the required parameters. A filtering technique
wasusedto computecorrections to the Dopplertracking data and thereby define an accu-
rate vehicle state vector. Thegrounddata wereusedas a voting sourcein caseof a
slow divergencebetweenthe two onboardsystems.
Descent orbit insertion
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Figure 5-I.- Lunar module descent orbital events,
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Figure 5-2.- Spacecraft attitudes during powered descent.
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Preparationfor PoweredDescent
Following the first sleep period in lunar orbit, the crewenteredandbeganactiva-
tion of the lunar module. (See"DescentPreparation" in section 4.) A listing of the
significant events for lunar moduledescentis presentedin table 5-I.
Undockingwasaccomplishedon schedulejust prior to acquisition of signal on lunar
revolution 13. After the lunar moduleinspection by the CommandModulePilot, a separa-
tion maneuverwasperformedby the commandandservice modules;20minuteslater, the
rendezvous-radarandvhf ranging outputswerecompared.Thetwo systemsagreedand indi-
cateda 0.7-mile range. Theinertial measurementunit wasalined optically for the first
time, and the resulting gyro torquing angleswerewell within the platform drift criteria
for a satisfactory primary system. Descentorbit insertion wasperformedon time approx-
imately 8 minutesafter MannedSpaceFlight i_etworkloss of signal. Table 5-11
contains the trajectory information on the descentorbit insertion, as reported by the
crewfollowing acquisition of signal on lunar revolution 14. An incorrectly loadedtar-
get vector causeda relatively large Z-axis residual for the abort guidancesystem. With
this exception, the residuals werewell within the three-sigmadispersion (±0.6 ft/sec)
predicted before flight.
Followingdescentorbit insertion, rendezvous-radardata wererecordedby the Lunar
ModulePilot andwereusedto predict that the pericynthion point wouldbe at analtitude
of approximately50000feet. Initial checksusing the landing point designator capa-
bility producedclose agreementby indicating an altitude of 52 000feet, Following
descentorbit insertion, the crewalso reported that a solar sighting performedby using
the alinementtelescopewaswell within the powereddescentinitiation go/no-gocriterion
of 0.25°. Thesolar sighting consisted of acquiring the sun throughthe telescopeand
comparingthe actual gimbalangles to those theoretically required andcomputedby the
onboardcomputerfor this observation. This check is an evenmoreaccurate indication
of platform performanceif the 0,07° bias correction for the telescoperear detent posi-
tion is subtracted from the recordeddata.
Thecomparisonof velocity residuals betweengroundtracking data and the onboard
system,as calculated along the earth-moonline-of-sight, providedan additional check
on the performanceof the primary guidancesystem. A 2-ft/sec residual wasrecordedat
acquisition of signal andprovidedconfidencethat the onboardstate vector wouldhave
altitude anddown-rangevelocity errors of small magnitudeat Poweredescentinitia-
tion. TheDopplerresidual wascomputedby comparingthe velocity measuredalong the
earth-moonline-of-sight by groundtracking with the samevelocity componentcomputedby
the primary system. As the lunar moduleapproachedpoweredescentinitiation, the
Dopplerresidual beganto increase in magnitudeto approximately13 ft/sec. Becausethe
earth-moonline-of-sight vector wasalmostnormalto the velocity vector at this point,
the residual indicated that the primary systemestimateof its state vector wasapproxi-
mately 21 000feet up rangeof the actual state vector. This sameerror wasalso re-
flected in the real-time comparisonsmadeby using the poweredflight processorpreviously
mentioned. Table 5-111is a comparisonof the latitude, longitude, andaltitude between
the best-estimate trajectory state vector at poweredescentinitiation, the operational
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trajectory, and the preflight calculated trajectory. Theonboardstate-vector errors at
powereddescentinitiation resulted from a combinationof the following conditions:
I. Uncoupledthruster firings during the dockedlandmarktracking exercise
2. Unaccounted-forvelocity accruedduring undockingandsubsequentinspection and
station-keeping activity
3. Descentorbit insertion residual
4. Propagatederrors in the lunar potential function
5. Lunarmoduleventing
TABLE5-I.- LUNARDESCENTEVENTIMES
Time, Eventhr:min:sec
102:17:17
102:20:53
102:24:40
102:27:32
102:32:55
I02:32:58
I02:33:05
I02:33:31
I02:36:57
I02:37:51
I02:37:59
I02:38:22
I02:38:45
I02:38:50
I02:38:50
I02:39:02
I02:39:31
I02:41:32
I02:41:37
I02:41:53
I02:42:03
I02:42:18
I02:42:19
I02:42:43
I02:42:58
I02:43:09
I02:43:13
I02:43:20
I02:43:22
I02:44:11
I02:44:21
I02:44:28
I02:44:59
I02:45:03
I02:45:40
102:45:40
Acquisition of data
Landing radar on
Abort guidance alinement to primary guidance
Yaw maneuver to obtain improved communications
Altitude of 50 000 feet
Propellant-settling firing start
Descent engine ignition
Fixed throttle position (crew report)
Faceup yaw maneuver in process
Landing-radar data good
Faceup maneuver complete
1202 alarm (computer determined)
Radar updates enabled
Altitude less than 30 000 feet (inhibit X-axis override)
Velocity less than 2000 ft/sec (start landing-radar velocity update)
1202 alarm
Throttle recovery
Program P64 entered
Landing-radar antenna to position 2
Attitude-hold (handling qualities check)
Automatic guidance
1201 alarm (computer determined)
Landing-radar low scale (less than 2500 feet)
1202 alarm (computer determined)
1202 alarm (computer determined)
Landing-point redesignation
Attitude-hold
Abort guicLance attitude update
Program P66 entered
Landing-radar data not good
Landing-radar data good
Redline low-level sensor light
Landing-radar data not good
Landing-radar data good
Landing
Engine off
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TABLE5-11.- DESCENTORBITINSERTION
MANEUVERRESIDUALS
Axis
Velocity residual, ft/sec
Before trimming After trimming
-0.I
=.4
-,l
0.0
-.4
.0
TABLE 5-111.- POWEREDDESCENT INITIATION STATE VECTORS
Parameter Operational Best-estimate Primary guidance
trajectory trajectory computer
Latitude, deg ....
Longitude, deg ....
Altitude, ft .....
0.9614
39.607
50 000
1.037
39.371
49 376
1.17
39.48
49 955
Powered Descent
The powered descent maneuver began with a 26-second thrusting period at minimum
throttle. Immediately after ignition, S-band communications were interrupted momentarily
but were reestablished when the antenna was switched from the automatic to the slew posi-
tion. The descent maneuver was initiated in a facedown attitude to permit the crew to
make time marks on selected landmarks. A landing point designator sighting on the crater
Maskelyne W was approximately 3 seconds early, confirming the suspected down-range error.
Following the landmark sightings, a yaw maneuver to faceup attitude was initiated at an
indicated altitude of approximately 45 900 feet. The maneuver took longer than expected
because of an incorrect setting of a rate display switch.
Landing-radar lock-on occurred before the end of the yaw maneuver, with the space-
craft rotating at approximately 4 deg/sec. The altitude difference between that calcu-
lated by the onboard computer and that determined by the landing radar was approximately
2800 feet, which agreed with the altitude error suspected from the Doppler residual com-
parison. Radar altitude updates of the onboard computer were enabled at 102:38:45, and
the differences converged within 30 seconds. Velocity updates began automatically
4 seconds after the altitude update was enabled. Two altitude-difference transients
occurred during computer alarms and were apparently associated with incomplete radar data
readout operations. (See "Computer Alarms During Descent" in section 16.)
The reduction in throttle setting was predicted to occur 384 seconds after ignition;
actual throttle reduction occurred at 386 seconds, which indicated nominal performance
of the descent engine.
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Thefirst of five computeralarmsoccurredapproximately5 minutesafter initiation
of the descent. Occurrencesof these alarmsare indicated in table 5-I andare discussed
in "ComputerAlarmsDuringDescent"in section 16. Althoughthe alarmsdid not degrade
the performanceof anyprimary guidanceor control function, they did interfere with an
early assessmentof the landing approachby the crew.
Arrival at high gate (endof braking phase)andthe automaticswitch to the final
approachphaseprogram(P64)occurredat 7129feet at a 125-ft/sec descentrate. These
values are slightly lower than predicted but are within acceptableboundaries. At
approximately5000feet, the Commanderswitchedhis control modefrom automaticto
attitude-hold to checkmanualcontrol in anticipation of the final descent.
After the pitchover at high gate, the landing point designator indicated that the
approachpathwasleading into a large crater. An unplannedredesignationwasintroduced
at this time. To avoid the crater, the Commanderagain switched from automatic to
attitude-hold control and manually increased the flight-path angle by pitching to a
nearly vertical attitude for range extension. Manual control began at an altitude of
approximately 600 feet. Ten seconds later, at approximately 400 feet, the rate-of-
descent mode was activated to control descent velocity. In this manner, the spacecraft
was guided approximately II00 feet down range from the initial aim point.
Figure 5-3 contains histories of altitude compared with altitude rate from the pri-
mary and abort guidance systems and from the Manned Space Flight Network powered flight
processor. The altitude difference existing between the primary system and the Manned
Space Flight Network at powered descent initiation can be observed in figure 5-3. All
three sources are initialized to the primary guidance state vector at powered descent
initiation. However, the primary system is updated by the landing radar, and the abort
guidance system is not. As indicated in figure 5-3, the altitude read-outs from both
systems gradually diverged so as to indicate a lower altitude for the primary system
until the abort system was manually updated with altitude data from the primary system.
The powered flight processor data reflect both the altitude and down-range errors
existing in the primary system at powered descent initiation. The radial velocity error
is directly proportional to the down-range position error such that a lO00-foot down-
range error will cause a l-ft/sec radial velocity error. Therefore, the 20 O00-foot
down-range error existing at powered descent initiation was also reflected as a 20-ft/sec
radial velocity residual. In figure 5-3, this error is apparent in the altitude region
near 27 000 feet, where an error of approximately 20 ft/sec is evident. The primary-
system altitude error in existence at powered descent initiation manifests itself at
touchdown when the powered flight processor indicates a landing altitude below the lunar
surface. Figure 5-4 contains a similar comparison of lateral velocity from the three
sources. Again, the divergence noted in the final phases in the abort guidance system
data was caused by a lack of radar updates.
Figure 5-5 contains a time history of spacecraft pitch attitude recorded by the
primary and abort guidance systems. The scale is set up so that a pitch of 0 ° would
place the X-axis of the spacecraft vertical at the landing site. Two separate designa-
tions of the landing site are evident in the phase after manual takeover. Figure 5-6
contains comparisons for the pitch and roll attitudes and indicates the lateral correc-
tions made in the final phase.
Figure 5-7 is an enlarged photograph of the area adjacent to the lunar landing site
and shows the final portions of tile ground track to landing. Figure 5-8 is an area
photograph, taken from a Lunar Orbiter flight, showing the landing-site ellipse and
the ground track flown to the landing point. Figure 5-9 contains a preliminary attempt to
reconstruct the surface terrain viewed during descent, based upon trajectory and rader
data and upon known surface features. The coordinates of the landing point, as obtained
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from the various real-time and postflight sources,are shownin table 5-1V. As shownin
figure 5-10, the actual landing point waslatitude 0°41'15'' Nand longitude 23°26' E,
comparedwith the targeted landing point of latitude 0°43'53" N andlongitude 23°38'51"E.
In this report, figure 5-10 is the basic referencemapfor the location of the landing
point. As noted: the landing point dispersion wascausedprimarily by errors in the on-
boardstate vector prior to powereddescentinitiation.
Figure 5-11 is a time history of pertinent vehicle control parametersduring the
entire descentphase. Evidenceof fuel slosh wasdetected in the attitude-rate informa-
tion following the yawmaneuver.Theslosh effect increasedto the point wherereaction
control thruster firings wererequired to dampthe rate prior to throttle recovery. The
dynamicbehaviorat this point andthroughthe remainderof the descentwascomparable
to that observedin simulations and indicates nominalcontrol systemperformance.
Approximately95 poundsof reaction control propellant wereusedduring powered
descent, as comparedto the predicted value of 40 pounds. Plots of propellant consump-
tion for the reaction control anddescentpropulsion systemsare shownin figure 5-12.
Thereaction control propellant consumptionwhile in the manualdescentcontrol modewas
51 pounds,approximatelyI-I/2 times greater than that for the automaticmode. This in-
crease in usagerate is attributed to the requirementfor greater attitude andtransla-
tion maneuveringin the final stagesof descent. Thedescentpropulsion system
propellant usagewasgreater than predicted becauseof the additional time required for
the landing-site redesignation.
TABLE 5-1V.- LUNAR LANDING COORDINATES a
Data source for solution Latitude, deg N(b)
Primary guidance onboard vector 0,649
Abort guidance onboard vector .639
Powered flight processor {based on .63]
4-track solution)
Alinement optical telescope .523
Rendezvous radar .636
Best-estimate trajectory acceler- .647
ometer reconstruction
Lunar module target
Photography
.691
.647 or
C0o41,51,,
Radius of
Longitude, deg E landing site 2,
miles
23.46
23.44
23.47
23.42
23.50
23.505
23.72
23.505 or
C23o26,00,,
937.17
937.56
936.74
937.13
937.14
937.05
aFollowing the Apollo I0 mission, a difference was noted (from the landmark track-
ing results) between the trajectory coordinate system and the coordinate system on the
reference map. In order to reference trajectory values to the l:lOO,O00 scale Lunar
Map ORB-II-6 (I00), dated December 1967, correction factors of +2'25" in latitude and
-4'17" in longitude must be applied to the trajectory values.
bAll latitude values are corrected for the estimated out-of-plane position error
at powered descent initiation.
CThese coordinate values are referenced to Lunar Map ORB-II-6 (lO0) and include
the correction factors.
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Figure 5-8,- Areaphotographof landing-site ellipse showinggroundtrack.
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LandingDynamics
The landing on the lunar surface occurred at 102:45:39.9 with negligible forward
velocity, approximately 2.1 ft/sec to the crew's left and 1.7 ft/sec vertically. Fig-
ure 5-13 shows the body-rate transients which indicate that the right and the forward
landing gear touched almost simultaneously, giving the spacecraft a roll-left and a
pitch-up motion. The left-directed lateral velocity resulted in a slight yaw-right tran-
sient at the point of touchdown. These touchdown conditions, obtained from attitude
rates and integration of accelerometer data, were verified qualitatively by the at-rest
positions of the lunar surface sensing probes and by surface buildup around the rims of
the footpads. Figure ll-17 (in section ll) shows the probe boom nearly vertical on the
inboard side of the minus Y footpad, indicating a velocity component in the minus Y di-
rection. Built-up lunar material can be seen outboard of the pad, which also indicates
a lateral velocity in this direction. The probe position and lunar material disturbance
produced by the minus Z gear assembly (fig. ll-17) indicate a lateral velocity in the
minus Y direction. Figure ll-16 (in section ll) shows in greater detail the surface
material disturbance on the minus Y side of the minus Z footpad. The plus Y landing gear
assembly supports the conclusion of a minus Y velocity because the probe was on the out-
board side and material was piled in board of the pad.
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Figure 5-13.- Spacecraft dynamics during lunar touchdown.
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Thecrewreported no sensationof rockup(postcontact instability) during the touch-
downphase. A postflight simulation of the landing dynamicsindicates that the maximum
rockupanglewasonly approximately2° , which is indicative of a stable landing. In the
simulation, the maximum footpad penetration was 2.5 to 3.5 inches, with an associated
vehicle slideout (skidding) of 1 to 3 inches. The landing gear struts stroked less than
1 inch, which represents about I0 percent of the energy absorption capability of the low-
level primary-strut honeycomb cartridge. Examination of photographs indicates agreement
with this analytical conclusion.
Postlanding Spacecraft Operations
Immediately after landing, the lunar module crew began a simulated launch countdown
in preparation for the possibility of a contingency lift-off. Two problems arose during
this simulated countdown. First, the mission timer had stopped and could not be re-
started; therefore, the event timer was started by using a mark from the ground. Second,
the descent stage fuel-helium heat exchanger froze, apparently with fuel trapped between
the heat exchanger and the valves, causing the pressure in the line to increase. (See
"Mission Timer Stopped" and "High Fuel Interface Pressure After Landing" in section 16
for further discussion of these problems.)
The inertial measurement unit was alined three times during this period by using
each of the three available lunar surface alinement options. The alinements were satis-
factory, and the results provided confidence in the technique. The simulated countdown
was terminated at 104-I/2 hours, and a partial power-down of the lunar module was
initiated.
During the lunar surface stay, the Command Module Pilot made several unsuccessful
attempts to locate the lunar module through the sextant by using sighting coordinates
transmitted from the ground. Estimates of the landing coordinates were obtained from
the lunar module computer, the lunar surface gravity alinement of the platform, and the
limited interpretation of the geological features during descent. Figure 5-14 shows the
areas that were tracked and the times of closest approach that were used for the sight-
ings. The actual landing site, as determined from films taken during the descent, did
not lie near the center of the sextant field of view for any of the coordinates used;
therefore, the ability to acquire the lunar module from a 60-mile orbit can neither be
established nor denied. The Command Module Pilot reported that only one grid square
could be scanned during a single pass.
Because of the unsuccessful attempts to sight the lunar module from the command
module, the decision was made to track the command module from the lunar module by using
the rendezvous radar. The command module was acquired at a 79.9-mile range and a
3236-ft/sec closing rate, and loss of track occurred at 85.3 miles with a receding range-
rate of 3531 ft/sec (fig. 5-15).
The inertial measurement unit was successfully alined two more times prior to lift-
off, once to obtain a drift check and once to establish the proper inertial orientation
for lift-off. The drift check indicated normal system operation, as discussed in "Guid-
ance and Control" in section 9. An abort guidance system alinement was also performed
prior to lift-off; however, a procedural error caused an azimuth misalinement, which
resulted in the out-of-plane velocity error discussed in "Guidance and Control" in
section 9.
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Ascent
Preparationsfor ascentbeganafter the endof the crewrest period at 121hours.
Thecommandmodulestate vector wasupdatedfrom the ground,with coordinatesprovided
for crater 130,a plannedlandmark. This crater wastracked by using the commandmodule
sextant on the revolution prior to lift-off to establish the target orbit plane. During
this revolution, the rendezvousradar wasusedto track the commandmodule,as previously
mentioned,and the lunar surface navigation program(P22)wasexercisedto establish the
location of the lunar modulerelative to the orbit plane. Crewactivities during the
preparation for launchwereconductedas planned,and lift-off occurredon time.
Theascent phasewasinitiated by a lO-secondperiod of vertical rise, whichallowed
the ascent stage to clear the descentstage andsurroundingterrain obstacles safely and
provided for rotation of the spacecraft to the correct launchazimuth. Thepitch-over
maneuverto a 50° attitude with respect to the local vertical began-when the ascent
velocity reached 40 ft/sec. Powered ascent was targeted to place the spacecraft in a
I0- by 45-mile orbit to establish the correct initial conditions for the rendezvous.
Figure 5-16 shows the planned ascent trajectory, as compared with the actual ascent
trajectory.
The crew reported that the ascent was smooth, with normal reaction control thruster
activity. The ascent stage appeared to "wallow" or traverse the attitude deadbands, as
expected. Figure 5-17 contains a time history of selected control system parameters
during the ascent maneuver. A data dropout occurred immediately after lift-off and made
accurate determination of the fire-in-the-hole forces difficult. The body rates recorded
just prior to the data dropout were small (less than 5 deg/sec) but were increasing in
magnitude at the time of the dropout. However, crew reports and associated dynamic
information during the data-loss period do not indicate that any rates exceeded the ex-
pected ranges.
The predominant disturbance torque during ascent was about the pitch axis and
appears to have been caused by thrust vector offset. Figure 5-18 contains an expanded
view of control system parameters during a selected period of the ascent phase. The
digital autopilot was designed to control about axes offset approximately 45 ° from the
spacecraft body axes and normally to fire only plus X thrusters during powered ascent.
Therefore, down-firing thrusters 2 and 3 were used almost exclusively during the early
phases of the ascent and were fired alternately to control the pitch disturbance torque.
These jets induced a roll rate while counteracting the pitch disturbance; therefore, the
accompanying roll motion contributed to the wallowing sensation reported by the crew.
As the maneuver progressed, the center of gravity moved toward the thrust vector, and
the resulting pitch disturbance torque and required thruster activity decreased until
almost no disturbance was present. Near the end of the maneuver, the center of gravity
moved to the opposite side of the thrust vector, and proper thruster activity to correct
for this opposite disturbance torque can be observed in figure 5-17.
The crew reported that the velocity-to-be-gained indication in the abort guidance
system differed 50 to I00 ft/sec from the primary-system indication near the end of the
ascent maneuver. The reason for these differences appears to be unsynchronized data dis-
played from the two systems (section 9).
Table 5-V contains a comparison of insertion conditions between those calculated by
various onboard sources and the planned values. Satisfactory agreement is indicated by
all sources. The powered flight processor was again used and indicated performance well
within the ranges expected for both systems.
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TABLE5-V.- INSERTIONSUMMARY
Source
Primaryguidancea
Abort guidance
Networktracking
Operational trajectory
Reconstructedfrom accelerometers
Actual (best-estimate trajectory)
Target valuesb
Altitude, ft
60 602
60 019
61249
60085
60337
60 30O
60 000
Radial velocity,
ft/sec
33
3O
35
32
33
32
32
Down-rangevelocity,
ft/sec
5537.0
5537.9
5540.7
5536.6
5534.9
5537.0
5534.9
aThefollowing velocity residuals werecalculated by the primary guidance:
X = -2.1 ft/sec, Y = -0.I ft/sec, Z = +1.8 ft/sec. Theorbit resulting after residuals
weretrimmedwasapocynthionaltitude = 47.3 miles and pericynthion altitude = 9.5 miles.
bAlso, cross-rangedisplacementof 1.7 miles wasto be corrected.
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Figure 5-16.- Trajectory parameters for lunar ascent phase.
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Rendezvous
Immediately after ascent insertion, the Commander began a platform alinement by
using the lunar module telescope. During this time, the ground relayed the lunar module
state vector to the command module computer to permit execution of navigation updates by
using the sextant and the vhf ranging system. The lunar module platform alinement took
longer than expected; consequently, the coelliptic sequence initiation program was entered
into the computer approximately 7 minutes later than planned. This delay allowed less
than the nominal 18 radar navigation updates between insertion and the first rendezvous
maneuver. Also, the first range-rate measurement for the backup solution was missed; how-
ever, this loss was not significant because both the lunar module and the command module
guidance systems performed normally. Figure 5-19 shows the ascent and rendezvous trajec-
tories and their relationship in lunar orbit.
Prior to the coelliptic sequence initiation, the lunar module out-of-plane velocity
was computed by the command module to be -l.O ft/sec, a value small enough to be deferred
until terminal phase initiation. The final lunar module solution for coelliptic sequence
initiation was a 51.5-ft/sec maneuver to be performed with the Z-axis reaction control
thrusters, with a planned ignition time of 125:19:34.7.
Following the coelliptic sequence initiation maneuver, the constant differential
height program was called up in both spacecraft. Operation of the guidance systems con-
tinued to be normal, and successful navigation updates were obtained by using the sex-
tant, the vhf ranging system, and the rendezvous radar. The Lunar Module Pilot reported
that the backup range-rate measurement at 36 minutes prior to the constant differential
height maneuver was outside the limits of the backup chart. Postflight trajectory analy-
sis has shown that the off-nominal command module orbit (62 by 56 miles) caused the range-
rate measurement to be approximately 60 ft/sec below nominal at the 36-minute data point.
The command module was near pericynthion and the lunar module was near apocynthion at the
measurement point. These conditions, which decreased the lunar module closure rate to
below the nominal value, are apparent in figure 5-20, a relative motion plot of the two
spacecraft between insertion and the constant differential height maneuver. Figure 5-20
was obtained by forward and backward integration of the last available lunar module state
vector prior to loss of signal following insertion and the final constant differential
height maneuver vector integrated backward to the coelliptic sequence initiation point.
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The dynamic range of the backup charts has been increased for future landing missions.
The constant differential height maneuver was accomplished at the lunar module primary
guidance computer time of 126:17:49.6.
The constant differential height maneuver was performed with a total velocity change
of 19.9 ft/sec. In a nominal coelliptic flight plan with a circular target orbit for the
command module, the velocity change for this maneuver would be zero. However, the ellip-
ticity of the command module orbit required a real-time change in the rendezvous plan
prior to lift-off to include approximately 5 ft/sec (applied retrograde) to compensate
for the change in differential height upon arriving at this maneuver point and approxi-
mately II ft/sec (applied vertically) to rotate the line of apsides to the correct angle.
Actual execution errors in ascent insertion and coelliptic sequence initiation resulted
in an additional velocity change requirement of approximately 8 ft/sec, which yielded the
actual total of 19.9 ft/sec.
Following the constant differential height maneuver, the computers in both space-
craft were configured for terminal phase initiation. Navigation updates were made, and
several computer recycles were performed to obtain an early indication of the maneuver
time. The final computation was initiated 12 minutes prior to the maneuver, as planned.
Ignition had been computed to occur at 127:03:39, or 6 minutes 39 seconds later than
planned.
Soon after the terminal phase initiation maneuver, both spacecraft passed behind
the moon. At the next acquisition, the spacecraft were flying in formation in prepara-
tion for docking. The crew reported that the rendezvous was nominal, with the velocity
change for the first midcourse maneuver less than l ft/sec and for the second approxi-
mately 1.5 ft/sec. The midcourse maneuvers were performed by thrusting the body-axis
components to zero, while the lunar module plus Z axis remained pointed at the command
module. The line-of-sight rates were reported to be small, and the planned braking was
used for the approach to station keeping. The lunar module and command module maneuver
solutions are summarized in tables 5-VI and 5-VII, respectively.
During the docking maneuver, two unexpected events occurred. In the alinement pro-
cedure for docking, the lunar module was maneuvered through the platform gimbal-lock
attitude, and the docking had to be completed by using the abort guidance system for
attitude control. The off-nominal attitude resulted from an added rotation to avoid
sunlight interference in the forward windows. The sun elevation was approximately 20 °
higher than planned because the angle for initiation of the terminal phase was reached
approximately 6 minutes late.
The second unexpected event occurred after docking and consisted of relative vehicle
alinement excursions of as much as 15° following initiation of the retract sequence. The
proper docking sequence consists of (I) initial contact, (2) lunar module plus X thrust-
ing from initial contact to capture latch, (3) switching of the command module control
from the automatic to the manual mode, (4) relative motions to be damped to within ±3° ,
and (5) initiation of retract to achieve hard docking. The Commander detected the rela-
tively low velocity at initial contact and applied plus X thrusting; however, the thrust-
ing was continued until after the misalinement excursion had developed because the
Commander had received no indication of the capture event. The dynamics were complicated
further when the Command Module Pilot also noticed the excursions and reversed the com-
mand module control mode from manual to automatic. At this time, both the lunar module
and the command module were in the minimum-deadband attitude-hold mode, thereby Causing
considerable thruster firing until the lunar module was placed in maximum deadband. The
spacecraft were stabilized by using manual control just prior to achieving a successful
hard dock. The initial observed misalinement excursion is considered to have been caused
by the continued lunar module thrusting following capture because the thrust vector does
not pass through the center of gravity of the command and service modules.
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Therendezvouswassuccessful andwassimilar to that for Apollo I0, with all guid-
anceandcontrol systemsoperating satisfactorily. TheCommandModulePilot reported
that the vhf ranging broke lock approximately25 times following ascent insertion; how-
ever, lock-on wasreestablishedeachtime, andnavigation updatesweresuccessful. The
lunar modulereaction control propellant usagewasnearly nominal.
Orbitof commandandservice
modules(60 mi),
Rendezvous-radartracking
........ Groundtracking
9
10 _ Sun
Earth
Event Time
1 Lift-off 124:22:00.8
2 Lunarmoduleinsertion 124:29:15.7
3 Coellipticsequenceinitiation 125:19:35.0
4 Constantdifferentialheightphase 126:17:49.6
5 Terminal phase initiation 127:0.3:51.8
6 First midcourse correction 127:18:_30.8
7 Second midcourse correction 127:33:30.8
8 Beginning of braking 127:.36:57..3
9 Beginning of station keeping 127:52:05.3
10 Docking 128:03:00.0
Figure 5-19.- Ascent and rendezvous trajectory.
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TABLE 5-V[.- LUNAR MOOULE _At_EUVER SOLUTIONS
, Primary guidance
4aneuven Solution I Ti_,_e, Velocity,
_ hr:min:sec it/see
Coelliptic sequence __ .... _'_'_¢
initiation ! Final I|_ST1g:35.48 ST.5 oostgrade
- 8.1 retrograde
Initial I126:17:46.36 1.B south
Constant differential! J 17.7 up
height -- --
8.1 retrograde
I Final I126:17:46.36 18.2 up
25.2 forward
1j7:03:16.12 1.9 right
Te_linal phase .4 doom
initiationb 25.0 forward
. r,nal I127:03:31.60 2.0right.,dow_
First midcourse ! 0.0 forward
_n ' ' -
correction al !_7,1B.30._ .4 right
.9 down
Second midcourse in 1 ii.7_ _ .. O,l forward
correction iFlnall _ .JJ.J,J,_ 1.2 right
I____] .5 down
asolutiom not obtained.
Abort ouidance
Time, Velocity, Time,
hr:inih:sec ft/sec _ hr:r!imsec
I
i125:Ig:34.70 51.3 posigrade 125:1g:35 I
(a) (a) 126:17:42
127:03:39 23,4 total
(a) (a)
(al {a)
Real-time nominal
Velocity, Time,
it/see !hr:min:$ec
i
52.9 posi_rade 125:19:35
i
126:57:00
127:12:00
127:27:00
5.1 retrograde
II.0 Up
22.4 posigrade
.2 north
11.7 up
to
' Actual
Velocity,
ft/sec
51.6 posi _rade
.7 south
•1 doxm
126:1l:50
127:03:52
[c)
(c)
8.0 retrograde
1,7 south
18.1 up
22.9 posigrade
1.4 north
II,0 up
(c)
(c]
bBody-axis reference frame; all other solutions are for local-vertical reference fra_ne, TO compare the primary guidance solution for terminal phase
initiation with the real-ti_e nominal and actual values, the following c_ponents are equivalent to those listed but with a correction to a local-vertical
reference frame: 22.7 posigrade, 1.5 north, and 10.6 Up.
CData not available because of moon occultation.
TABLE 5-VII.- COMMAND MODULE MANEUVER SOLUTIONS a
Time, Solution,
Maneuver hr:min:sec ft/sec
Coelliptic sequence initiation 125:19:34.70
Constant differential height
Terminal phase initiation
First midcourse correction
Second midcourse correction
126:17:46.00
51.3 retrograde
1.4 south
0 up/down
9.1 posigrade
2.4 north
14.6 down
b127:02:34.50
c127:03:30.8
127:18:30.8
127:33:30.8
22.9 retrograde
1.7 south
ll.9 down
1.3 retrograde
.6 south
.l retrograde
l.O south
.6 down
aAll solutions are in the local-horizontal coordinate frame.
blnitial computed time of ignition using nominal elevation angle of
208.3 ° for terminal phase initiation.
CFinal solution using lunar module time of ignition.
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6. COMMUNICATIONS
Performance of all communications systems (sections 8, 9, I0, and 13) -- including
those of the command module, lunar module, portable life support system, and Manned
Space Flight Network--was generally as expected. This section presents only those
aspects of communications systems performance which were unique to the Apollo II flight.
The performance of these systems was otherwise consistent with that of previous flights.
The S-band communications system provided good-quality voice, as did the vhf link within
its range capability. The performance of command module and lunar module up-data links
was nominal, and real-time and playback telemetry performance was excellent. Color
television pictures of high quality were received from the command module. Good-quality
black-and-white television pictures were received and converted to standard format during
lunar surface operations. Excellent-quality tracking data were obtained for both the
command and the lunar modules. The received up-link and down-link signal powers corre-
sponded to preflight predictions. Communications systems management, including antenna
switching, was generally good.
Two-way phase lock with the command module S-band equipment was maintained by the
Merritt Island, Grand Bahama Island, Bermuda, and U.S.N.S. Vanguard stations through
orbital insertion, except during S-IC/S-II staging, interstage jettison, and station-to-
station handovers. A complete loss of up-link lock and command capability was encountered
between 6 and 6-I/2 minutes after earth lift-off because the operator of the ground
transmitter at the Grand Bahama Island station terminated transmission 30 seconds early.
Full S-band communications capability was restored at the scheduled handover time when
the Bermuda station established two-way phase lock. During the Merritt Island station
coverage of the launch phase, PM and FM receivers were used to demodulate the received
telemetry data. (Normally, only the PM data link is used.) The purpose of this con-
figuration was to provide additional data on the possibility of improving telemetry
coverage, by using the FM receiver, during S-IC/S-II staging and interstage jettison.
There was no loss of data through the FM receiver at staging. On the other hand, the
same event caused a 9-second loss of data at the PM receiver output (fig. 6-I). However,
the loss of data at interstage jettison was approximately the same for both types of
receivers.
Norr,me I II { I Isynchronization .,--.
_,, .... !---- .... ____, .......... , -....
..... ____......... _ _=_. ..... _____.... ,.... ,.....
DO0 O_ Ol O002 CK):03 00:04 00:05 00:06
lime, min:sec
(a) PM telemetry performance.
Figure 6-I.- Communications systems performance (down link) during launch.
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(b) FM telemetry performance.
Figure 6-I.- Concluded.
The television transmission attempted during the first pass over the Goldstone
station was unsuccessful because of a shorted patch cable in the ground station televi-
sion equipment. Also, the tracking coverage during this pass was limited to approxi-
mately 3 minutes by terrain obstructions. All subsequent transmissions provided
high-quality television.
The U.S.N.S. Redstone and Mercury and the Hawaii station provided adequate coverage
of translunar injection. A late handover of the command module and instrument unit up
links from the U.S.N.S. Redstone to the U.S.N.S. Mercury and an early handover of both
up links from the U.S.N.S. Mercury to the Hawaii station were performed because of
command computer problems at the U.S.N.S. Mercury. Approximately 58 seconds of command
module data were lost during these handovers. The loss of data during the handover from
the U.S.N.S. Mercury to the Hawaii station was caused by terrain obstructions.
Communications between the command module and the ground were lost during a portion
of transposition and docking because the crew failed to switch omnidirectional antennas
during the pitch maneuver. Two-way phase lock was regained when the crew acquired the
high-gain antenna in the narrow beamwidth. The telemetry data recorded on board the
spacecraft during this phase were subsequently played back to the ground. Between
3-I/2 and 4 hours, the down-link voice received at the Mission Control Center was
distorted by equipment failures within the Goldstone station.
During the fourth lunar orbit revolution, lunar module communications equipment was
activated for the first time. Good-quality normal and backup down-voice and high- and
low-bit-rate telemetry were received through the 210-foot antenna at Goldstone, Califor-
nia, while the spacecraft was transmitting through an omnidirectional antenna. As
expected, telemetry decommutation frame synchronization could not be maintained in the
high-bit-rate mode by using the 85-foot antenna at Goldstone for reception.
Between acquisition of the lunar module signal at 102:16:30 and the pitch-down
maneuver during powered descent, valid steerable antenna autotrack could not be achieved,
and received up-link and down-link carrier powers were 4 to 6 decibels less than nominal.
Coincidentally, several losses of phase lock were experienced (fig. 6-2). Prior to the
unscheduled yaw maneuver initiated at I02:27:22, the line of sight from the lunar module
steerable antenna to earth was obstructed by a reaction control thruster plume deflector.
(See "Steerable Antenna Acquisition" in section 16.) Therefore, in this attitude, the
antenna was more susceptible to incidental phase and amplitude modulation resulting from
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multipath effects off either the lunar moduleor the. lunar surface. Thesharp losses of
phaselock wereprobablycausedby the buildup of oscillations in the steerable antenna
motionas the frequenciesof the incidental amplitudeandphasemodulationapproached
multiples of the antennaswitching frequency(50 hertz). After the yawmaneuver,auto-
track with the correct steerable antennapointing angleswasnot attempteduntil
102:40:12. Subsequently,valid autotrack wasmaintainedthroughoutlanding.
f_
-w A - Steerable antenna automatic mode
S • Steerable antenna slew Imanual) mode
Unscheduled yaw
i ig]
lili L-.
102:16"-- 102:21 102:26 102:31 102:36
Time, hr:min
--!--.A
Landing
210-ff antenna i
1
85-ft antenna
I
[
i
' 1 × 10 "3 bit error rate telemetry
| 70-percen! word intelligibility
' l
102:41 102:46 102:51
(a) Down-link power.
___L
102:16 102:21
J
i i
102:26 102:31
I ! _ _ Usable voice
_ _ 'l Unu'sable
_ _ voice
102:56 102:41 102:46 102:51
Time, hr:min
(b) Voice performance (210-foot antenna).
Figure 6-2.- Communications systems performance (down link) during final descent.
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(d) Telemetry performance (85-foot antenna).
Figure 6-2.- Concluded.
As shown in figure 6-2, the performance of the down-link voice and telemetry channels
was consistent with the received carrier power. The long periods of loss of PCM synchro-
nization on data received at the 85-foot station distinctly illustrate the advantage of
scheduling the descent maneuver during coverage by a 210-foot antenna.
After landing, the lunar module steerable antenna was switched to the slew (manual)
mode and was used for all communications during the lunar surface stay. Also, the
Manned Space Flight Network was configured to relay voice communications between the
two spacecraft. This configuration provided good-quality voice while the command module
was transmitting through the high-gain antenna. However, the lunar module crewmen
reported that the noise associated with random keying of the voice-operated amplifier
within the Manned Space Flight Network relay configuration was objectionable when the
command module was transmitting through an omnidirectional antenna. This noise was
expected with operation on an omnidirectional antenna, and the use of the two-way voice
relay through the Manned Space Flight Network was discontinued, as planned, after the
noise was reported. During the subsequent extravehicular activity, a one-way voice
relay through the Manned Space Flight Network to the command module was utilized.
Primary coverage of the extravehicular activity was provided by the 210-foot antennas
at Goldstone, California, and Parkes, Australia. Backup coverage was provided by the
85-foot antennas at Goldstone, California, and Honeysuckle Creek, Australia. Voice com-
munications during this period were satisfactory; however, voice-operated-relay operations
caused breakup of the voice received at the Manned Space Flight Network stations. (See
"Network Performance" in section 13 and "Voice Breakup During Extravehicular Activity"
in section 16.) This breakup was primarily associated with the Lunar Module Pilot.
Throughout the lunar surface operation, an echo was heard on the ground 2.6 seconds after
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the up-link transmissionsbecausethe up-link voice wasturned aroundandtransmitted on
the lunar moduleS-banddownlink. (Seethe subsectionof section 16entitled "Echo
During Extravehicular Activity.") TheParkesreceiving station waslargely usedby the
Mission Control Centeras the primary receiving station for real-time television trans-
missions. Thetelemetry decommutationsystemand the PAM-to-PCMconverter maintained
framesynchronizationon the lunar moduletelemetry data andthe portable-life-support-
systemstatus data, respectively, throughoutthe lunar surface activities.
Anevaluation of data recordedby the Honeysucklestation during lunar surface
activities wasaccomplishedto determinewhethera station with an 85-foot antennacould
havesupportedthis missionphasewithout deploymentof the lunar moduleerectable anten-
na. Theresults of the evaluation werecomparedwith those of a similar evaluation
recordedat the Goldstonestation whichusedthe 210-foot antenna. A comparisonof slow-
scan television signals receivedat the two stations showsthat althoughthere wasa
decibel difference in signal-to-noise ratios, there wasno appreciable difference in
picture quality. Thedifferences in down-link voice intelligibility andtelemetry data
quality werenot significant. Thereis no perceptible difference in the quality of
biomedicaldata receivedat the 85- and 210-foot stations. Playbackof portable-life-
support-systemstatus data for the LunarModulePilot showsthat framesynchronization
wasmaintained88and I00 percent of the time for the stations with the 85- and the
210-foot antennas,respectively. Basedon these comparisons,it is believed that the
groundstation with the 85-foot antennacould havesupportedthe lunar surface activities
without deploymentof the erectable antenna,with slightly degradeddata.
Theperformanceof the communicationsystemduring the ascentandrendezvousphases
wasnominalexcept for a 15-secondloss of down-link phaselock at ascentengine ignition
Thedata indicate this loss canbeattributed to rapid phaseperturbations causedby
transmissionthrough the ascentengineplume. During future Apollo missions, a wider
carrier tracking loop bandwidthwill be selected by the MannedSpaceFlight Networksta-
tions prior to poweredascent. This changewill minimizethe possibility of loss of
phaselock becauseof rapid phaseperturbations.
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7. TRAJECTORY
Theanalysis of the trajectory from lift-off to spacecraft/S-IVBseparationwas
basedon Marshall SpaceFlight Center results and Manned Space Flight Network tracking
data. After separation, the actual trajectory information was based on the best-estimate
trajectory generated after the flight from Manned Space Flight Network tracking and telem-
etry data.
The earth and moon models used for the trajectory analysis are described geometri-
cally as follows: <I) The earth model _s a modified seventh-order expansion containing
geodetic and gravitational constants representative of the Fischer ellipsoid, and (2) the
moon model is a spherical harmonic expansion containing the R2 potential function, which
is defined in reference I. Table 7-I defines the trajectory and maneuver parameters.
TABLE 7-I.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS
Parameter Definition
Geodetic latitude
Selenographic latitude
Longitude
A]tirude
Space-fixed velocity
Space-fixed flight-path angle
Space-fixed heading angle
Apogee
Perigee
Apocynthion
Pericynthion
Period
Inclination
Longitude of the ascending
node
Spacecraft position measured north or south from the
the equator of the earth to the local-vertical
vector, deg
Spacecraft position measured north or south from the
true lunar equatorial plane to the IocaT-vertical
vector, deg
Spacecraft position measured east or west from the
prime meridian of the body to the local-vertical
vector, deg
Perpendicular distance from the reference body to
the point of orbit intersect, ft or miles; alti-
tude above the lunar surface is referenced to
landing site 2
Magnitude of the inertial velocity vector refer-
enced to the body-centered, inertial reference
coordinate system, ft/sec
Flight-path angle measured positive upward from the
body-centered, local-horizontal plane to the
inertial velocity vector, deg
Angle of the projection of the inertial velocity
vector onto the local body-centered, horizontal
plane, measured positive eastward from north, deg
Maximum altitude above the oblate earth model, miles
Minimum altitude above the oblate earth model, miles
Maximum altitude above the moon model, referenced
to landing site 2, mites
Minimum altitude above the moon model, referenced to
landing site 2, miles
Time required for spacecraft to complete 360° orbit
rotation, min
Acute angle formed at the intersection of the orbit
plane and the equatorial plane of the reference
body, deg
Longitude where the orbit plane crosses the equa-
torial plane of the reference body from below,
deg
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Launch Phase
The launch trajectory was essentially nominal and was approximately identical to
that of Apollo I0. A maximum dynamic pressure of 735 Ib/ft 2 was experienced. The S-IC
center and outboard engines and the S-IVB engine cut off within 1 second of the planned
times, and the S-II outboard engine cut off 3 seconds early. At S-IVB cut-off, the
altitude was high by 9100 feet, the velocity was low by 6.0 ft/sec, and the flight-path
angle was high by 0.01 °. All of these variations were within the expected dispersions.
Earth Parking Orbit
Earth parking orbit insertion occurred at 0:11:49.3. The parking orbit was per-
turbed by low-level hydrogen venting of the S-IVB stage until 2:34:38, the time of S-IVB
restart preparation.
Translunar Injection
The S-IVB was reignited for the translunar ejection maneuver at 2:44:16.2, or within
1 second of the predicted time, and cut-off occurred at 2:50:03. All parameters were
nominal, as shown in figure 7-I.
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l I I
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Figure 7-I.- Trajectory parameters during translunar injection firing.
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ManeuverAnalysis
Theparametersderived from the best-estimatetrajectory for eachspacecraft maneu-
ver executedduring the translunar, lunar orbit, andtransearth coast phasesare pre-
sentedin table 7-11. Tables 7-111and7-1Vpresent the respective pericynthion and
free-return conditions after eachtranslunar maneuver.Thefree-return results indicate
conditions at entry interface producedby eachmaneuver,assumingno additional orbit
perturbations. Tables7-V and7-VI present the respective maneuversummariesfor the
lunar orbit andthe transearth coast phases.
Translunar injection.- The pericynthion altitude resulting from translunar injection
was 896.3 miles, as compared with the preflight prediction of 718.9 miles. This alti-
tude difference is representative of a 1.6-ft/sec accuracy in the injection maneuver.
The associated free-return conditions show an earth capture of the spacecraft.
Separation and dockinq.- The command and service modules separated from the S-IVB
and successfully completed the transposition and docking sequence. The spacecraft were
ejected from the S-IVB at 3 hours 17 minutes. The effect of the O.7-ft/sec ejection
maneuver was a change in the predicted pericynthion altitude to 827.2 miles. The sepa-
ration maneuver performed by the service propulsion system was executed precisely and on
time. The resulting trajectory conditions indicate a pericynthion altitude reduction to
180.0 miles, as compared to the planned value of 167.7 miles. The difference indicates
a O.24-ft/sec execution error.
Translunar midcourse correction.- The computed midcourse correction for the first
option point was only 17.1 ft/sec. A real-time decision was made, therefore, to delay
the first midcourse correction until the second option point at translunar injection plus
24 hours because of the small increase to only 21.2 ft/sec in the corrective velocity
required. The first and only translunar midcourse correction was initiated on time and
resulted in a pericynthion altitude of 61.5 miles, as compared with the desired value of
60.0 miles. Two other opportunities for midcourse correction were available during the
translunar phase, but the velocity changes required to satisfy planned pericynthion alti-
tude and nodal position targets were well below the levels at which normal lunar orbit
insertion can be retargeted. Therefore, no further translunar midcourse corrections
were required. The translunar trajectory was similar to that of Apollo I0.
Lunar orbit insertion and circularization.- The lunar orbit insertion and circulari-
zation targeting philosophy for Apollo II differed from that of Apollo I0 in two ways.
First, targeting for the landing-site latitude was biased to account for the orbit
plane regression observed in Apollo I0, and second, the circularization maneuver was
targeted for a noncircular orbit of 65.7 by 53.7 miles, as compared with the 60-mile
circular orbit targeted for Apollo I0. A discussion of these considerations is presented
in "Lunar Orbit Targeting" in section 7. The representative ground track of the space-
craft during the lunar orbit phase of the mission is shown in figure 7-2.
The sequence of events for lunar orbit insertion was initiated on time, and the
orbit achieved as 169.7 by 60.0 miles. The firing duration was 4.5 seconds less than
predicted because of higher-than-predicted thrust. (See "Service Propulsion" in sec-
tion 8.)
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Thecircularization maneuverwasinitiated two revolutions later andachievedthe
desired target orbit to within 0.I mile. Thespacecraftwasplaced into a 65.7-by
53.8-mile orbit, with pericynthion at approximately80° W,as planned. TheR2orbit
prediction modelpredicted a spacecraft orbit at 126hours (revolution 13) of 59.9 by
59.3 miles. However,the orbit did not circularize during this period (fig. 7-3). The
effects of the lunar potential weresufficient to causethis prediction to be in error
by approximately2.5 miles. Theactual spacecraft orbit at 126hourswas62.4 by
56.6 miles.
Undockinq and command module separation.- The lunar module was undocked from the
command module during lunar revolution 13 at approximately lO0 hours. The command and
service modules then performed a three-impulse separation sequence, with an actual
firing time of 9 seconds and a velocity change of 2.7 ft/sec. As reported by the crew,
the lunar module trajectory perturbations resulting from undocking and station keeping
were not compensated for in the descent orbit insertion maneuver one-half revolution
later. These errors directly affected the lunar module state-vector accuracy at the
initiation of powered descent.
Lunar module descent.- The descent orbit insertion maneuver was executed at
101.5 hours, and approximately 57 minutes later, the powered descent sequence began.
The detailed trajectory analysis for the lunar module descent phase is presented in
"Descent Trajectory Logic" in section 5. The trajectory parameters and maneuver results
are presented in tables 7-11 and 7-V.
Lunar module ascent and rendezvous.- The lunar module ascent stage lifted off the
lunar surface at 124:22:00.8 after staying on the surface for 21 hours 36.35 minutes.
The lunar orbit insertion and rendezvous sequence were normal. The terminal phase was
completed by 128 hours. The detailed trajectory analysis for ascent and rendezvous is
presented in "Ascent" and "Rendezvous" in section 5. Tables 7-11 and 7-V present the
trajectory parameters and maneuver results for these phases.
Transearth injection.- The transearth injection maneuver was initiated on time and
achieved a velocity change of only 1.2 ft/sec less than planned. This maneuver exceeded
the real-time planned duration by 3.4 seconds because of a slightly lower-than-expected
thrust. (See "Service Propulsion" in section 8.) The transearth injection would not
have achieved acceptable earth entry conditions. The resulting perigee altitude solution
was 69.4 miles, as compared with the nominal value of 20.4 miles.
Transearth midcourse correction.- At the fifth midcourse-correction option point,
the first and only transearth midcourse correction of 4.8 ft/sec was made with the reac-
tion control system, and the trajectory was corrected to the predicted entry flight-path
angle of -6.51 °.
73
TABLE 7-11.- TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS
Event
5-1V8 second ignition
S-IVB second cut-off
Translunar injection
Command module/S-IVB separation
Docking
Spacecraft/S-IVB separation (ejection)
Separation maneuver
Ignition
Cut-off
First mldcourse correction
Ignition
Cut-off
Lunar orbit insertion
Ignition
Cut-off
Lunar orbit clrcularization
Ignition
Cut-off
Undocking
Separation
Ignition
Cut-off
Descent orbit insertion
Ignition
Cut-off
Powered descent initiation
Lunar orbit engine cut-off
Coelliptic sequence initiation
Ignition
Cut-off
Terminal phase initiation
Ignition
Cut-off
Terminal phase finalization
Docking
_scent stage Jettison
Final separation
Ignition
Cut-off
Transearth injection
Ignition
Cut-off
_econd midcourse correction
Ignition
Cut-off
_ommand module/service module
separation
Refer- [
ence
body
Earth
Earth
Earth
Earth
Earth
Earth
Earth
Earth
Earth
Earth
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
MOon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Moon
Hoon
fE Earth l
Earth
arth /
Time,
hr:min:sec
2:44:16.2
2:50:03.2
2:50:13.2
3:17:04.6
3:24:03.1
4:16:59.I
4:40:01.8
4:40:04.7
26:44:58.7 l26:45:01.8
75:49:50.4
75:55:48.0
80:11:36.8
80:II:53.5
I00:12:00.0
I00:39:52.9
lO0:40:Ol.g
I01:36:14.0
101:36:44
102:33:05
124:29:15.7
125:19:35.0
125:20:22.0
127:03:51.8
127:04:14.5
127:46:09.8
128:03:00.0
130:09:31.2
130:30:01.0
130:30:08.1
135:23:42.3
135:26:13.7
Altitude, J
Latitude,degLongitude.deg miles j
l
Transl unar phase
8.03 S 172.55 E 105.8
g.52 N 165.61 W 173.3
g.g8 N 164.84 W 180.6
31.16 N 88.76 W 4 110.9
30.18 N 81.71 14 5 317.6
23.18 N 67.70 W 3 506.5
21.16 N 68.46 W 16 620.8
21.16 N 68.46 W 16 627.3
5.99 N II.16 W 109 475.3
6.00 N II.17 W 109 477.2
Lunar orbit phase
1.57 S 169.58 W 86.7.16 N 167.13 E 60.1
.02 S 170.09 E 61.8
.02 S 169.16 E 61.6
l.II N I16.21 E 62.9
.99 N 31.86 E 62.7
1.05 N J 31.41 E 62.5
1.12 S 140.20 W 56.4
1.16 S I 141.88 W 57.8
4
1.02 N J 39.39 E 6.4
.73 N 12.99 E I0.0
.98 S i 147.12 W 47.4
.91 S 149.57 W 48.4
1.17 S 110.28 iV 44.1
1.17 S 111.46 W 44,0
.80 N 118.61 E 7.6
1.18 N 67.31 E 60.6
I .I0 N 41.85 E 61.6
.08 N 20.19 W 62.7
.19 N 20.58 W 62.7
.16 S 164.02 E 52.4 .
.50 N 154.02 E ; 58.1
Transearth coast phase
13.16 S 3 169 087.2 !
150:30:07.4150:29:57.413.16 S 37_3 W I 169 080.6 1
I
194:49:12.7 35.09 S J 122.54 E I 1 778.3 I
Space-fixed
velocity,
it/see J Space-fixed
flight-path
angl , deg Space-fixed
heading angle,
deg E of N
25 562
35 567
35 546
24 456.8
22 662.5
16 060.8
14 680.0
14 663.0
5 025.0
50ID.D
0.02
6.91
7.37
46.24
44.94
62.01
64.30
64.25
77.05
76.88
57.78
59.93
60.07
95.10
99.57
II0.90
113.73
113.74
120.88
120.87
8 250.0
5 479.0
5 477.3
5 338.3
5 333.8
5 332.7
5 332.2
5 364.9
5 284.9
5 564.9
5 537.9
5 328.I
5 376.6
5 391.5
5 413.2
5 339.7
5 341.5
5 335.9
5 330.I
5 326.9
5 376.0
8 589.0
-9.99
-.20
-.49
.32
.16
-.13
-.16
.I0
-. 06
.03
.28
.11
.og
-.16
-.03
.42
.16
.15
-.06
-. 02
-.03
5.13
-62.80
-66.89
-66.55
-66.77
-89.13
-106.89
-106.90
-75.70
-75.19
-I04.23
-I08.15
-77.98
-76.98
-g3.16
-92.65
-70.45
-87.63
-97.81
-52.86
-52.73
-62.77
-62.60
4 075.0
4 074.0
29 615.5 I -80.34
-80.41
35 26
129.30
129.30
69.27
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(a) 180 ° to 90 ° W.
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Figure 7-2.- Lunar ground track for revolutions 1 and 30.
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CommandModuleEntry
Thebest-estimate trajectory for the commandmoduleduring entry wasobtained from
a digital postflight reconstruction. Theonboardtelemetry recorder was inoperative
during entry, and, becausethe spacecraft experiencedcommunicationsblackout during the
first portion of entry, completetelemetry information wasnot recorded. AnApollo
rangeinstrumentation aircraft receiveda small amountof data soonafter the entry
interface was reachedandagain approximately4 minutesinto the entry. Thesedata,
combinedwith the best-estimate trajectory, producedthe postflight data presentedin
this report. Table 7-VII presentsthe actual conditions at entry interface. The
flight-path angle at entry was 0.03 ° shallower than predicted at the last midcourse
correction, which caused a peak load factor of G.56g that was slightly higher than
planned. The spacecraft landed in the Pacific Ocean at longitude 169.15 ° ',Iand
latitude 13.30 ° _I.
TABLE 7-VII.- ENTRY TRAJECTORY PARAMETERS
Entry interface (400 O00-foot altitude):
Time, hr:min:sec ............................ ]95:03:05.7
Geodetic latitude, deg S ........................ 3.19
Longitude, deg E ............................ 171.96
Altitude, miles ............................. 65.8
Space-fixed velocity, ft/sec ...................... 36 194.4
Space-fixed flight-path angle, deg ................... -6.48
Space-fixed heading angle, deg E of N .................. 50.18
Maximum conditions:
Velocity, ft/sec ............................ 36 277.4
Acceleration, g ............................. 6.51
Drogue deployment:
Time, hr:min:sec ............................ 195:12:06.9
Geodetic latitude, deg S
Recovery ship report ......................... 13.25
Onboard guidance ........................... 13.30
Target ................................ 13.32
Longitude, deg W
Recovery ship report ......................... 169.15
Onboard guidance ........................... 169.15
Target ................................ 16g.15
Service Module Entry
The service module entry was recorded on film by aircraft. This film shows the
service module entering the atmosphere of the earth and disintegrating near the command
module. According to preflight predictions, the service module should have skipped out
of the atmosphere into a highly elliptical orbit. The Apollo II crew observed the serv-
ice module approximately 5 minutes after seParation and indicated that the reaction con-
trol thrusters were firing and that the module was rotating. A more complete discussion
of this anomaly is presented in "Service Module Entry" in section 16.
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Lunar Orbit Targeting
The targeting philosophy for the lunar orbit insertion maneuver differed in two ways
from that of Apollo I0. First, the landing-site latitude targeting was biased in an
attempt to account for the orbit plane regression noted in Apollo I0. During Apollo I0,
the lunar module passed approximately 5 miles south of the landing site on the low-
altitude pass following descent orbit insertion. The Apollo II target bias of -0.37 ° in
latitude was based on the Langley Research Center 13th-degree, 13th-order lunar gravity
model. Of all gravity models investigated, this one came the closest to predicting the
orbit inclination and longitude of ascending node rates observed from Apollo I0 data.
During the lunar landing phase in revolution 14, the lunar module latitude was 0.078 °
north of the desired landing-site latitude. A large part of this error resulted because
the targeted orbit was not achieved at lunar orbit insertion. The difference between
the predicted and actual values was approximately 0.05 ° , which represents the prediction
error from the 13th-degree, 13th-order model over 14 revolutions. However, the amount of
lunar module plane change required during descent was reduced from the 0.337 ° that would
have been required for a landing during Apollo I0 to 0.078 ° in Apollo II by biasing the
lunar orbit insertion targeting. A comparison between Apollo I0 and II latitude target-
ing results is presented in table 7-VIII.
The second change from Apollo I0 targeting was that the circularization maneuver
was targeted for a noncircular orbit of 53.7 by 65.7 miles. The R2 lunar potential model
predicted this orbit would decay to a 60-mile circular orbit at nominal time for rendez-
vous, thereby conserving ascent stage propellants. Although the R2 model is currently
the best for predicting inplane orbital elements, it cannot predict accurately over long
intervals. Figure 7-3 shows tilat the R2 predictions, using the revolution 3 vector,
matched the observed altitudes for approximately 12 revolutions. It should be noted that
the service module reaction-control-system separation maneuver in lunar orbit was taken
into account for both tile circularization targeting and tile R2 prediction. Estimates
show that if the spacecraft had been placed into a nearly circular orbit, as in Apollo I0,
a degenerated orbit of 55.7 by 67.3 miles would have resulted by the time of rendezvous.
The velocity penalty at the constant differential height maneuver for the Apollo I0
approach would have been at least 23 ft/sec, as compared to the actual 8 ft/sec resulting
from the executed circularization targeting scheme. A comparison between Apollo II and
Apollo I0 circularization results is presented in table 7-1X.
TABLE 7-VIII.- LATITUDE TARGETING SUMMARY TABLE 7-1X.- CIRCULARIZATION ALTITUDE TARGETING
Landing-site latitude on the
landing revo]utions, deg
Latitude
Apollo I0
Desired 0.691
Actual .354
Error .337 S
Apollo II
0.691
.769
.078 N
Altitude
At circularization:
Desired
Actual
Error
At rendezvous:
Desired
Actual
Error
1
Orbit altitude, miles
]
Apollo 10
60.0 by 60.0
61.0 by 62.8
1.0 by 2.8
60.0 by 60,0
58.3 by 65.9
-l.9 by 5.9
Apollo II
53,7 by 65.7
54.5 by 66.1
.8 by .4
60.0 by 60.0
56.5 by 62.6
-3.5 by 2.6
8O
7O
65
6o
55
I I
IC rcular zation ISeparation Ascent stage jettison
,
R2 predicted :i
I
0
o
s°6 _ 1'o l's 2% 2's 30
Revolution
Figure 7-3.- Apocynthion-pericynthion history.
Lunar Orbit Navigation
The preflight plan for lunar orbit navigation, based on Apollo 8 and I0 postflight
analyses, was to fit tracking data from two near-side lunar passes with the orbit plane
constrained to the latest one-pass solution. For descent targeting, it was planned to
use the landing-site coordinates determined from landmark sightings during revolution 12
if it appeared that the proper landmark had been tracked. If not, the best-estimate pre-
flight coordinates from Lunar Orbiter data and Apollo I0 sightings were to be used. In
addition, these coordinates were to be adjusted to account for a two-revolution propaga-
tion of radial errors determined in revolutions 3 to I0. The predicted worst-case esti-
mate of navigation accuracy was approximately 3000 feet in both latitude and longitude.
Several unanticipated problems severely affected navigation accuracy. First,
greater inconsistency and larger errors were observed in the one-pass orbit plane esti-
mates than had been observed on any previous mission (fig. 7-4). These errors were the
result of a known deficiency in the R2 lunar potential model. This condition should not
occur on future missions because different lunar inclination angles will be flown.
A second problem, closely related to the first, was that the _._o-revolution propaga-
tion errors for crosstrack, or latitude, errors were extremely inconsistent. The average
propagation error based on five samples at the end of revolution I0 was 2900 feet, but
the uncertainty in tilis estimate was ±9000 feet. Conversely, the propagation errors for
radial and downtrack, or longitude, errors were within expected limits. No adjustment
was made for either latitude or longitude propagation errors because of the large uncer-
tainty in the case of latitude and the small Correction (800 feet) required in the case
of longitude.
The coordinates obtained from the landmark tracking during revolution 12 deviated
from the best preflight estimate of the center of the landing-site ellipse by 0.097 ° N,
0.0147 ° E, and 0.038 mile below. These errors are attributed to the R2 potential model
deficiencies. The large difference in latitude resulted from an error in the spacecraft
state-vector estimate of the orbit plane; these were the data used to generate the
sighting angles. The difference in longitude could also have been caused by an error in
the estimated state vector or by tracking of the wrong landmark.
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Thethird problemarea wasthe large numberof trajectory perturbations in revolu-
tions II to 13 becauseof uncoupledattitude maneuvers,suchas hot-firing tests of the
lunar modulethrusters, undockingimpulse, station-keeping activity, sublimator operation
and possibly tunnel andcabin venting. Thenet effect of these perturbations wasa siz-
able down-rangemiss.
A comparisonof the lunar landing point coordinatesgeneratedfrom various data
sourcesis presentedin table 5-1V. Thedifference, or miss distance, was0.0444° S and
0.2199° E, or approximately4440and 21990feet, respectively. Themiss in latitude was
causedby neglecting the two-revolution orbit planepropagationerror, and the miss in
longitude resulted from the trajectory perturbations during revolutions II to 13.
Thecoordinatesusedfor ascent targeting were the best preflight estimateof
landing-site radius andthe onboard-guidancestimateof latitude and longitude at touch-
down(corrected for initial state-vector errors fromgroundtracking). Theestimated
errors in targeting coordinateswerea radius 1500feet less than desired anda longitude
4400feet to the west.
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Figure 7°4.- Selenographic latitude estimates based on a one-pass solution
using the R2 model.
40
82
8. PERFORMANCEOFTHECOMMANDANDSERVICEMODULES
The performance of the command and service modules is discussed in this section.
The sequential, pyrotechnic, thermal protection, earth landing, power distribution, and
emergency detection systems operated as intended and are not discussed further. Discrep-
ancies and anomalies are generally mentioned in this section, but are discussed in greater
detail in section 16. Descriptive and historical information about the command and ser-
vice modules is given in appendix B.
Structural and Mechanical Systems
At earth lift-off, measured winds, both at the 6D-foot level and in the region of
maximum dynamic pressure, indicated that structural loads were well below the established
limits. During the first stage of flight, accelerations measured in the command module
were nominal and similar to those measured during the Apollo I0 mission. The predicted
and calculated spacecraft loads (I) at lift-off, (2) in the region of maximum dynamic
pressure, (3) at the end of first-stage boost, and (4) during staging are shown in ta-
ble 8-I.
Command module accelerometer data indicate that sustained low-frequency longitudinal
oscillations were limited to O.15g during S-IC boost. Structural loads during S-II and
S-IVB boost, translunar injection, both docking operations, all service propulsion ma-
neuvers, and entry were well within design limits.
As with all other mechanical systems, the docking system performed as required for
both the translunar and the lunar orbit docking events. The information given in ta-
ble 8-II concerning the two docking operations at contact is based upon crew comments.
The probe retract time for both events was between 6 and 8 seconds. During the gas re-
tract phase of the lunar orbit docking, the crew detected a relative yaw misalinement
that was estimated to have been as much as 15° . (See "Rendezvous" in sections 4 and 5
for further discussion of the docking system.) The unexpected vehicle motions were not
precipitated by the docking hardware and did not prevent accomplishment of a successful
hard dock. Computer simulations of the lunar orbit docking event indicate that the ob-
served vehicle misalinements can be caused by lunar module plus X thrusting after the
command module is placed in an attitude-free control mode. (See "Guidance, Navigation,
and Control" in this section.)
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TABLE 8-II.- TRANSLUNAR AND LUNAR ORBIT CONTACT CONDITIONS
Contact conditions Translunar Lunar orbit
docking docking
Axial velocity, ft/sec ....
Lateral velocity, ft/sec
Angular velocity, deg/sec .
Angular alinement, deg ....
Miss distance, in.......
0.I to 0.2
0
0
0
4
0.I
0
0
0
0
Electrical Power
Batteries.- The bus voltages of the entry and pyrotechnic batteries were maintained
at normal levels, and battery charging was nominal. All three entry batteries contained
the cellophane separators; whereas, only battery B used this type of separator for the
Apollo I0 mission. The improved performance of the cellophane separators is evident from
voltage/current data, which show, at a 15-ampere load, that the cellophane-type batteries
maintain an output 1 to 2 volts higher than the Permion-type batteries.
The only departure from expected performance occurred when battery A was placed on
main bus A for the translunar midcourse correction. During this maneuver, the normal
current supplied by each battery is between 4 and 8 amperes, but the current from bat-
tery A was initially 25 amperes and gradually declined to approximately I0 amperes just
prior to removal from the main bus. This occurrence can be explained by consideration of
two conditions: (I) Fuel cell 1 on main bus A had a lower than average skin temperature
(400 ° F), which caused it to deliver less current than usual, and (2) battery A had been
fully charged just prior to the maneuver. Both these conditions combined to result in
the higher-than-usual current delivery by battery A. Performance was normal thereafter.
Ine total battery capacity was maintained continuously above 103 A-h until separation of
the command module from the service module.
Fuel cells.- The fuel cells and radiators performed satisfactorily during the pre-
launch and flight phases. All three fuel cells were activated 68 hours prior to launch,
and after a 3.5-hour conditioning load, they were placed on open-circuit inline heater
operation until 3 hours prior to launch. After that time, the fuel cells provided full
spacecraft power.
During the 195 hours of the mission, the fuel cells supplied approximately 393 kWh
of energy at an average spacecraft current of 68.7 amperes (22.9 amperes per fuel cell)
and an average command module bus voltage of 29.4 volts. The maximum deviation from
equal load sharing between individual fuel cells was an acceptable 4.5 amperes.
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All thermal parameters,including condenserexit temperature,remainedwithin nor-
mal operating rangesandagreedfavorably with predicted flight values. Thecondenser
exit temperatureon fuel cell 2 fluctuated periodically every 3 to 8 minutesthroughout
the flight. This disturbancewassimilar to that notedon all other flights andhas been
shownto haveno effect on fuel cell performance.
CryogenicStorage
Thecryogenicstorage systemsatisfactorily supplied reactants to the fuel cells and
metabolicoxygento the environmentalcontrol system. At launch, the total oxygenquan-
tity was615pounds(79 poundsabovethe minimumredline limit), and the hydrogenquan-
tity was54.1 pounds(I.0 poundabovethe minimumredline limit). Theoverall consumption
from the systemwasnominalduring the flight.
Oneheater in oxygentank 2 wasdiscoveredto be inoperative. Recordsshowthat it
hadfailed betweenthe times of the countdowndemonstrationtest and the actual count-
down,and current measurementsindicate that the elementhadan opencircuit. This anom-
aly is discussedin detail in section 16.
Very-High-FrequencyRanging
Theoperation of the vhf ranging systemwasnominalduring descentand from lunar
lift-off until orbital insertion. Followinginsertion, several tracking dropoutswere
experienced. Thesedropoutsresulted from negative circuit marginswhichwerecausedby
the useof the lunar moduleaft vhf antennainstead of the forward vhf antenna. After
the antennaswere switched, vhf rangingoperation returned to normal. A maximumrange
of 246miles wasmeasured,anda comparisonof the vhf ranging data with rendezvous-radar
data andthe predicted trajectory showedclose agreement.
Instrumentation
Theinstrumentation system-- including the data storage equipment,the central tim-
ing equipment,andthe signal conditioning equipment--supported the mission. Thedata
storage equipmentdid not operateduring entry becausethe circuit breakerwasopen. The
circuit breaker that supplies ac powerto the recorderalso controls operation of theS-bandFMtransmitter. Whenthe television cameraandassociatedmonitor were to be
poweredwithout transmitting to a groundstation, the circuit breakerwasopenedto dis-
able the S-bandFMtransmitter. This breakerwasinadvertently left openafter the last
television transmission.
At approximately5 hours20minutesinto a scheduledcabin oxygenenrichment("Low
OxygenFlowRate" in section 16), the oxygenflow-rate transducer indicated a low oxygen
flow rate. Comparisonof the oxygenmanifold pressure, oxygen-flow-restrictor differen-
tial pressures, andcryogenicoxygenvalues indicated that the flow-rate-transducer out-
put calibration hadshifted downward.To compensatefor the uncertainties associated
with the oxygenflow indications, cabin enrichmentprocedureswereextendedfrom 8 to
9 hours.
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Guidance,Navigation, andControl
Thecommandmoduleguidance,navigation, and control system performance was satis-
factory throughout the mission. Earth launch, earth orbit, and translunar injection mon-
itoring functions were normal except that the crew reported a 1.5 ° pitch deviation from
the expected flight director attitude indicator reading during the translunar injection
maneuver. The procedure was designed for the crew to aline the flight director attitude
indicator/orbit-rate drive electronics assembly at approximately 4 deg/min while the
launch vehicle maintained the local vertical. One error of 0.5 ° is attributed to the
movement of the S-IVB while the flight director attitude indicator and the orbit-rate
drive electronics were being alined. An additional 0.2 ° error resulted from an error in
orbit-rate drive electronics initialization. Furthermore, the reading accuracy of the
flight director attitude indicator is 0.25 ° . An additional source of error for the
Apollo II mission was a late trajectory modification that changed the ignition attitude
by 0.4 ° . The accumulation of errors from these four sources accounts for the error re-
ported by the crew. The present procedure is considered adequate; therefore, no change
is being prepared for later missions.
Transposition and docking_.- Two unexpected indications reported by the crew later
proved to be the normal operation of the respective systems. The 180 ° pitch transposi-
tion maneuver was to be performed automatically under digital autopilot control with a
manually initiated angular rate. The crew reported that each time the digital autopilot
was activated, it stopped the manually induced rate and maintained a constant attitude.
The cause of the apparent discrepancy was procedural; although the digital autopilot was
correctly initialized for the maneuver, in eac.h case, the rotational hand controller was
moved out of detent prior to enabling of the digital autopilot. Normally, when the out-
of-detent signal is received by the computer, the digital autopilot is switched from an
automatic to an attitude-hold function until it {s reenabled. After four attempts, the
maneuver was initiated properly and proceeded according to plan.
The other discrepancy concerned the entry monitor system velocity counter. The crew
reported biasing the counter to -I00 ft/sec prior to separation, thrusting forward until
the counter indicated 100.6, then thrusting aft until the counter indicated 100.5. After
the transposition maneuver, the counter indicated 99.1 rather than the expected 100.5.
The cause of this apparent discrepancy was also procedural. The transposition maneuver
was made at an average angular velocity of 1.75 deg/sec. The entry monitor system is
mounted approximately 12 feet from the center of rotation. The resulting centripetal
acceleration integrated over the time necessary to move 180 ° yields a 1.2-ft/sec velocity
change and accounts for the error observed. The docking maneuver following transposition
was normal, with only small transients.
Inertial reference _stem alinements.- The inertial measurement unit was alined as
shown in table 8-111. Results were normal and comparable to those of previous missions.
Translation maneuvers.- A summary of pertinent parameters for each of the service
propulsion maneuvers is contained in table 8-1V. All maneuvers were as expected, with
very small residuals. Monitoring of these maneuvers by the entry monitor system was
excellent, as shown in table 8-V. The velocity initializing the entry monitor velocity
counter prior to each firing is biased by the velocity expected to be accrued during
thrust tail-off. When in control of a maneuver, the entry monitor issues an engine-off
discrete signal when the velocity counter reaches zero in order to avoid an overburn,
and the bias includes an allowance for the predicted tail-off.
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Tile crewwasconcernedabout the duration of the transearth injection maneuver.
Whenthe firing appearedto be approximately3 secondslonger than anticipated, the crew
issued a manualengine-off command.Further discussion of this problemis containedin
"Service Propulsion" in this section. Thedata indicate that a computerengine-off dis-
crete signal appearedsimultaneouslywith actual engineshutdown. Therefore, the manual
input, which is not instrumented,waseither later than, or simultaneouswith, the auto-
matic command.
Attitude control.- All attitude control functions were performed satisfactorily
throughout the mission. The passive thermal control roll maneuver was used during trans-
lunar and transearth coast.
After entry into lunar orbit and while still in tile docked configuration, the crew
reported a tendency of the spacecraft to position itself along the local vertical with
the lunar module positioned down. This effect was apparently a gravity gradient torque,
which can be as large as 0.86 ft-lb when the longitudinal axis of the vehicle is oriented
45 ° from the local vertical. A thruster duty cycle of once every 15 to 18 seconds would
be consistent with a disturbance torque of this magnitude.
Midcourse navi_.-Midcourse navigation using star/horizon sightings was per-
formed during the translunar and transearth coast phases. The first two groups of sight-
ings, at 43 600 miles and at 126 800 miles, were used to calibrate the height of the
horizon for updating the computer. Although several procedural problems were encountered
during early attempts, the apparent horizon altitude was determined to be 35 kilometers.
Table 8-VI contains a synopsis of the navigation sightings performed.
Landmark tracking.- Landmark tracking was performed in lunar orbit as indicated in
table 8-VII. The objective of the sightings was to eliminate part of the relative uncer-
tainty between the landing site and the command module orbit and thus improve the ac-
curacy of descent targeting. The sightings also provided an independent check on the
overall targeting scheme. The pitch technique provided spacecraft control while the
sextant was in use. The landmark tracking program was also used to point the optics in
several unsuccessful attempts to locate and track the lunar module on the lunar surface.
(See "Postlanding Spacecraft Operations" in section 5.)
Entry_.- The entry was performed under automatic control, as planned. No telemetry
data are available for the period during blackout; however, all indications are that the
system performed as intended.
The onboard calculations for inertial velocity and flight-path angle at the entry
interface, which were 36 195 ft/sec and -6.488 ° , respectively, compare favorably with the
36 194-ft/sec and -6.483 ° calculations determined from tracking. Figure 13-I in sec-
tion 13 shows a summary of landing-point data. The onboard computer indicated a landing
at longitude 169°9 ' W and latitude 13018 ' N, or 1.69 miles from the desired target point.
Because no telemetry nor radar was available during entry, a final evaluation of naviga-
tion accuracy cannot be obtained. However, a simulated best-estimate trajectory shows a
landing point 1.03 miles from the target and confirms the onboard solution. Indications
are that the entry monitor system performed as intended.
Inertial measurement unit performance.- Preflight performance of the inertial com-
ponents is summarized in table 8-VIII. This table also shows the average value of the
accelerometer bias measurements and gyro null bias drift measurements made in flight and
the accompanying updates.
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Thegyro drift compensationupdateswerenot as successful a.sexpected,probablybe-
causeof the changein sign of the compensationvalues. With the changein the torquing
current, a bias difference apparently occurredas a result of residual magnetizationin
the torquer winding. Thedifference wassmall, however,andhadno effect on the mission.
Figure 8-I contains a comparisonof velocity measuredby the inertial measurement
unit with that from the launchvehicle guidancesystemduring earth ascent. Theseve-
locity differences reflect the errors in the inertial componentcompensationvalues. One
set of error terms that wouldcausethesevelocity errors is shownin table 8-1X. The
divergencebetweenthe two systemsis well within the expectedlimits and indicates ex-
cellent performance,although a momentarysaturation of the launchvehicle guidancesys-
temY-axis accelerometercausedan initial 5-ft/sec error betweenthe two systems. The
remainderof the divergencein this axis wascausedprimarily by a misalinementduring
gyrocompassingof the spacecraft guidancesystem. The60-ft/sec o_t-of-plane velocity
error at insertion is equivalent to a misalinementof 0.II°; this is corroboratedby the
Z-axis gyro torquing angle calculated during the initial optical alinementin earth orbit.
Computer.- The computer performed as intended throughout the mission. A number of
alarms occurred, but all were caused by procedural errors or were intended to caution the
respective crewman.
_tics.- The sextant and the scanning telescope performed normally throughout the
mission, After the coelliptic sequence maneuver, the Command Module Pilot reported that,
after selecting the rendezvous tracking program (P20), the optics had to be "zeroed" be-
fore automatic tracking of the lunar module would begin. Data indicate that the optics
mode switch was in the COMPUTER position when the command module was set up for the con-
tingency mirror-image coelliptic sequence maneuver. In this maneuver program, the service
propulsion engine gimbals are trimmed by the computer through the digital-to-analog con-
verter outputs of the optics coupling data units. The same converters are used to drive
the sextant shaft and trunnion when the optics are in COMPUTER mode. The telescope is
mechanically linked to the sextant so that it is operated when the sextant is operated.
To avoid driving the optics with a gimbal drive signal, or vice versa, the computer issues
discrete signals which enable or disable the appropriate output. With the optics drive
disengaged, the trunnion in the sextant was observed (during preflight testing) to drift
toward the positive stop. The drift is caused by an antibacklash spring.
A register in the computer tracks trunnion position but is not large enough to pro-
vide an unambiguous value for the full range of allowable trunnion angles. Therefore,
the register is biased to provide unambiguous readouts for the normally used range of
-I0 ° to +64.7 ° . In this case, the trunnion drifted beyond 64.7 ° , the register overflowed,
and the computer lost track of actual trunnion position. When the automatic optics posi-
tioning routine was entered after selection of the rendezvous tracking program (P20), the
computer drive commands, based on the invalid counter contents, drove the trunnion to the
positive stop. Zeroing the system reestablished synchronization and proper operation.
Entry monitor system.- Operation of the entry monitor system was normal, although
one segment on the electroluminescent numerical display for the velocity counter failed
to operate during the mission. (See "Loss of Electroluminescent Segment in Entry Monitor
System" in section 16.)
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TABLE 8-V,- ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM VELOCITY SUMMARY
L
Maneuver
L
Separation
First midcourse
correction
Lunar orbit
insertion
Lunar orbit
circularization
Transearth
injection
Second midcourse
correction
Total velocity to be
gained along X-axis
minus residual,
ft/sec
19.8
20.9
2917.4
159.3
3283.2
4.7
Velocity set into
entry monitor
system counter,
ft/sec
15.2
16.8
2910.8
153.]
3262.5
4.8
Planned
residual,
ft/sec
-4.6
-4.1
-6.6
-6.2
-20.7
+.l
Actual
residual,
ft/sec
-4.0
-3.8
-6.8
-5.2
-17.9
+.2
Corrected entry
monitor error,
ft/sec
(a)
+0.6
+.3
-.2
+l .0
+2.8
+.I
aA correction factor of 0.2 ft/sec was applied in order to determine the corrected error.
TABLE 8-VI.- MIDCOURSE NAVIGATION
Group
l
Set/marks
I/4
a2/3
3/6
4/3
2 I/3
2/3
3/4
Star
2 Diphda
40 Altair
45 Fomalhaut
2 Diphda
l Alpheratz
Horizon
Earth near
Earth far
Earth near
Earth near
Earth near
Time,
hr:min
6:36
__
8:08
24:20
Distance
from earth,
miles
43 600
126 800
Remarks
The optics calibration was determined
as -0.003°; it was not entered.
Difficulty was encountered in locating
the star because of procedural
problems.
Sightings were misalined up to 50° in
the measurement plane; the misaline-
ment resulted from improper instruc-
tions from the ground.
The optics calibration was zero and
was therefore not entered. The
automaticmaneuver computed on
board did not consider the lunar
module; therefore, difficulty in
locating the first star was en-
countered as the optics were pointed
at the lunar module. The ground-
computed maneuver was used, and the
sightings proceeded satisfactorily.
2 Diphda
45 Fomalhaut
Earth near
Earth far 25:20
aThe first sighting on star 40 was rejected; it had the wrong horizon.
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TABLE 8-VII.- LANDMARK TRACKING
Time, Landmark Number of Optics mode
hr:min:sec identification marks
82:43:00 5 Sextant, manual -- resolved
98:49:00
104:39:00
122:24:00
A1 (altitude
landmark)
130
130
130
Sextant, manual --resolved
Sextant, manual --resolved
Sextant, manual -- resolved
Error
X-axis:
Scale factor error, _pm ......
Bias, cm/sec 2 ...........
Y-axls:
Scale factor error, ppm ......
Bias, cm/sec 2 ...........
Z-axis:
Scale factor error, ppm ......
Bias, cm/sec 2 ...........
X-axls:
Null bias drift, mERU .......
Acceleration drift, spin reference
axis, mERU/g ..........
Acceleration drift, input axis,
mERU/g .............
X-axis:
Null bias drift, mERU .......
Acceleration drift, spin reference
axis, mERU/g ..........
Acceleration drift, input axis,
mERU/g .............
Z-axis:
Null bias drift, mERU .......
Acceleration drift, spin reference
axis, mERU/g ..........
Acceleration drift, input axis,
mERU/g .............
aupdated to +0.08 at 31 hours.
bupdated to +0.02 at 31 hours.
CUpdated to +0.44 at 31 hours.
dUpdated to +0.26 at 31 hours.
eupdated to -0.31 at 31 hours.
TABLE B-VIII.- COMMAND MODULE INERTIAL COMPONENT PREFLIGHT HISTORY
i Ist'°dar01'o'ICouOtdowoIr1'gh,mean devi ati on samples value 1oad
Accelerometers
46 B
.07 9
56 8
.ll 8
50 8
.14 8
Gyroscopes
-1.2 1.7 g 0.4 c-1.8
-5.4 3.8 g -3.3 -6.0
13.7 3.9 9 14.4 15.0
-I .5 1 .I 9 -2.4 d-.6
1.7 2.0 8 1.3 3.0
7.1 5.6 14 g.o 5.0
-.9 1.6 g -2.3 e-.2
8.4 6.6 B 20.4 5.0
.8 6.4 g -4.7 1.0
35
-.23
-27
-.05
-43
.20
50 40
-.25 -.26
-98 -80
.04 a-.13
-I01 -30
.15 b.14
Flight average Flight averagebefore update after update
-0.26 -0.26
+.08 +.08
.00 +.01
+2.4 -1.2
+.7 -1.4
-,6 -0. I
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TABLE 8-1X.- INERTIAL SUBSYSTEM ERRORS DURING LAUNCH
Error term Uncompensated One-s igma
error speci fication
4.2 --Offset velocity, ft/sec ...........
Bias, cm/sec2:
X-axis ..................
Y-axis ...................
Z-axis ..................
Null bias drift, mERU:
X-axis ..................
Y-axis ..................
Z-axis ..................
Acceleration drift, input axis, mERU/g:
X-axis ..................
Y-axis ........ - ..........
Z-axis ..................
Acceleration drift, spin reference axis,
mERU/g:
Y-axis ..................
Acceleration drift, output axis, mERU/g:
X-axis ..................
Y-axis ..................
Z-axis ..................
Uncorrelated platform misalinement about the
X-axis, arc sec ..............
Uncorrelated platform misalinement about the
Y-axis, arc sec ..............
a-.046
a. 150
a.OOl
a2.4
a.7
a_.8
-6.8
2.0
-.7
-8.0
-2.3
.8
-3.0
-13
-26
0.2
2.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
5.0
2to5
2to5
50
50
aAveraged for entire flight.
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56
_ 32
__ 16
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-160
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Figure 8-I.- Velocity comparison between
instrument unit and spacecraft guidance
during ascent.
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Reaction Control
Service module.- Performance of the service module reaction control system was normal
throughout the mission. The total propellant consumed prior to the command module/service
module separation was 560 pounds, 30 pounds less than predicted. During all mission
phases, the system pressures and temperatures remained well within their normal operating
ranges.
At the time the command and service modules separated from the S-IVB, the crew re-
ported that the propellant isolation valve indicators for quad B indicated the "barber-
pole" position. This indication corresponds to at least one primary and one secondary
valve being in the closed position. Twenty to 30 seconds after closure, the crew re-
opened the Valves according to the checklist procedures, and no further problems were
experienced. (See "Indicated Closure of Propellant Isolation Valves" in section 16.)
Command module.- After command module/service module separation, the crew reported
that the minus-yaw engine in system 1 was not responding properly to firing commands
through the automatic coils. Postflight data confirm that this engine produced low, but
detectable, thrust when the automatic coils were activated. Also, the response to direct
coil commands was normal, which indicates that, mechanically, the two valves were opera-
ting properly and that one of the two valves was operating when the automatic coils were
energized. Postflight tests confirmed that an intermittent circuit existed on a terminal
board in the valve electronics. ("Failure of Automatic Coil in One Thruster" in sec-
tion 16 contains a discussion of this anomaly.)
All measured system pressures and temperatures were normal throughout the mission,
and except for the problem with the yaw engine, both systems operated as expected during
entry. Approximately 1 minute after command module/service module separation, system 2
was disabled, and system 1 was used for entry control, as planned. Forty-one pounds of
propellant were used during entry.
Service Propulsion
Service propulsion system performance was satisfactory during each of the five ma-
neuvers, with a total firing time of 531.9 seconds. The actual ignition times and firing
durations are listed in table 8-1V. The longest engine firing was for 357.5 seconds dur-
ing the lunar orbit insertion maneuver. The fourth and fifth service propulsion firings
were preceded by a plus-X reaction control translation to effect propellant settling, and
all firings were conducted under automatic control.
The steady-state performance during all firings was satisfactory. The steady-state
pressure data indicate essentially nominal performance; however, the gaging system data
indicate a mixture ratio of 1.55 rather than the expected ratio of 1.60 to 1.61.
The engine transient performance during all starts and shutdowns was satisfactory.
The chamber pressure overshoot during the start of the spacecraft separation maneuver
from the S-IVB was approximately 120 psia, which corresponds to the upper specification
limit for starts requiring only one bank of propellant valves. On subsequent firings,
the chamber pressure overshoots were all less than 120 psia. During the separation
firing, minor oscillations in the measured chamber pressure were observed, beginning
approximately 1.5 seconds after the initial firing signal. However, the magnitude of
the oscillations was less than 30 psi (peak-to-peak), and by approximately 2.2 seconds
after ignition, the chamber pressure data indicated normal steady-state operation.
95
Theheliumpressurization systemfunctioned normally throughoutthe mission. All
systemtemperaturesweremaintainedwithin their redline limits without heater operation.
Thepropellant utilization andgagingsystemoperatedsatisfactorily throughoutthe
mission. Themodeselection switch for the gagingsystemwasset in the normalposition
for all service propulsion firings; as a result, only the primary systemdata were used.
Thepropellant utilization valve wasin the NORMALposition during the separation and
first midcoursefirings andfor the first 76 secondsof the lunar orbit insertion firing.
At that time, the valve wasmovedto the INCREASE.positionandremainedthere throughthe
first 122secondsof the transearth injection firing. Thevalve position wasmovedto
NORMALfor approximately9 secondsand then to DECREASEfor most of the remainderof the
transearth injection firing.
Figure 8-2 showsthe indicated propellant unbalance,as computedfrom the data. The
indicated unbalancehistory should reflect the unbalancehistory displayed in the cabin,
within the accuracyof the telemetry system. As expected,baseduponprevious flights,
the indicated unbalancefollowing the start of the lunar orbit insertion firing showed
decreasereadings. Theinitial decreasereadingswerecausedprimarily by the oxidizer
level in the sumptank exceedingthe maximumgageableheight. This condition occursbe-
causeoxidizer is transferred from the storage tank to the sumptank as a result of he-
lium absorption from the sumptank ullage. This phenomenon,in combinationwith a known
storage tank oxidizer gagingerror, is knownto causeboth the initial decreasereadings
anda step increase in the unbalanceat crossover. Thecrewmenwerebriefed on these con-
ditions prior to flight and, therefore, expectedboth the initial decreasereadingsanda
step increase of 150to 200poundsat crossover. Whenthe unbalancestarted to increase
(approachzero) prior to crossover, the crew, in anticipation of the increase, properly
interpreted the unbalancemetermovementas an indication of a low mixture ratio and
movedthe propellant utilization valve to the INCREASEposition. As shownin figure 8-2,
the unbalancethen started to decreasein responseto the valve change,andat crossover,
the expectedstep increaseoccurred. At the end of the firing, the crewreported that
the unbalancewasa 50-poundincrease, whichagreeswell with the telemetereddata shown
in figure 8-2. This early recognition of a lower mixture ratio and the movementof the
propellant utilization valve to the INCREASEposition during lunar orbit insertion re-
sulted in a higher-than-predicted averagethrust for the firing and in a duration of
4.5 secondsless than predicted.
Theduration of the firing, as determinedby MissionControl, wasdecreasedto re-
flect the higher thrust level experiencedon the lunar orbit insertion firing. However,
during the transearth injection firing, the propellant utilization valve wascycled from
the NORMALto the DECREASEposition twice. This tran½fer resulted in less than the ex-
pectedthrust andconsequentlyresulted in an overburnof 3.4 secondsbeyondthe recal-
culated transearth injection firing prediction.
Preliminary calculations, whichwerebasedon-the telemeteredgagingdata andthe
predicted effects of propellant utilization valve position, yielded mixture ratios for
the NORMALvalve position of approximately1.55, comparedto an expectedrangeof 1.60
to 1.61. Less-than-expectedmixture ratios werealso experiencedduring the Apollo 9
and I0 missions, andsufficient preflight analysesweremadeprior to the Apollo II mis-
sion to verify that the propellant utilization andgagingsystemwascapableof correcting
for mixture-ratio shifts of the magnitudesexperienced. Thereasonfor the less-than-
expectedmixture ratios during the last three flights is still under investigation.
An abnormaldecayin the secondary(systemB) nitrogen pressurewasobservedduring
the lunar orbit insertion service propulsion firing, which indicated a leak in the system
that operatesthe engineupperbipropellant valve bank. Nofurther leakagewasindicated
during the remainderof the mission. (This anomalyis discussedin greater detail in
"Service PropulsionNitrogenLeak" in section 16.)
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Figure 8-2.- Service propulsion propellant unbalance.
Environmental Control System
The environmental control system performed satisfactorily throughout the mission and
provided a comfortable environment for the crew and adequate thermal control of spacecraft
equipment.
Oxygen distribution.- The cabin pressure stabilized at 4.7 psia prior to translunar
injection and returned to that value after initial lunar module pressurization. However,
two master alarms indicating high oxygen flow occurred during lunar module pressurization
when the oxygen flow rate was decreasing. This condition was also experienced during
ground testing. Postflight analysis has shown that this condition was caused by a mal-
function of the oxygen flow rate transducer. (See "Oxygen Flow Master Alarms" in
section 16.)
Particulate backcontamination control.- The command module oxygen systems were used
for particulate luna{ surface backcontamT-n-ation control from final command module docking
until earth landing. At approximately 128 hours, the oxygen flow rate was adjusted to an
indicated reading of approximately 0.6 Ib/hr to establish a positive differential pressure
between the two spacecraft; this adjustment caused the cabin pressure to increase to about
5.4 psia. The oxygen purge was terminated at 130 hours 9 minutes following the command
module tunnel hatch leak check.
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Thermalcontrol.- The primary coolant system provided adequate thermal control for
crew comfort and for the spacecraft equipment throughout the mission. The secondary
coolant system was activated only during redundant component checks and the earth entry
chilldown. The evaporators were not activated during lunar orbit coast because the
radiators provided adequate temperature control.
At I05 hours 19 minutes, the primary evaporator outlet temperature had dropped to
31.5 ° F. Normally, the temperature is maintained above 42 ° F by the glycol temperature
control valve during cold temperature excursions of the radiator. (This discrepancy is
discussed in "Glycol Temperature Control Valve" in section 16.)
Water manaqement.- Gas in the spacecraft potable water has been a problem on all
manned Apollo flights. On the Apollo II mission, a two-membrane water/gas separator was
installed on both the water gun and the outlet at the food preparation unit. The sep-
arators allow only gas to pass through one membrane into the cabin atmosphere, while the
second membrane passes only gas-free water to the outlet port for crew consumption. The
crew indicated that performance of the separators was satisfactory. Water in the food
bags and from the water pistol was nearly free of gas. Two interface problems were ex-
perienced during use of the separators. There is no positive lock between the water
pistol and the inlet port of the separator; thus, occasionally, the separator would not
remain in place while the water pistol was being used to fill a food bag. Also, the crew
commented that some provision for positively retaining the food bag to the separator out-
let port would be highly desirable. For future spacecraft, a redesign of the separator
will provide positive locking between the water pistol and the inlet port of the separa-
tor. Also, a change has been made in the separator outlet probe to provide an improved
interface with the food bag.
Crew Station
The displays and controls were adequate except that the mission clock in the lower
equipment bay ran slow, by less than I0 seconds over a 24-hour period, as reported by the
crew. The mission clocks have a history of slow operation, which has been attributed to
electromagnetic interference. In addition, the glass face was found to be cracked. This
problem has also been experienced in the past and is caused by stress introduced in the
glass during the assembly process.
The lunar module clock is identical to the command module clock. Because of the
lunar module clock problem discussed in "Mission Timer Stopped" in section 16, an
improved-design timer is being procured and will be incorporated in future command
modules.
Consumables
The predictions for consumables usage improved from mission to mission such that for
the Apollo II mission, all the command and service module consumable quantities were
within I0 percent of the preflight estimates.
Service _ropulsion propellant.- The service propulsion propellant usage was within
5 percent of the preflight estimate for the mission. The deviations which were expe-
rienced have been attributed to the variations in firing times. (See "Service Propulsion"
in this section.) In table 8-X, the loadings were calculated from gaging system readings
and measured densities prior to lift-off.
98
Reaction control pro_ellant.- Reaction control system propellant usage predictions
and flight data agreed to within 5 percent.
Service module: The reaction control system propellant usage for the service module
was higher than expected during transposition and docking and during the initial set of
navigation sightings. This higher usage was balanced by efficient maneuvering of the
command and service modules during the rendezvous sequence, in which the propellant con-
sumption was less than predicted. The usages listed in table 8-XI were calculated from
telemetered helium tank pressure data by using the relationship between pressure, volume,
and temperature.
Command module: The reaction control system propellant usages for the command mod-
ule (shown in table 8-XI) were calculated from pressure, volume, and temperature
relationships.
_.- The oxygen and hydrogen usages were within 5 percent of those predicted.
This deviation was caused by the loss of an oxygen tank heater element and by a reduced
reaction control system heater duty cycle. Usaqes listed in table 8-XII are based on
the electrical power produced by the fuel cells_
Water.- Predictions concerning the amount of water consumed in the command and serv-
ice modules are not generated for each mission because the system has an initial charge
of potable water at lift-off, and additional water is generated in the fuel cells in ex-
cess of the demand. Also, some water is dumped overboard, and some is consumed. The
water quantities loaded, consumed, produced, and expelled during the Apollo II mission
are shown in table 8-XIII.
TABLE 8-X.- S_RVICE PROPULSION PROPELLANT USAGE
Conditions
Loaded:
In tanks
In lines
Total
Consumed
Remaining at command
module/service module
separation
Actual usage, Ib
Fuel
15 633
79
15 712
13 754
1 958
Oxidizer
24 967
124
25 091
21 985
3 106
Total
40 803
35 739
5 064
Preflight
planned
usage, Ib
40 803
36 296
4 5O7
99
TABLE8-Xl.- REACTIONCONTROLSYSTEMPROPELLANTUSAGE
(a) Servicemodule
Condition
Loaded:
QuadA
QuadB
QuadC
QuadD
Total
Consumed
Remainingat command
module/servicemodule
separation
Actual usage,Ib
Fuel
II0
II0
II0
II0
440
191
249
Oxidizer
225
225
225
225
9OO
369
531
Total
1340
560
780
Preflight
planned
usage,Ib
1342
590
752
(b) Commandmodule
Condition
Loaded:
SystemA
SystemB
Total
Consumed:
SystemA
SystemB
Total
Remainingat mainpara-
chute deployment:
SystemA
SystemB
Total
Fuel
44.8
44.4
89.2
Actual usage, Ib
Oxidizer
78.4
78.3
156.7
Total
245.9
15.0
.0
15.0
30.8
44.4
75.2
26.8
.0
26.8
51.6
78.3
]29.9
40.8
205.1
Preflight
planned
usage, Ib
245.0
39.3
2O5.7
lO0
TABLE 8-XII.- CRYOGENICS USAGE
Condition
Available at lift-off:
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Consumed:
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Remaining at command module/
service module separation:
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Hydrogen usage, Ib
Actual
27.3
26.8
54.1
17.5
17.4
34.9
9.8
9.4
19.2
Planned
56.4
m_
36.6
BB
Wl
19.8
Oxygen usage, Ib
Actual
300.5
314.5
615.0
174.0
180.0
354.0
126.5
134.5
261.0
Planned
ml
634.7
_m
371 .I
_w
lw
263.6
TABLE 8-XIII.- WATER USAGE
Condition Quantity, Ib
Loaded:
Potable water tank
Waste water tank
Produced in flight:
Fuel cells
Lithium hydroxide, metabolic
31.7
28
315
Not applicable
Dumped overboard (including urine)
Evaporated prior to command module/service module separation
Remaining at command module/service module separation:
Potable water tank
Water waste tank
325.7
8.7
36.8
43.5
I01
9. PERFORMANCEOFTHELUNARMODULE
A discussion of the lunar modulesystemsperformanceis presentedin this section.
Thesignificant problemsare discussedin detail in section 16. Descriptive andhistori-
cal information about the lunar moduleis presentedin appendixB.
Structural and MechanicalSystems
Nostructural instrumentation wasinstalled on the lunar module;consequently,the
structural performanceevaluation wasbasedon lunar moduleguidanceandcontrol data,
cabin pressuredata, commandmoduleacceleration data, photographs,andanalytical
results.
Basedonmeasuredcommandmoduleaccelerations andon simulations using measured
winddata, the lunar moduleloads are inferred to havebeenwithin structural limits
during the S-IC, S-II, andS-IVBlaunchphasefirings andduring the S-IVBtranslunar
injection maneuvers.Theloads during both dockingswerealso within structural limits.
Commandmoduleaccelerometerdata showminimal structural excitation during the service
propulsion maneuvers,which indicated that the lunar moduleloads werewell within
structural limits.
Thestructural loading environmentduring lunar landing wasevaluated frommotion
picture film, still photographs,postflight landing simulations, and crewcomments.The
motionpicture film from the onboardcamerashowednoevidenceof structural oscillations
during landing, and crewcommentsagreewith this assessment.Flight data from the
uidanceandpropulsion systemswereusedin conductingthe simulations of the landing.See"LandingDynamics"in section 5.) Thesimulations andphotographsindicate that
the landing-gear-strut stroking wasvery small andthat the external loads developed
during landing werewell within designvalues.
ThermalControl
Thelunar moduleinternal temperaturesat the endof the translunar flight were
nominalandwithin 3° F of the launchtemperatures. During the active periods, tempera-
ture responsewasnormal, andall antennatemperatureswerewithin acceptablelimits.
Thecrew inspected the descentstage thermal shielding after the lunar landing and
observedno significant damage.
Electrical Power
Theelectrical powersystemperformedsatisfactorily. Thedc busvoltage was
maintainedabove28.8 volts throughoutthe flight. Themaximumobservedload was
81amperesduring powereddescentinitiation. Both inverters performedas expected.
Theknobon the ascent-engine-armcircuit breakerwasbroken, probably by the aft
edgeof the oxygenpurgesystemhitting the breakerduring preparationsfor extravehic-
ular activity. In anyevent, this circuit breakerwasclosed without difficulty when
required prior to ascent. (See"BrokenCircuit BreakerKnob"in section 16.)
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At staging, the descentbatteries hadsupplied 1055A-h of a nominaltotal capacity
of 1600A-h. Thedifference in load sharing at staging was2 A-h on batteries 1 and 2 and
23 A-h on batteries 3 and4; bothof these values are acceptable.
At lunar modulejettison, the two ascentbatteries haddelivered 336A-h of a nominal
total capacity of 592A-h. Theascentbatteries continuedto supplypowerfor a total
of 680A-h at 28V dc or higher.
CommunicationsEquipment
Theoverall performanceof the S-bandsteerable antennawassatisfactory. However,
somedifficulties wereexperiencedduring descentof the lunar module. Prior to the
scheduled180° yawmaneuver,the signal strength droppedbelowthe tracking level, and
the antennabrokelock several times. After the maneuverwascompleted,newlook angles
wereset, andthe antennaacquired the up-link signal andtracked normally until landing.
Themostprobablecauseof the problemwasa combinationof vehicle blockageandmulti-
path reflections from the lunar surface, as discussedin "Steerable AntennaAcquisition"
in section 16.
During the entire extravehicular activity, the lunar modulerelay providedgood
voice andextravehicular mobility unit data. Occasionalbreakupof the LunarModule
Pilot's voice occurredin the extravehicular communicationsystemrelay mode. Themost
probablecausewasthat the sensitivity of the voice-operatedrelay of the Commander's
audio center in the lunar modulewasinadvertently set at less than the maximumspecified.(This anomalyis discussedin "Voice BreakupDuringExtravehicular Activity" in sec-
tion 16.) Also, during the extravehicular activity, the MannedSpaceFlight Network
receivedan intermittent echoof the up-link transmissions. This echowasmost likely
causedby signal coupling betweenthe headsetandmicrophone. (A detailed discussion
of this anomalyis given in "EchoDuringExtravehicular Activity" in section 16.) After
crewingress into the lunar module,the voice link waslost whenthe portable life
support systemantennaswerestowed;however,the data from the extravehicular mobility
unit remainedacceptable.
Television transmissionwasgoodduring the entire extravehicular activity, both
from the descentstage stowageunit andfrom the tripod on the lunar surface. The
signal-to-noise ratios of the television link weregood. Thetelevision wasturned off
after 5 hours4 minutesof continuousoperation.
Lunarmodulevoice and data communicationswere normalduring the lift-off from the
lunar surface. Thesteerable antennamaintainedlock andtracked throughout the ascent.
Up-link signal strength remainedstable at approximately-88 dBm.
Instrumentation
Theperformanceof the operational instrumentation wassatisfactory, with the
exceptionof the data storage electronic assembly(onboardvoice recorder). Whenthe
tape wasplayed, no timing signal wasevident, andthe voice wasweakandunreadable,
with a 400-hertz humand a widebandnoise background. (For further discussion of this
anomaly,see "OnboardRecorderFailure" in section 16.)
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Guidance and Control
Power-up initialization.- The guidance and control system power-up sequence was
nomina-Texcept that the crew reported an initial difficulty in alining the abort guidance
system. The abort guidance system is alined in flight by transferring the inertial
measurement unit gimbal angles from the primary guidance system, and from these angles
establishing a direction cosine matrix. Prior to the first alinement after activation,
the primary system coupling data units and the abort system gimbal angle registers must
be zeroed to ensure that the angles accurately reflect the platform attitude. Failure
to zero could cause the symptoms reported. Another possible cause of the difficulty is
an incorrect setting of the orbital rate drive electronics mode switch. If this switch
is set in the ORBITAL RATE position, even though the orbital rate drive unit is powered
down, the pitch attitude displayed on the flight director attitude indicator will be
offset by an amount corresponding to the orbital rate drive revolver. No data are
available for the alinement attempt, and no pertinent information is contained in the
data before and after the occurrence. Because of the success of all subsequent alinement
attempts, hardware and software malfunctions are unlikely, and a procedural discrepancy
is the most probable cause of the difficulty.
Attitude reference system alinements.- Pertinent data concerning each of the
inertial measurement unit alinements are contained in table 9-I. The first alinement
was performed before undocking, and the command module platform was used as a reference
in correcting for the measured 2.05 ° misalinement of the docking interface. After
undocking, the alinement optical telescope was used to realine the platform to the same
reference, and a misalinement equivalent to the gyro torquing angles shown in table 9-I
was calculated. These angles were well within the go/no-go limits established preflight.
TABLE g-l.- LUNAR MODULE PLATFORM ALINEMENT SUMMARY
Time, I
hr:min l
-- i
I00:15 [ P52
103:01 J P57
I03:47 J P57
I04:16 [ P57
122:17 [ P57
123:49 [ P5/
124:51 I P52
Alinement mode
Type of Telescope
alinement Option
I (a)
I 3
3
4
3
4
3
Technique detent
(b)
NA Front
1 NA
2 Left rear
Right rear
3 Left rear
3 Right rear
3 Left front
Right rear
NA Front
Front
!
Star
used
Acrux
Antares
NA
Rigel
Navi
Rigel
Capella
Mirfak
Capella
Rigel
Acrux
Star angle
difference,
deg
0.03
.15
.og
•OB
.07
.ll
0
Gyro torquing angle, deg
, E
X-axis J _-axis ] Z-axis
o.2.I_o•o o
t
.005 -.I05 - 225
-,167 .186 .014
.228 , -.025 ] -.2B4
i
-69916g l-628
!
.ogg I .067 -.041
I
1
.137
a3 indicates reference stable member matrix (REFSMMAT); 4 indicates landing site.
bl indicates REFSF_IAT plus g; 2 indicates two bodies; 3 indicates one body plus g.
Gyro drift, mERU
X-axis Y-axis I Z-axis
4.5 -=.0 [ 0.4
2.6 -2,6 l -2.3
-4.g -3.2 ( -2.0
.4 -2.8 1 8.1
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After the descentorbit insertion maneuver,an alinementcheckwasperformedby
makingthree telescopesightings on the sun. A comparisonwasmadebetweenthe actual
pitch angle required for the sunmarksandthe angle calculated by the onboardcomputer.
Theresults werewell within the allowable tolerance andagain indicated a properly func-
tioning platform.
The inertial measurementunit wasalined five times while on the lunar surface. All
three alinementoptions wereusedsuccessfully andare listed as follows: (I) an aline-
mentusin9 a gravity vector calculated by the onboardaccelerometersanda prestored
azimuth, (2) an alinementusing the two vectors obtained from two different star sightings,
and (3) analinementusing the calculated gravity vector anda single star sighting to
determinean azimuth.
TheLunarModulePilot reported that the optical sightings associatedwith these
alinementswerebasedon a techniquein whichthe averageof five successivesightings
wascalculated by handand then inserted into the computer. Ananalysis of these
successivesightings indicated that the randomsighting error wassmall and that the only
significant trend observedin the successivesightings was lunar rate.
Theplatform remainedinertial during the 17.5-hourperiod betweenthe third and
fourth alinements. Becauseboth of these alinementswereto the sameorientation, it is
possible to makeanestimate of gyro drift while on the lunar surface. Drift was
calculated from three sources: the gyro torquing anglesor misalinement,indicated at
the secondalinement; the gimbalangle changehistory in comparisonto that predicted
from lunar rate; and the comparison of the actual gravity tracking history of the onboard
accelerometers with that predicted from lunar rate. The results from the alinements
(table 9-11) indicate excellent agreement for the granularity of the data used.
TABLE 9-11.- LUNAR SURFACE GYRO DRIFT COMPARISON
Axis
Gyro drift, deg
Computer output
(program P57) Gimbal angle change Computed from gravity
0.699
-.696
.628
0.707
-.73
.623
0.413
-.76
1.00
The abort guidance system was alined to the primary system at least nine times
during the mission (table 9-111). The alinement accuracy, as determined by the Euler
angle differences between the primary and abort systems for the eight alinements avail-
able on telemetry, was within specification tolerances. In addition, the abort guidance
system was independently alined three times on the lunar surface by using gravity, as
determined by the abort system accelerometers, and by using an azimuth derived from an
external source. The resulting Euler angles are shown in table 9-1V. A valid comparison
following the first alinement cannot be made because the abort guidance system azimuth
was not updated. Primary guidance alinements following the second alinement were incom-
patible with the abort guidance system because the inertial measurement unit was not
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alined to the local vertical. A comparisonof the Euler angles for the third alinement
indicated an azimutherror of 0.08° . This error resulted from an incorrect azimuthvalue
received from the groundandloadedmanuallyin the abort guidancesystem. Theresulting
0.08° azimutherror causedan out-of-plane velocity difference betweenthe primary and
abort systemsat insertion. (See"Ascent" in section 5.)
TABLE9-111.- GUIDANCESYSTEMALINEMENTCOMPARISON
Time,
hr:min:sec
Indicated difference, gimbal
minusabort electronics, deg
X-axis Y-axis Z-axis
Lunarsurface
102:52:01
103:15:29
103:50:29
122:36:00
122:53:00
122:54:30
-0. 0081
-.0161
-. 0063
-.0166
-.0152
-. 0071
0.0066
-.0271
-.0015
-.0025
-.0071
-.0101
0.0004
.0004
.0028
.0028
-.0012
-.0012
Inflight
100:56:20 -0.0019 -0.0037 0.0067
126:11:56 -.0369 .0104 -.0468
TABLE 9-1V.- LUNAR SURFACE ALINEMENT COMPARISON
Angle Abort guidance Primary guidance Difference
,i
Yaw, deg .....
Pitch, deg ....
Roll, deg ....
13.3194
4.4041
.5001
13.2275
4.4055
.4614
O. 0919
-.0014
.0387
Translation maneuvers.- All translation maneuvers were performed under the primary
guidance system control, with the abort guidance system operating in a monitor mode.
Significant parameters are contained in table 9-V. The dynamic response of the spacecraft
was nominal during descent and ascent engine maneuvers, although the effect of fuel slosh
during powered descent was greater than expected, based on preflight simulations. Slosh
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oscillations becamenoticeable after the 180° yaw maneuver and gradually increased to
the extent that thruster firings were required for damping (fig. 5-11 in section 5). The
effect remained noticeable and significant until after the end of the braking phase, when
the engine was throttled down to begin rate-of-descent control. The slosh response has
been reproduced postflight by making slight variations in the slosh model damping ratio.
TABLE 9-V.- LUNAR MODULE MANEUVER SUMMARYa
Condition
Time
Ignition, b hr:min:sec ......
Cut-off? hr:min:sec ......
Duration, sec ..........
Velocity (desired/actual), ft/sec:
Descent orbit
insertion
(-PGNCS/DPS)
ci01:36:14
101:36:44
30.0
Powered descent
initiation
(PGNCS/DPS)
102:33:05.01
102:45:41.40
756.39
6775 (total)
Maneuver
Ascent
(PGNCS/APS)
124:22:00.79
124:29:15.67
434.B8
X-axis component ........
Y-axis component .......
Z-axis component .......
Coordinate system .......
Velocity residual after trimmlng,
ft/sec:
X-axis com monent ......
Y-axls component ......
Z-axis component ......
Gimbai drive actuator, in.:
Initial
Pitch ............
Roll ............
Maximum excursion
Pitch ............
Roll ............
Steady state
Pitch ............
Roll ............
Maximum rate excursion, deg/sec:
Pitch .............
Roll .............
Yaw ..............
Maximum attitude excursion, deg:
Pitch .............
Roll .............
Yaw ..............
-75.8/ (d)
O/ (d)
9.8/ (d)
Local vertical
co
-.4
0
(d)
(d)
(d)
g71.27/971.32
.22/.1B
5550.05/5551 .57
Stable platform
NA .4
-1.0
1,4
NA
.43
-,02
.03
- .28
.59
-.28
.8 -16.2
-.8 1.8
-.6 2.0
1.2 3.2
-I .6 -2.0
-2.4 -2.0
Coelliptic se-
quence initiation
(PGNCS/RCS)
c125:19:35
125:20:22
47.0
5ls/I I1.0/
O/ (d)
Local vertical
-.2
.7
*.]
NA
(d)
(d)
aRendezvous m_neuvers after terminal phase initiation are discussed in section 5, based on crew reports.
bignition and cut-off times are those commanded by the computer.
CReported by crew.
dNo data available.
Constant-
differential height
(PGNCS/RCS)
126:17:49.6
126:18:2g.2
17.8
2.04/2.05
18.99/18.85
6.6/6.17
Earth-centered
inertial
.I
-.]
0
WA
o.B
-.6
".2
-1.6
.8
*.4
Terminal phase
initiation
(PGNCS/RCS)
127:03:51.8
]27:04:14.5
22.7
-20,70/-20.62
-13.81/-14.10
-4.1g/-4.93
Earth-centered
inertial
-.2
0
-.I
NA
1.2
-.8
-.2
-.4
-.4
.8
The ascent maneuver was nominal, with the crew reporting the wallowing tendency
inherent in the control technique used. As shown in table 9-V, the velocity at insertion
was 2 ft/sec higher than planned. This higher velocity has been attributed to a differ-
ence in the predicted and actual tail-off characteristics of the engine.
The abort guidance system, as stated, was used to monitor all primary guidance
system maneuvers. Performance was excellent except for some isolated procedural problems.
The azimuth misalinement which was inserted into the abort guidance system prior to
lift-off and which contributed to the out-of-plane error at insertion is discussed in
"Attitude Reference System Alinements" in this section. During the ascent firing, the
abort guidance system velocity to be gained was used to compare with and to monitor the
primary system velocity to be gained. The crew reported that near the end of the inser-
tion maneuver, the primary and abort system displays differed by 50 to IOO ft/sec. A
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similar comparison of the reported parameter differences has been made postflight and is
shown in figure 9-I. As indicated, the velocity difference was as large as 39 ft/sec and
was caused by lack of time synchronization between the two sets of data. The calculations
are made and displayed independently by the two computers, which have outputs that are
not synchronized. Therefore, the time at which a given velocity is valid could vary as
much as 4 seconds between the two systems. Both systems appear to have operated
properly.
1
\
g)g--
20( -- -
AbOrt guidance
syslem data I_S
.Abort guidance system
[
:,0 :20 :30 :40 :50 :_00 :10 :_
Time, hr:min:se£
Figure 9-I.- Comparison of primary guidance and abort guidance system
velocities during final ascent phase.
The abort guidance system performed satisfactorily during monitoring of rendezvous
maneuvers, although residuals after the terminal phase initiation maneuver were somewhat
large. The differences were caused by a 23-second-late initiation of the maneuver and
by relatively large attitude excursions induced because of the incorrect selection of
wide deadband in the primary system. The desired velocity vector in the abort guidance
system is chosen for a nominal time of rendezvous. If the terminal phase initiation
maneuver is begun at a time other than nominal and if the abort system is not retargeted,
the maneuver direction and magnitude will not be correct.
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Attitude control.- The digital autopilot was the primary source of attitude control
during the mission, and it performed as designed. One procedural discrepancy occurred
during the 180 ° yaw maneuver after the start of powered descent. The yaw maneuver was
performed manually by using the proportional rate output of the rotational hand control-
ler. Because a low rate scale was erroneously selected for display, the maneuver was
begun and partially completed at less than the desired rate of I0 deg/sec. Continuing
the maneuver on the low rate scale would have delayed landing-radar acquisition. After
the problem was recognized, the high rate scale was selected, and the maneuver was com-
pleted as planned. The abort guidance system was used just prior to the second docking.
Performance was as expected; however, some difficulty was experienced during the docking.
(See "Rendezvous" in section 5.)
Primary guidance, navicati99, and control sys_erformance.- The inertial measure-
ment unit was replaced 12 days before launch, and the new unit exhibited excellent
performance throughout the mission. Table 9-VI contains the preflight history of the
inertial components for the inertial measurement unit. The accelerometer bias history
is shown in table 9-VII. An accelerometer bias update was performed prior to undocking,
with the results as shown in table 9-VII.
TABLE 9-VI.- LUNAR MODULE INERTIAL COMPONENT PREFLIGHT HISTORY
Error
I Sample Standard Number of Countdown Flightmean deviation samples value load
Accelerometers
X-axis:
Scale
Bias,
Y-axis:
Scale
Bias,
Z-axis:
Scale
Bias,
factor error, ppm ......
cm/sec 2 ...........
factor error, ppm ......
cm/sec 2 ...........
factor error, ppm ......
cm/sec 2 ...........
X-axis:
Null bias drift, mERU .......
Acceleration drift, spin reference
axis, mERU/g ..........
Acceleration drift, input axis,
mERU/g .............
Y-axis:
Null bias drift, mERU .......
Acceleration drift, spin reference
axis, mERU/g ..........
Acceleration drift, input axis,
mERU/g .............
Z-axis:
Null bias drift, mERU .......
Acceleration drift, spin reference
axis, mERU/g ..........
Acceleration drift, input axis,
mERU/g .............
-155
.60
-1156
.08
-549
.14
Gyroscopes
-I .5
5.7
12.8
3.0
-4.0
-2.3
4.1
-4 o7
-9.3
III
.09
II
.04
72
.12
-237 -270
,70 .66
-1164 -1150
.05 .I0
-600 -620
.22 .20
1.4
0
3.5
].6
1.4
6.]
.6
.4
7.7
3
2
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
-I .3
5.7
15.2
1.3
-3.1
2.0
3.5
-4.4
-3.8
-1.6
6.0
I0.0
3.8
-5.0
3.0
4.4
-5.0
-3.0
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TABLE9-VII.- ACCELEROMETERBIASFLIGHTHISTORY
Condition
Flight load
Updatedvalue
Flight averagebefore update
Flight averageafter update
X-axis
0.66
.66
.63
.67
2Bias, cm/sec
Y-axis
0.I0
• 04
.04
.07
Z-axis
0.20
.03
.03
-.01
Visibility in orbit and on the lunar surface through the alinement optical telescope
was as expected. Because of the relative position of the earth, the sun, and the reflec-
tions off the lunar surface, only the left and right rear telescope detent positions were
usable after touchdown. Star recognition and visibility through these detents proved to
be adequate. The sun angle had changed by the time of lift-off, and only the right rear
detent was usable. This detent proved sufficient for the alinements made just prior to
lift-off. (See "Ascent" in section 5.)
The lunar module guidance computer performed as designed, except for a number of
unexpected alarms. The first alarm occurred during the power-up sequence when the display
keyboard circuit breaker was closed, and a 520 alarm (RADAR RUPT), which was not expected
at this time, was generated• This alarm, which has been reproduced on the ground, was
caused by a random setting of logic gates during the turn-on sequence. The 520 alarm has
a low probability of occurrence and is neither abnormal nor indicative of a malfunction.
The Executive overflow alarms that occurred during descent ("Powered Descent" in
section 5) are now known to be normal for the existing situation and are indicative of
the proper performance of the guidance computer. These alarms are discussed in
"Computer Alarms During Descent" in section 16.
Abort guidance system performance.- Except for procedural errors which degraded
performance to some extent, all required functions were satisfactory. Eight known state-
vector transfers from the primary system were performed. The resulting position and
velocity differences for three of the transfers are shown in table 9-VIII. With the
exception of one incorrect difference caused by an incorrect K-factor used to time-
synchronize the system, all state-vector updates were accomplished without difficulty.
TABLE 9-VIII.- ABORT GUIDANCE STATE-VECTOR UPDATES
Time,
hr:min:sec
122:31:02
124:09:12
126:10:14
Abort minus primary guidance
Position, ft
-137.6
-177.6
-301.3
Velocity, ft/sec
0.05
-.15
-2. Ol
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The preflight inertial component test history is shown in table 9-1X. The inflight
calibration results were not recorded; however, just prior to the inflight calibration
(before loss of data), the accelerometer biases were calculated from velocity data and
known computer compensations. The shift between the preinstallation calibration data and
the flight measurements is shown in table 9-X. (The capability estimate limits are based
on current three-sigma capability estimates with expected measurement errors included.)
TABLE 9-1X.- ABORT GUIDANCE PREINSTALLATION CALIBRATION DATA
(a) Accelerometer bias
Axis
Sample
mean,
_g
-53
-22
-79
Standard
deviation,
_g
42
9
22
Number
of
samples
15
15
15
Final cali-
bration value,
ug
l
-17
-66
Flight compensa-
tion value,
ug
0
-23.7
-71.2
(b) Accelerometer scale factor
Axis
Standard
deviation,
ppm
14
28
12
Number
of
samples
Final cali-
bration value,
ppm
-430
324
1483
Flight compensa-
tion value,
ppm
-463.5
299.5
1453.4
(c) Gyro scale factor
Axis
Sample
mean,
deg/hr
-I048
-300
3456
Standard
deviation,
deg/hr
-lO
-47
16
Number
of
samples
15
15
15
Final cali-
bration value,
deg/hr
-I048
-285
3443
Flight load
value,
deg/hr
-1048
-285
3443
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TABLE 9-1X.- ABORT GUIDANCE PREINSTALLATION CALIBRATION DATA - Concluded
(d) Gyro fixed drift
Axis
Sample
mean,
ppm
0.33
.04
.51
Standard
deviation,
ppm
0.05
.05
.07
Number
of
samples
15
15
15
Final cali-
bration value,
ppm
0.27
.03
.41
Flight load
value,
ppm
0.27
.03
.41
(e) Gyro spin axis mass unbalance
Axis
Sample
mean,
deg/hr/g
-0.67
Standard
deviation,
deg/hr/g
0.12
Number
of
samples
15
Final cali-
bration value,
deg/hr/g
-0.65
Flight load
value,
deg/hr/g
-0.65
TABLE 9-X.- ACCELEROMETER STABILITY
(a) Preinstallation and flight measurements
Accelerometer bias _Jg
Accelerometer
X-axis
Y-axis
Z-axis
Preinstallation
calibration
(June 6, 1969)
1
-17
-66
J
Freefall
(July 20, 1969)
-65
-41
-84
48-day
shift
-66
-24
-18
Capability
estimate
185
185
185
112
TABLE9-X.- ACCELEROMETERS ABILITY- Concluded
(b) Inflight measurements
Accelerometerbias, _g
Accelerometer CapabilityBeforedescent After ascent Shift estimate
X-axis
Y-axis
Z-axis
-34
-27
-41
-62
-31
-62
-28
-4
-21
60
60
60
Whentelemetereddata wereregainedafter the inflight calibration andafter powered
ascent, excellent accelerometerstability wasindicated as shownin table 9-X. (The
capability estimate limits are baseduponcurrent three-sigmacapability estimateswith
expectedmeasurementerrors included.) Inflight calibration data on the gyros were
reported, andtwo lunar surface gyro calibrations wereperformedwith the results shown
in table 9-XI. Thedegreeof stability of the instrumentswaswell within the expected
values.
TABLE9-XI.- GYROCALIBRATIONCOMPARISON
Calibration
Preinstallation (June2, 1969)
Final earth prelaunch(June28, 1968)
Inflight (July 20, 1969)
First lunar surface (July 21, 1969)
Secondlunar surface (July 21, 1969)
Gyrodrift, deg/hr
X-axis Y-axis
0.27 0.03
.I0 -.13
.33 -.07
.34 -.08
.41 -.04
Z-axis
0.41
.35
.38
.47
.50
Theonly hardwarediscrepancyreported in the abort guidancesystemwasthe failure
of an electroluminescentsegmentin onedigit of the data entry anddisplay assembly.(This failure is discussedin "ElectroluminescentSegmenton Display Inoperative" in
section 16.)
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ReactionControl
Theperformanceof the reaction control systemwassatisfactory. Thesystempres-
surization sequencewasnominal, andthe regulators maintainedacceptableoutlet pressures(between178and184psia) throughoutthe mission.
Thecrewreported thrust chamberassemblywarningflags for three enginepairs.
TheA2 andA4 flags occurredsimultaneouslyduring lunar modulestation-keeping prior
to descentorbit insertion. TheB4flag appearedshortly thereafter andalso twicejust before powereddescentinitiation. Thecrewbelieved that these flags wereaccom-
paniedby masteralarms. Theflags werereset by cycling of the caution andwarning
electronics circuit breaker. (See"ReactionControl SystemWarningFlags" in section 16
for further discussion of thesewarningflags.)
Thechamberpressureswitch in reaction control engineBID failed in the closed
modeapproximately8.5 minutesafter powereddescentinitiation. Theswitch remained
closed for 2 minutes53 seconds,then openedand functionedproperly for the remainder
of the mission. Thefailure modeis believed to be the sameas that on the Apollo 9 and
lO missions, that is, particulate contaminationor propellant residue holding the switch
closed. Theonly potential consequenceof the failure wouldhavebeenthe inability to
detect anengine failed in the off mode.
A masteralarmwasnotedat 126:44:00,whensevenconsecutivepulseswerecommanded
on engineA2Awithout a pressureswitch response. Further discussion of this discrepancy
is given in "Thrust ChamberPressureSwitches"in section 16.
Thermalcharacteristics weresatisfactory, andall temperatureswerewithin predicted
values. ThemaximL:mquadtemperaturewas232° Fon quadl subsequento touchdown.The
fuel tank temperaturesrangedfrom 68° to 71° F.
Propellant usage,basedon the propellant quantity measuringdevice, was319pounds,
comparedwith a predicted value of 253poundsandthe total propellant load of 549 pounds.
Approximately57of the 66 poundsin excessof the predictions wereusedduring powered
descent. Figures 9-2 and9-3 include total andindividual systempropellant consumption
profiles.
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Figure 9-2.- Propellant consumption from each system.
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Figure 9-3.- Total propellant consumption.
During powered ascent, the reaction control system was used in the ascent inter-
connect mode. The reaction control system used approximately 69 pounds of propellant
from the ascent propulsion tanks.
Descent Propulsion
The descent propulsion system operation was satisfactory for the descent orbit
insertion and descent maneuvers. The engine transients and throttle response were
normal.
Inflight performance.- The descent orbit insertion maneuver lasted 30 seconds; the
resulting velocity change was 76.4 ft/sec. The engine was started at the minimum
throttle setting of 13.0 percent of full thrust and, after approximately 15 seconds, was
throttled to 40-percent thrust for the remainder of the firing.
The duration of the powered descent firing was 756.3 seconds, corresponding to a
velocity change of approximately 6775 ft/sec. The engine was at the minimum throttle
setting (13 percent) at the beginning of the firing and, after approximately 26 seconds,
was advanced to full throttle. There was approximately a 45-second data dropout during
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this period, but crewreports indicated that the throttle-up conditions wereapparently
normal. Figure 9-4 presents descentpropulsion systempressuresand throttle settings
as a function of time. Thedata havebeensmoothedanddo not reflect the data dropout
andthrottle fluctuations just before touchdown.
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(b) Oxidizer interface, fuel interface, and regulator outlet pressures.
Figure 9-4.- Descent propulsion system performance.
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During the powereddescentmaneuver,the oxidizer interface pressureappearedto
oscillate as muchas 67 psi peakto peak. Thepressurecontinuedto oscillate through-
out the firing, although over a smaller range(fig. 9-5); the oscillations weremost
prominentat approximately50-percentthrottle. Thefact that oscillations of this
magnitudewerenot observedin the chamberpressureor the fuel interface pressure
measurementsindicates that they werenot real. Engineperformancewasnot affected.
Oscillations of this type havebeenobservedat the White SandsTest Facility on similar
pressuremeasurementinstallations on numerousengines. Thehigh-magnitudepressure
oscillations observedduring the WhiteSandsTest Facility tests wereamplifications of
muchlower pressureoscillations in the system. Thephenomenonhasbeendemonstrated
in groundtests wheresmall actual oscillations wereamplified by cavity resonanceof a
pressuretransducerassemblycontaining a tee with the transduceron oneleg of the tee
anda caponanother leg. This assemblyis similar to the interface pressuretransducer
installation. Theresonanceconditions will vary with the amountof helium trapped in
the tee andwith the throttle setting.
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Figure 9-5.- Oxidizer interface pressure and chamber pressure oscillations.
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System pressurization.- The oxidizer tank ullage pressure decayed from 158 to 95 psia
during the period from lift-off to the first activation of the system at approximately
83 hours. During this period, the fuel tank ullage pressure decayed from 163 to 139 psia.
These decays, which resulted from helium absorption into the propellants, were within the
expected range.
The measured pressure profile in the supercritical helium tank was normal. The
preflight and inflight pressure rise rates were 8.3 and 6.4 psi/hr, respectively.
During propellant venting after landing, the fuel interface pressure increased
rapidly to an off-scale reading. The fuel line had frozen during venting of the super-
critical helium, trapping fuel between the prevalve and the helium heat exchanger; and
this fuel, when heated from engine soakback, caused the pressure rise. (See "High Fuel
Interface After Landing" in section 16 for further discussion of this problem.)
Ga_system performance.- During the descent orbit insertion maneuver and the
early portion of powered descent, the two oxidizer propellant gages indicated off-scale
(greater than the maximum 95-percent indication), as expected. The fuel probes, however,
indicated approximately 94.5 percent instead of reading off-scale. The propellant loaded
was equivalent to approximately 97.3 and 96.4 percent for oxidizer and fuel, respectively.
An initial low fuel reading had also occurred on the Apollo I0 mission. As the firing
continued, the propellant gages began to indicate consumption correctly. The tank 1 and
tank 2 fuel probe measurements agreed throughout the firing. The tank 1 and tank 2
oxidizer probe measurements agreed initially, but midway through the firing, they began
to diverge until the difference was approximately 3 percent. For the remainder of the
firing, the difference remained constant. The divergence was probably caused by oxidizer
flowing from tank 2 to tank 1 through the propellant crossover line as a result of an
offset in the spacecraft center of gravity.
The low-level light came on at 102:44:30.4, which indicated that approximately
116 seconds of total firing time remained, based on the sensor location. The propellant-
remaining time line from the low-level light indication to the calculated propellant
depletion is as follows.
Landing
Propellant go/no-go Calculated
low-level Engine decision propellant
light on cut-off point depletion
116 2o 6
Firing time remaining, sec
The indicated time of 45 seconds to propellant depletion compares favorably with the
postflight calculated value of 50 seconds to oxidizer tank 2 depletion. The 5-second
difference is within the measurement accuracy of the system. The low-level signal was
triggered by the point sensor in either oxidizer tank 2 or fuel tank 2.
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AscentPropulsion
Theascent propulsionsystemwasfired for 435secondsfrom lunar lift-off to orbit
insertion. All aspectsof systemperformancewerenominal.
Theregulator outlet pressure, whichwas184psia during the firing, returned to
the nominallockup value of 188.5psia after enginecut-off. Table 9-XII presents a
comparisonof the actual andpredicted performance. Basedonengine flow rate data, the
enginemixture ratio wasestimatedto be 1.595. Theestimatedusablepropellant remaining
at engineshutdownwas174poundsof oxidizer and121 poundsof fuel; thesequantities
are equivalent to 25 secondsof additional firing time to oxidizer depletion.
TABLE 9-XII.- STEADY-STATE PERFORMANCE
Parameter
Regulator outlet pressure, psia .....
Oxidizer bulk temperature, °F ......
Fuel bulk temperature, °F ........
Oxidizer interface pressure, psia .....
Fuel interface pressure, psia ......
Engine chamber pressure, psia ......
Mixture ratio ..............
Thrust, Ib ...............
Specific impulse, sec ..........
lO seconds after ignition
Predicted
(a)
184
70
7O
170.6
170.4
122.6
1.604
3464
309.4
Measured
(b)
184.5
70.4
71.0
170.0
169.3
122
400 seconds after ignition
Predicted
(a)
184
70
70
169.6
169.5
122.5
1.595
3439
308.8
Measured
(b)
184
70.4
71.0
169.5
168.8
122
apreflight prediction based on acceptance test data and assuming nominal system performance.
bActual flight data with known biases removed.
After ascent propulsion system cut-off and during lunar orbit, the fuel and inter-
face pressures increased from their respective flow pressures to lockup and then con-
tinued to increase to approximately 3.6 psi for fuel and II to 12 psi for oxidizer.
Loss of signal occurred approximately 39 minutes after engine shutdown as the vehicle
went behind the moon. Pressure rises in the system were observed during both the
Apollo 9 and the Apollo I0 missions. This initial pressure rise after shutdown was
caused by a number of contributing factors, such as regulator lockup, heating of the
ullage gas, and vaporization from the remaining propellants.
At reacquisition of signal (approximately 1 hour 29 minutes after shutdown), drops
of approximately 6 and 3.6 psi had occurred in the oxidizer and fuel pressures, respec-
tively. Thereafter, the pressure remained at a constant level for the 4.5 hours that
the data were monitored. This behavior rules out leakage as a cause of the pressure
drops. The apparent pressure drops had no effect on ascent propulsion system performance
and were probably caused by a combination of ullage gas cooling, pressure transducer
drift as a result of engine heat soakback, and instrumentation resolution. At tempera-
tures higher than 200 ° F, the accuracy of the pressure transducer degrades to ±4 percent
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(_I0 psia) rather than the normal+2percent. A permanentshift mayalso occur at high
temperatures. Thermalanalysis indicates that the peaksoakbacktemperatureswere
200° to 235° F. Errors whichmaybe attributed to various sourcesinclude a transducer
shift of 4 percent (equivalent to ±I0 psi), a pulse-code-modulationresolution of
2 counts (equivalent to 2 psi), anda l-psi ullage pressurechangewhich is effective
only on the oxidizer side.
EnvironmentalControl System
Theenvironmentalcontrol systemin the lunar modulesupportedall lunar operations
satisfactorily, with only the following minor exceptions.
Routinewater/glycol samplingduring prelaunchactivities showedthe presenceof
large numbersof crystals whichwereidentified as benzathiazyldisulfide. Thesecrystals
wereprecipitated from a corrosion inhibitor in the fluid. Theenvironmentalcontrol
systemwasflushed andfiltered repeatedly, but the crystallization continued. Thefluid
wasthen replacedwith onecontaining a previously omitted additive (sodiumsulfite), and
the amountof crystallization decreased. A spacecraft pumppackagewasrun ona bench
rig with the fluid containing crystals, andthe pumpperformancewasshownto be unaf-
fected, evenfor long durations. During the test, the filter in the test packageplugged,
andthe bypassvalve opened. Pumpdisassemblyrevealedno deterioration. It wasthen
demonstratedthat the crystals, while presenting an undesirablecontamination,werenot
harmful to environmentalcontrol systemoperation. Theflight performanceof the heat
transport section wasnominal. Theinvestigation revealed that recently the corrosion
inhibitor formulation was slightly modified. For future spacecraft, water/glycol with
the original corrosion inhibitor formulation will be used.
Depressurization of the lunar module cabin through the bacteria filter during the
extravehicular activity required more time than predicted. The data indicate that the
cabin pressure transducer reading was high at the low end of its range; consequently,
the crew could have opened the hatch sooner if the true pressure had been known.
During the sleep period on the lunar surface, the crew reported that they were too
cold to sleep. Analysis of the conditions experienced indicated that once the crewmen
were in a cold condition, there was not enough heat available in the environmental control
system to return them to a comfortable condition. Ground tests have indicated that in
addition to the required procedural changes which are designed to maintain heat in the
suit circuit, blankets will be provided and the crew will sleep in hammocks.
Shortly after lunar module ascent, the crewmen reported that the carbon dioxide
indicator was erratic; therefore, they switched to the secondary cartridge. The crewmen
had also selected the secondary water separator because one crewman had reported water
in his suit. Evaluation of the erratic carbon dioxide readings indicated that the
carbon dioxide sensor had malfunctioned, and the circuit breaker was pulled. Erratic
operation in the past has been caused by free water in the optical section of the sensor.
Further discussion of both the erratic carbon dioxide readings and the water in the
crewman's suit is contained in "Indication of High Carbon Dioxide Partial Pressure" and
"Water in One Suit" in section 16.
Radar
Performance of the rendezvous and landing radars was satisfactory, and antenna
temperatures were always within normal limits. Range and velocity were acquired by the
landing radar at slant ranges of approximately 44 000 and 28 000 feet, respectively.
The tracker was lost briefly at altitudes of 240 and 75 feet; these losses were expected
and are attributed to zero-Doppler effects associated with manual maneuvering.
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CrewStation
_s and controls.- The displays and controls supported the mission satisfac-
torily, except that the mission timer stopped during the descent. After being deenergized
for II hours, the timer was started again and operated properly throughout the remainder
of the mission. The most probable cause of this failure was a cracked solder joint.
This anomaly is discussed in greater detail in "Mission Timer Stopped" in section 16.
Crew provisions.- The Commander and Lunar Module Pilot were provided with communica-
tions carrier adapter eartubes (with molded earpieces) for use in the lunar module cabin.
The purpose of these earphone adapters was to increase the audio level to the ear; use
of the adapters is according to crewman preference. The Lunar Module Pilot used the
adapters throughout the lunar module descent and landing phase, but after landing, he
found the molded earpieces uncomfortable and removed them. The Commander did not use
adapters because his preflight experience indicated that audio volume levels were
adequate. The Apollo I0 Lunar Module Pilot had used the adapters during his entire
lunar module operational period and had reported no discomfort. The Apollo 12 crewmembers
were also provided adapters for optional use.
The crew commented that the inflight coverall garments would be more utilitarian if
they were patterned after the standard one-piece summer flying suit. More pockets with
a better method of closure, preferably zippers, were recommended and will be provided
for evaluation by future crews.
The crew reported that the lunar module windows fogged repeatedly while the sun-
shades were installed. They transferred two of the command module tissue dispensers to
the lunar module and used the tissues to clean the windows instead of using the window
heaters for defogging. Tissue dispensers are being added to the lunar module stowage
list.
Consumables
On the Apollo II mission, the actual usage of only three consumables deviated by as
much as I0 percent from the preflight predictions. These consumables were the descent
stage oxygen, ascent stage oxygen, and reaction control system propellant. The actual
oxygen requirements were less than predicted because the leakage rate was lower than
expected. The actual reaction control propellant requirement was greater than predicted
because of the increased hover time during the descent phase.
The electrical power system consumables usage was within 5 percent of predicted
flight requirements. The usage of current from the descent stage batteries was approx-
imately 8 percent less than predicted, and the usage of current from the ascent stage
batteries was approximately 3 percent more than predicted. The deviations appear to
have resulted from uncertainties in the predicted usage for reaction control heater
duty cycles. Electrical power consumption is discussed further in "Electrical Power" in
this section.
Descent propulsion system propellant.- The higher-than-predicted propellant usage
by the descent propulsion system was caused by the maneuvering to avoid a large crater
during the final stages of descent. Until that time, propellant usage had been nominal.
Allowance for manual hover and landing-point redesignation was in the preflight budget
but was not considered part of the nominal usage.
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Thedescentpropulsion systempropellant loading quantities given in table 9-XIII
werecalculated from readingsandmeasuredensities prior to lift-off.
TABLE9-XIII.- DESCENTPROPULSIONPROPELLANTUSAGE
Condition
Loaded
Consumed
Nominal
Redesignation
Marginfor manual
Total
hover
Remainingat enginecut-off
Tanks
Manifold
Total
Actual usage
Fuel I Oxidizer
!
6975 I II 209
---- J ----
6724 I I0 69O
216 J 458
351 61
251 I 519
Ib
Total
18 184
17 414
770
Prefl i ght
planned
usage, Ib
18 184
17 010
103
114
17 227
957
Ascent propulsion system propellant.- The actual ascent propulsion system propellant
usage was within 5 percent of the preflight predictions, The loadings given in
table 9-XIV were determined from measured densities prior to lift-off and from weights
of offloaded propellants. A portion of the propellants was used by the reaction control
system during ascent stage operations.
TABLE 9-XIV.- ASCENT PROPULSION PROPELLANT USAGE
Condition
Loaded
Consumed
By ascent propulsion sys-
tem prior to ascent
stage jettison
By reaction control system
Total
Remaining at ascent stage
jettison
Actual usage, Ib
Fuel
2020
]833
23
1856
164
Oxidizer Total
3218 5238
2934 --
46 --
2980 4836
238 402
Preflight
planned
usage, Ib
5238
4966
272
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Reaction control system progellant.- The increased hover time for lunar landing
resulted in a deviation of over lO percent in the reaction control system propellant
usage, as compared with the preflight predictions. Propellant consumption (shown in
table 9-XV) was calculated from telemetered helium tank pressure histories by using the
relationships between pressure, volume, and temperature. The mixture ratio was assumed
to be 1.94 for the calculations.
TABLE 9-XV.- LUNAR MODULE REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM PROPELLANT USAGE
Condition
Loaded
System A
System B
Total
Consumed
System A
System B
Total
Remaining at lunar module
jettison
System A
Sys tern B
Total
Actual usage
i Fuel Oxidizer
l
I 108 209
! 108 209
! 216 418
46 go
62 121
I08 211
l
62 ll9
46 88
I08 207
I
Ib
Total
634
319
_w
315
Prefl ight
planned
usage, Ib
633
253
w_
38O
_.- The actual oxygen usage was lower than the preflight predictions because
the oxygen leak rate from the cabin was less than the specification value. The actual
rate was 0.05 Ib/hr, as compared with the specification rate of 0.2 Ib/hr. In
table 9-XVl, the actual quantities loaded and consumed are based on telemetered data.
Water.- The actual water usage was within lO percent of the preflight predictions.
In table 9-XVII, the actual quantities loaded and consumed are based on telemetered
data.
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TABLE 9-XVI.- OXYGEN USAGE
Condition
Loaded (at lift-off)
Descent stage
Ascent stage
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Consumed
Descent stage
Ascent stage
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Remaining in descent stage at lunar lift-off
Remaining at ascent stage jettison
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Actual
usage,
Ib
48.2
2.5
2.5
5.0
17.2
1.0
.I
I.I
31.0
1.5
2.4
3.9
Preflight
planned
usage, Ib
48.2
2.4
2.4
4.8
21.7
1.5
0
1.5
26.5
.9
2.4
3.3
TABLE 9-XVII.- LUNAR MODULE WATER USAGE
Condition
Loaded (at lift-off)
Descent stage
Ascent stage
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Consumed
Descent stage
Ascent stage
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
Actual
usage,
Ib
217.5
42.4
42.4
84.8
147.0
19.2
18.1
37.3
Remaining in descent stage at lunar lift-off
Remaining at ascent stage jettison
Tank 1
Tank 2
Total
70.5
23.2
24.3
47.5
Preflight
planned
usage, Ib
217.5
42.4
42.4
84.8
158.6
17.3
17.3
34.6
58.9
25.1
25.1
5O.2
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lO. PERFORMANCEOFTHEEXTRAVEHICULARMOBILITYUNIT
Performanceof the extravehicular-mobility-unit wasexcellent throughoutboth intra-
vehicular andextravehicular lunar surfaceoperations. Crewmobility wasgoodduring
extravehicular activity, andan analysis of inflight cooling systemdata showsgood
correlation with grounddata. Thecrewremainedcomfortablethroughoutthe moststren-
uoussurface operations. Becauseof the lower-than-expectedmetabolic rates, oxygen
andwater consumptionwasbelowpredicted levels throughoutthe extravehicular activities.
Thepressuregarmentassemblies,including helmetandintravehicular gloves, were
wornduring launch. Thepressuregarmentassembliesof the Commanderand LunarHodule
Pilot hadbeenreconfiguredwith newarmbearingswhichcontributed to the relatively
unrestricted mobility demonstrateduring lunar surface operations.
TheCommandModulePilot's pressuregarmentassemblydid not fit in the lower
abdomenandcrotch areas; the incorrect fit wascausedby the urine collection andtrans-
fer assemblyflange. Pressurepoints resulted from insufficient size in the pressure
garmentassembly. Onfuture flights, fit checkswill be performedwith the crewman
wearingthe urine collection and transfer assembly,the fecal containmentsystem,and
the liquid cooling garment,as applicable, In addition, the fit checkwill include a
position simulating that whichthe crewmanexperiencesduring the countdown.
All three pressuregarmentassembliesandthe liquid cooling garmentsfor the
CommanderandLunarModulePilot weredonnedat approximately97 hours in preparation
for the lunar landing andlunar surface operations. Donningwasaccomplishednormally
with the crewmenhelping eachother, as required. Thesuit integrity checkprior to un-
dockingwascompletedsuccessfully, with suit pressuresdecayingapproximately0.I psi.
Wristlets andcomfort gloves weretakenaboardfor optional useby the Commanderand
LunarModulePilot during the lunar stay. Becauseof the quick adaptionto the I/6-g en-
vironment, the light loads handledon this mission, and the short duration of the lunar
surface activity, both crewmenelected to omit the useof the protective wristlets and
comfort gloves, Without the protection of the wristlets, the LunarModulePilot's wrists
wererubbedby the wrist rings, andthe grasp capability of the Commanderwasreduced
somewhatwithout the comfort gloves.
After attachmentof the lunar modulerestraint, a pressurepoint developedon the
instep of the LunarModulePilot's right foot becausethe restraint tendedto pull him
forward andout boardrather than straight down. However,he compensatedby movinghis
right foot forward andout board; this foot then took the majority of the load. After
assessmentof the Apollo 12mission, a determination is to bemadeof whethercorrective
action is required.
Extravehicular activity preparations proceededsmoothly. However,moretime was
required than plannedfor completingthe unstowageof equipmentandperformingother
minor tasks not normallyemphasizedin training exercises.
Theoxygen-purge-systemcheckoutwasperformedsuccessfully. Duringpre-egress
activities, the crewmembersencountereddifficulty in mating the remote-control-unit
connectorandwererequired to spendapproximately10minutesin matingeachconnector.
Each time the crewman thought the connector was alined, the lock ]ever caused the con-
nector to lean to one side and disengage. (This problem is discussed further in
"Mating of Remote Control Unit to Portable Life Support System" in section 16.)
Another difficulty was the bulk of the portable life support system. One circuit
breaker was broken, and the positions of two circuit breakers were changed when the
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crewmembersaccidentally bumpedthemwith their portable life support systemsas they
performedthe pre-egressactivities.
While waiting for the cabin to depressurize, the membersof the crewwerecomfort-
able, eventhoughthe inlet temperatureof the liquid cooling garmentreachedapproxi-
mately90° F prior to sublimator startup. Nothermal changeswere notedat egress.
Theportable life support systemandoxygenpurgesystemwerewornquite comfortably,
andthe back-supportedmasswasnot objectionable in the I/6-g environment.
Analysis of the extravehicular activity data showsa goodcorrelation with data from
previous training conductedin the SpaceEnvironmentalSimulation Laboratoryfacility.
As expected,the feedwaterpressureduring the missionwasslightly higher than that in-
dicated during simulations. Thedifference results from the lunar gravitational effect
on the headof water at the sublimator andtransducer, the high point in the system.
Theonly other discernible differences were in temperaturereadouts, whichgenerally in-
dicated better performance(morecooling) than expected. Comfortin the liquid cooling
garmentwasalwaysadequate,althoughthe data indicate a muchhigher temperaturefor
the Commander'sgarmentthan for the LunarModulePilot's garment. This observation
correlates with previous simulation experiencewhich showsthat the Commanderhada
strong preferencefor a warmerbodytemperaturethan that desired by the LunarModule
Pilot. This parameteris controlled by eachcrewmanto meethis comfort requirements.
Operationof the extravehicular mobility unit while in the extravehicular modewasun-
eventful. Theonly changenecessaryto the control settings for the portable life sup-
port systemwasthat of the diverter valves, whichboth crewmenchangedat their option
for comfort.
Becauseof the lower-than-expectedmetabolic rates for the LunarModulePilot and
especially for the Commander,the actual oxygenandfeedwaterquantities consumedwere
lower than predicted. Consumablesdata are shownin table I0-I.
TABLEI0-I.- APOLLOII CONSUMABLESDATA
Condition
Actual
8OO
191
1.26
.54
.72
Metabolic rate, Btu/hr .....
Time,min ...........
Oxygen,Ib
Loaded............
Consumeda ..........
Remaining ..........
Feedwater,Ib
Loaded............
Consumedb ..........
Remaining ..........
8.6
2.9
5.7
Commander
Predicted
1360
160
1.26
LunarModulePilot
Actual
II00
186
1.26
Predicted
1265
160
1.26
.68
.58
8.5
5.4
3.1
.60
.66
8.6
4.4
4.2
.63
.63
8.5
5.1
3.4
aApproximately 0.06 pound was required for the suit integrity check.
bApproximately 0.6 pound was required for startup and as trapped water.
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TABLEI0-I.- APOLLOII CONSUMABLESDATA- Concluded
Condition
Power,Wh
Initial chargec .......
Consumed..........
Remaining.... ......
Actual
270
133
137
Commander
Predicted
270
130
140
LunarModulePilot
Actual
270
135
135
Predicted
270
130
140
CMinimumprelaunchcharge.
Crewmanmobility andbalancein the extravehicular mobility unit weresufficient to
allow stable movementduring performanceof lunar surface tasks. TheLunarModulePilot
demonstratedthe capability to walk, run, changedirection while running, and stop move-
mentwithout difficulty. Hereported a tendencyto tip backwardsin the soft sandand
noted that he hadto be careful to compensatefor the different location of the center
of mass. Thecrewmenknelt downandcontactedthe lunar surfacewhile retrieving objects.
Thecrewstated that getting downon oneor both kneesto retrieve samplesand allow
closer inspection of the lunar surface shouldbea normaloperating mode. Additional
waist mobility wouldimprovethe ability to get closer to the lunar surface and, in
addition, would increasedownwardvisibility.
Eachcrewmanraised his extravehicular visor assemblyto various positions through-
out the extravehicular activity andnoteda back reflection of his face from the visor.
Thereflection wasgreatest with the sunshining approximately90° from the front of
the visor assembly. With this reflection, it wasdifficult to see into shadedareas.
In addition, the continuousmovementfrom sunlight into shadowandback into sunlight
required extra time becauseof the necessarywait for adaptation to changesin light
intensity. Useof the blinders on the visor assemblycould havealleviated the reflec-
tion andadaptation problemto someextent.
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II. THELUNARSURFACE
Preflight planning for the Apollo II mission included a lunar surface stay of ap-
proximately22 hours, including 2 hours 40minutesthat wereallotted to extravehicular
activities.
After landing, the crewperformeda lunar modulecheckoutto ascertain launch
capability andphotographedthe landing area from the lunar module. Then, following an
extensive checkoutof the extravehicular mobility unit, the crewmenleft the lunar
moduleto accomplishthe following activities:
I. Inspection of the lunar moduleexterior
2. Collection of a contingencysample,a bulk sample,anddocumentedsamplesof
lunar surface materials
3. Evaluation of the physical characteristics of the lunar surface and its effects
on extravehicular activity
4. Deploymentof the solar wind compositionexperimentand, at the endof the
extravehicular activities, retrieval of the experimentfor return to earth
5. Deploymentof the early Apollo scientific experimentspackage,consisting of
the passive seismic experimentandthe laser ranging retroreflector
Throughouthe extravehicular activities, the crewmenmadedetailed observations
andtook photographsto documenttheir activites andthe lunar surface characteristics.
A television cameraprovidedreal-time coverageof crewextravehicular activities. Al-
thoughthe crewmenwereoperating in a newenvironment,they wereable to complete the
activities at a rate very close to that predicted before flight (table II-I).
Except for a portion of the planned documented sample collection not completed,
the lunar surface activities were totally successful, and all objectives were accom-
plished. As had been anticipated prior to flight, there was insufficient time for exact
performance of the documented sample collection. Two core samples and several loose
rock samples were collected and returned. There was also insufficient time to fill the
environmental and gas analysis sample containers, which were a part of the documented
sampling.
Minor equipment malfunctions and operational discrepancies occurred during the
extravehicular activity, but none prevented accomplishment of the respective tasks.
Conversely, several operations were enhanced, and equipment performance increased be-
cause of unexpected influences of the lunar environment.
The planned time line of major surface activities compared with the actual time
required is shown in table II-I. Table II-I lists the events sequentially, as presented
in the Lunar Surface Operations Plan, and also includes several major unplanned activ-
ities. Crew rest periods, system checks, spontaneous observations, and unscheduled
evaluations not necessarily related to the task being accomplished are not listed as
separate activities but are included in the appropriate times.
During deployment of the television camera, several activities were accomplished,
including some that were unplanned. The time line provided a minimum amount of time
for the Commander to (I) remove the thermal blanket on the equipment compartment,
(2) change the camera lens, (3) remove the tripod and camera from the compartment, and
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TABLE II-I.- COMPARATIVE TIMES FOR PLANNED LUNAR SURFACE EVENTS
Planned time, Actual time, Difference, Remarks
Event min:sec min:sec min:Sec
Final preparation for egress I0:00 20:45 +10:45
Commander egress to surface
Commander environmental famil-
iarization
Contingency sample collection
Preliminary spacecraft checks
Lunar Modu|e Pilot egress to
surface
Commander photography and ob-
servation
Television camera deployment
(partial)
Lunar Module Pilot environ-
mental familiarization
Television camera deployment
(complete)
Solar wind composition experi-
ment deployment
Bulk sample and extravehicular
mobility unit evaluation
(complete)
Lunar module inspection by
Lunar Module Pilot
Lunar module inspection by
Commander
Experiment package offloading
Experiment package deploy-
ment
Documented sample collection
Lunar Module Pilot ingress
Transfer of sample return
container
Commander ingress
I0:00
5:00
4:30
6:30
7:00
0:00
4:00
6:00
7:00
4:00
14:30
14:00
15:30
7:00
9:00
34:00
4:00
14:00
9:30
8:00
2:05
3:36
6:35
7:00
2:40
4:50
15:00
ll:50
6:20
18:45
18:15
17:10
5:20
13:00
17:50
4:00
9:00
6:14
-2:00
-2:55
-0.54
+0:05
0:00
+2:40
+0:50
+9:00
+4:50
+2:20
÷4:15
+4:15
+1:40
-1:40
+4:00
-16:10
0:00
-5:00
-3:16
Approximately 8 min 30 sec from
cabin pressure reading of
0,2 psia until hatch opening
Out of sequence with planned
time line
Out of sequence
Approximately 2 min I0 sec for
portable life support system
checks
Deployment interrupted for ac-
tivity with plaque
Includes assisting Commander
with plaque and television
camera deployment
Includes photography of solar
composition experiment and
comments on lunar surface
characteristics
Includes closeup camera photo-
graphs
From door open to door closed
From selection of _ite to com-
pletion of photography;
trouble leveling the equip-
ment
Partially completed
Includes cabin repressuriza-
tion
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(4) move the tripod-mounted camera to a remote location. This time also included a few
minutes for (I) viewing selected lunar features, (2) positioning the camera to cover the
subsequent surface activities, and (3) returning to the compartment.
Throughout the extravehicular activity, both crewmen made observations and evalua-
tions of the lunar environment, including lighting and surface features as well as other
characteristics of scientific or operational interest. During the extravehicular activity,
the sun angle ranged from 14.5 ° to 16 ° . Most of the observations and evaluations will
provide valuable information for future equipment design, crew training, and flight
planning.
The evaluation of lunar surface experiments is contained in the following paragraphs.
Photographic results, including those related to specific experiments, are discussed both
in the appropriate sections and in a general description of lunar surface photography.
(See "Solar Wind Composition Experiment" in this section. Definitions of some scientific
terms used in this section are contained in appendix C.)
Lunar Geology Experiment
Summary.- The Apollo II spacecraft landed in the southwestern part of Mare Tranquil-
litatis at latitude 0°41'15 '' N and longitude 23026 ' E (fig, II-I), approximately 20 kilo-
meters southwest of the crater Sabine D. This part of Mare Tranquillitatis is crossed
by relatively faint, but distinct, north-northwest-trending rays (bright, whitish lines)
associated with the crater Theophilus, which lies 320 kilometers to the southeast
(ref. 2). The landing site is approximately 25 kilometers southeast of Surveyor V and
68 kilometers southwest of the impact crater formed by Ranger VIII. A fairly prominent
north-northeast-trending ray lies 15 kilometers west of the landing site. This ray may
be related to Alfraganus, 160 kilometers to the southwest, or to Tycho, approximately
1500 kilometers to the southwest. The landing site lies between major rays, but may
contain rare fragments derived from Theophilus, Alfraganus, Tycho, or other distant
craters.
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Figure II-I.- Landing location relative to Surveyor V and Ranger VIII.
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About400meterseast of the landing point is a sharp-rimmedray crater, approxi-
mately180meters in diameterand 30metersdeep,whichwasunofficially namedWest
Crater. WestCrater is surroundedby a blocky ejecta (material ejected from crater) apron
that extendsalmost symmetricallyoutwardapproximately250meters from the rim crest.
Blocksas large as 5 meters in diameterexist from on the rim to as far awayfrom the rim
as approximately150meters, as well as in the interior of the crater. Raysof blocky
ejecta, with manyfragments0.5 to 2 metersacross, extendbeyondthe ejecta apronwest
of the landing point. Thelunar modulelandedbetweenthese rays in a path that is rela-
tively free of extremely coarse blocks.
At the landing site, the lunar surface consists of fragmental debris ranging in size
from particles too fine to be resolved by the naked eye to blocks 0.8 meter in diameter.
This debris forms a layer that is called the lunar regolith. At the surface, the regolith
(debris layer) is porous and weakly coherent. It grades downward into a similar, but more
densely packed, substrate. The bulk of the regolith consists of fine particles, but many
small rock fragments were encountered in the subsurface as well as on the surface.
In the vicinity of the lunar module, the mare surface has numerous small craters
ranging in diameter from a few centimeters to several tens of meters. Just southwest of
the lunar module is a double crater 12 meters long, 6 meters wide, and 1 meter deep, with
a subdued raised rim. Approximately 50 meters east of the lunar module is a steep-walled,
but shallow, crater 33 meters in diameter and 4 meters deep which was visited by the Com-
mander near the end of the extravehicular period.
All of the craters in the immediate vicinity of the lunar module have rims, walls,
and floors of relatively fine-grained material, with scattered coarser fragments that
occur in about the same abundance as on the intercrater areas. These craters are up to
a meter deep and, because of the lack of blocky ejecta, appear to have been excavated
entirely in the regolith.
At the 33-meter-diameter crater east of the lunar module, the walls and rim have
the same texture as the regolith elsewhere; however, a pile of blocks was observed on the
floor of the crater. The crater floor may lie close to the base of the regolith. Sev-
eral craters of about the same size --with steep walls and shallow, flat floors or
floors with central humps --occur in the area around the landing site. From the depths
of these craters, the thickness of the regolith is estimated to range from 3 to 6 meters.
Coarse fragments are scattered in the vicinity of the lunar module in about the same
abundance as at the Surveyor I landing site in the Ocean of Storms at latitude 2°24.6 ' S
and longitude 48°18 ' N. The coarse fragments are distinctly more abundant than at the
other Surveyor landing sites on the maria, including the landing site of Surveyor V north-
west of the lunar module. The Surveyor I landing site was near a fresh blocky-rim crater
but beyond the apron of coarse blocky ejecta, as was the Apollo II site. It may be in-
ferred that many rock fragments in the immediate vicinity of the spacecraft, at both the
Surveyor I and the Apollo II landing sites, were derived from the nearby blocky-rim crater.
Fragments derived from West Crater may have come from depths as great as 30 meters beneath
the mare surface and may be direct samples of the bedrock from which the local regolith
was derived.
Rock fragments at the Apollo II landing site have a wide variety of shapes, and most
are embedded to varying degrees in the fine matrix of the regolith. Most of the rocks
are rounded or partially rounded on their upper surfaces, but angular fragments of irreg-
ular shape are also abundant. A few rocks are rectangular slabs with a faint platy
(parallel fractures) structure. Many of the rounded rocks, when collected, were found
to be flat or of irregular angular shape on the bottom. The exposed part of one unusual
rock, which was not collected, was described by the Commander as resembling an automobile
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zdistributor cap. When this rock was dislodged, the sculptured "cap" was found to be the
top of a much bigger rock, the buried part of which was larger in lateral dimensions and
angular in form.
The evidence suggests that processes of erosion are taking place on the lunar sur-
face and that this erosion is leading to the gradual rounding of the exposed surfaces
of rocks. Several processes may be involved. On some rounded rock surfaces, the indi-
vidual clasts (fragmented material) and grains that compose the rocks and the glassy
linings of pits on the surfaces have been left in raised relief by general wearing away
or ablation of the surface. This
differential erosion is most prom-
inent in microbreccia (rocks con-
sisting of small sharp fragments
embedded in a fine-grained matrix).
Fne ablation may be caused primar-
ily by small particles bombarding
the surface.
Some crystalline rocks of me-
dium grain size have rounded sur-
faces that have been produced by
the peeling of closely spaced
exfoliation (thin, concentric
flakes) shells. The observed
"distributor cap" form may have
developed by exfoliation or by
spalling of the free surfaces of
the rock as a result of one or more
energetic impacts on the top
surface.
Minute pits from a fraction
of a millimeter to approximately
2 millimeters in diameter and from
a fraction of a millimeter to
1 millimeter deep occur on the
rounded surfaces of most rocks.
As described in "Geologic Photog-
raphy and Mapping Procedures" in
this section, many of these pits
are lined with glass. The pits are
present on a specimen of microbrec-
cia which has been tentatively
identified in photographs taken on
the lunar surface and for which a
preliminary orientation of the rock
at the time of collection has been
obtained. (An example is
fig. 11-2.) The pits, which are
found primarily on the upper side
of the specimen, clearly have been
produced by a process acting on
the exposed surface. The pits do
not resemble impact craters pro-
duced in the laboratory (at col-
lision velocities of 7 km/sec and
below), and their origin is yet to
be explained.
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Figure 11-2.- Lunar sample and relative position
on lunar surface.
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Regionalgeologic setting.- MareTranquillitatis hasan irregular form (refs 3
and4). Twocharacteristics suggestthat the marematerial is relatively thin: il) an
unusual ridge ring, named Lamont, located in the southwest part of the mare, may be
localized over the shallowly buried rim of a premare crater; and (2) no large positive
gravity anomaly, like those over the deep mare-filled circular basins, is associated with
Mare Tranquillitatis (ref. 5).
The southern part of Mare Tranquillitatis is crossed by relatively faint but distinct
north-northwest-trending rays and prominent secondary craters associated with the crater
Theophilus. Approximately 15 kilometers west of the landing site is a fairly prominent
north-northeast-trending ray. The ray may be related to either of the craters Alfraganus
or Tycho located 160 and 1500 kilometers, respectively, to the southwest.
A hill of highland-like material protrudes above the mare surface 52 kilometers
east-southeast of the landing site. This structure suggests that the mare material is
very thin in this region, perhaps no more than a few hundred meters thick.
Location of the landing site from transmitted g_eologic data.- The landing site was
tentatively identified during the lunar surface stay on the basis of observations trans-
mitted by the crew. The Commander reported avoiding a blocky crater the size of a foot-
ball field during landing and observed a hill that he estimated to be from 0.5 to 1 mile
west of the lunar module. The lunar module was tilted 4.5 ° E (backward) on the lunar
surface.
During the first pass of the command and service modules after lunar module landing
(approximately 1 to 1.5 hours after landing), the first of several different landinn-site
locations, computed from the onboard computer and from tracking data, was transmitted to
the Command Module Pilot for visual search. (See section 5.) The first such estimate
of the landing site was northwest of the planned landing ellipse. The only site near
this computed location that could have matched the reported description was near North
Crater at the northwest boundary of the landing ellipse. However, this region did not
match the description very closely. Later, computed estimates indicated that the landing
site was considerably south of the earlier determination, and the areas near West Crater
most closely fit the description. These data were transmitted to the Command Module
Pilot on the last pass before lunar module lift-off, but the Command Module Pilot's ac-
tivities at this time did not permit visual search. The location just west of West Crater
was confirmed by rendezvous-radar tracking of the command module by the lunar module near
the end of the lunar stay period and by the descent photography.
The crater that was avoided during landing was reported by the crew to be surrounded
by ejecta containing blocks up to 5 meters in diameter and which extended I00 to 200 me-
ters from the crater rim, indicating a relatively fresh, sharp-rimmed ray crater. The
only crater in the I00- to 200-meter size range that meets the description and is in the
vicinity indicated by the radar is West Crater near the southwest edge of the planned
landing ellipse. A description by the Commander of a double crater approximately 6 to
12 meters in size and south of the lunar module shadow, plus the identification of West
Crater, the hill to the west, and the 21- to 24-meter crater reported behind the lunar
module, formed a unique pattern from which the landing site was determined to within
approximately 8 meters. The 21- to 24-meter crater has been since identified by photom-
etry as being 33 meters in diameter. The returned sequence-camera descent photography
confirmed the landing point location. The position corresponds to coordinates latitude
0°41'15 '' N and longitude 23°26'0 '' E on figure 5-10 (in section 5).
Geology from transmitted data.- The surface of the mare near the landing site is
unusually rough and of greater geologic interest than expected before flight. Television
pictures indicated a greater abundance of coarse fragmental debris than at any of the
four Surveyor landing sites on the maria except that of Surveyor I (ref. 6). It is
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likely that the observed fragments and the samples returned to earth had been derived
from varying depths beneath the original mare surface and have had widely different his-
tories of exposure on the lunar surface.
The major topographic features in the landing area are large craters a few hundred
meters across, four of which are broad subdued features. The fifth large crater is West
Crater located 400 meters east of the landing point. Near the lunar module, the surface
is pocked by numerous small craters and strewn with fragmental debris, part of which may
have been generated during the impact formation of West Crater.
Among the smaller craters, both sharp, raised-rim craters and relatively subdued
craters are common. They range in size from a few centimeters to 20 meters. A slightly
subdued, raised-rim crater (the reported 21- to 24-meter crater) 33 meters in diameter
and 4 meters deep occurs approximately 50 meters east of the lunar module, and a double
crater (the reported doublet crater) approximately 12 meters long and 6 meters wide lies
I0 meters west of the lunar module at a 260 ° azimuth (fig. 5-8).
The walls and floors of most of the craters are smooth and uninterrupted by either
outcrops or conspicuous stratification. Rocks present in the 33-meter crater are larger
than any of those seen on the surface in the vicinity of the lunar module. The bulk of
the surface layer consists of fine-grained particles which tended to adhere to the crew-
men's boots and suits, as well as to equipment, and which was molded into smooth forms
in the footprints.
The regolith is weak and relatively easily trenched to depths of several centimeters.
At an altitude of approximately 30 meters prior to landing, the crewmen observed dust
moving away from the center of the descent propulsion blast. The lunar module footpads
penetrated to a maximum depth of 7 or 8 centimeters. The crewmen's boots left prints
generally from 3 millimeters to 2 or 3 centimeters deep (fig. 11-3). Surface material
was easily dislodged when kicked. The
flagpole and drive tubes were pressed into
the surface to a depth of approximately
12 centimeters. At that depth, the regolith
was not sufficiently strong to hold the core
tubes upright. A hammer was used to drive
the core tubes to depths of 15 to 20 centi-
_= meters. In places, during scooping opera-
tions, rocks were encountered in the
subsurface.
The crewmen's boot treads were sharply
preserved, and angles as large as 70° were
maintained in the footprint walls (fig. 11-4).
The surface disturbed by walking tended to
break into slabs, cracking outward approxi-
mately 12 to 15 centimeters from the edges
of the footprints.
Figure 11-3.- Surface characteristics
around footprints.
The finest particles of the surface had
some adhesion to boots, gloves, suits, hand-
tools, and rocks on the lunar surface. On
repeated contact, the coating on the boots
thickened to the point that the color of the
boots was completely obscured. When the
fine particles were brushed off the suits,
a stain remained.
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During the television pano-
rama, the Commanderpointed out
several rocks west of the tele-
vision camera,oneof whichwas
tabular andstanding onedge,
protruding 30 centimetersabove
the surface. Strewnfields of
angular blocks, manymorethan
0.5 meter long, occur north and
west of the lunar module. In
genera!, the rocks tendedto be
roundedon top andflat or angu-
lar on the bottom. Thecohesive
strength of rock fragmentsvar-
ied, and in somecases the crew
haddifficulty in distinguish-
ing aggregates,or clods of fine
debris, from rocks.
Geologic Rhotography and
mapping procedures.- Television
and photographic.coverage of the
lunar surface activities consti-
tute most of the fundamental
data for the lunar geology ex-
periment and complement infor-
mation reported by the crew.
(Refer to "Photography" in this
section for a discussion of
lunar surface photography.)
Figure 11-4.- Footprint in surface material. Photographic documentation
of the lunar surface was ac-
quired with a 16-millimeter se-
quence camera, a closeup stereoscopic camera, and two 70-millimeter still cameras (one
with an 80-millimeter lens and the other with a 60-millimeter lens). The camera with
the 60-millimeter lens was intended primarily for gathering geologic data, and a trans-
parent plate containing a five-by-five matrix of crosses was mounted in front of the
film plane to define the coordinate system for the optical geometry.
Photographic procedures planned for the lunar geology experiment for use with the
70-millimeter Hasselblad and the 60-millimeter lens were the panorama survey, the sample
area survey, and the single sample survey.
The panorama survey consists of 12 pictures taken at intervals of 30 ° in azimuth and
aimed at the horizon with the lens focused at 22.5 meters. The resulting pictures, when
matched together as a mosaic, form a continuous 360 ° view of the landing site from which
relative azimuth angles can be measured between features of interest. The Commander took
a partial panorama from the foot of the ladder immediately after he stepped to the lunar
surface (fig. ll-5(a)). Also, three panoramas were taken from the vertexes of an imag-
inary triangle surrounding the lunar module (for example, figs. ll-5(b) and II-5(c)).
The sample area survey consists of five or more pictures taken of an area 4 to
6 meters from the camera. The first picture was taken approximately down sun, and the
succeeding three or more pictures were taken cross sun, with parallel camera axes at
intervals of 1 to 2 meters.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 11-5.- Panoramic views.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 11-5.- Panorar, fic views,
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Thesingle samplesurveywasdesignedto record structures that wereparticularly
significant to the crew. Thearea wasphotographedfrom a distance of 1.6 meters. As
with the samplearea survey, the first picture wastakenapproximatelydownsun, andthe
next twoweretaken cross sun.
Geologic stud_from photographs.- The lunar geology experiment includes a detailed
study and comparison of photographs of the rock samples in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory
with photographs taken on the lunar surface. The method of study involves drawings of
geologic sketch maps of faces that show features of the rock unobscured by dust and de-
tailed descriptions of the morphologic (relating to former structure), structural, and
textural features of the rock, together with interpretation of the associated geologic
features. The photographs and geologic sketches constitute a permanent record of the
appearance of the specimens before subsequent destructive laboratory work.
A small rock 2 by 4 by 6 centimeters, which was collected in the contingency sample,
has been tentatively located on the lunar surface photographs. Photographs of the rock
show a fresh-appearing vesicular (with small cavities resulting from vaporization in a
molten mass) lava, similar in vesicularity, texture, and crystallinity to many terres-
trial basalts (fig. II-2). _i_: i
The third largest rock in the contingency sample was collected within 2 meters of
the lunar module. The rock has an ovoid shape, tapered at one end, with a broadly
rounded top and nearly flat bottom (fig. 11-6). This rock is approximately 5.5 centi_
meters long, 2 to 3 centimeters wide, and 1.5 to 2 centimeters thick. Parts of the top
and sides of the rock are covered with fine dust, but the bottom and lower sides indicate !
a very fine-grained clastic rock containing scattered subrounded rock fragments up to
5 millimeters in diameter. The rounded ovoid shape of the top and sides of this specimen
is irregular in detail. In the central part of the rock, a broad depression is formed by
many coalescing shallow irregular cavities and round pits. Adjacent to the central part,
toward the tapered front end, round deep pits are abundant and so closely spaced that
some pits intersect others and indicate more than one generation of pitting. The bottom
of the rock is marked by two parallel flat surfaces separated by an irregular longitudinal
scarp approximately 0.5 to 1 millimeter high. A few small cavities are present, but no
round pits of the type found on the top appear on the bottom of the rock. An irregular
fracture pattern occurs on the bottom of the rock. The fractures are short, discontinuous,
and largely filled with dust. On the top of the rock near the tapered end, a set of short
fractures 3 to 9 millimeters long is largely dust filled and does not appear to penetrate
far into the rock. On a few sides and corners, there are short curved fractures which
may be exfoliation features. This rock is a breccia of small subangular lithic fragments
in a very fine-grained matrix. The rock resembles the material of the surface layer as
photographed by the stereoscopic closeup camera, except that this specimen is indurated.
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Figure 11-6.- Detailed view of lunar rock.
Photometric evaluation.- The general photometric characteristics of the surface were
not noticeably different from those observed at the Surveyor landing sites. See "Photog-
raphy" in this section for a more detailed evaluation of the photography during lunar
orbit and surface operations. The albedo of the lunar surface decreased significantly
when the surface was disturbed or covered with a spray of fine-grained material kicked
up by the crew. At low phase angles, the reflectance of the fine-grained material was
increased noticeably, especially where it was compressed smoothly by the crewmen's boots.
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Surface traverse and samplin 9 logs.- The television pictures and lunar surface photo-
graphs were used to prepare a map of the locations of surface features, emplaced instru-
ments, and samples (fig. 11-7). The most distant single traverse was made to the
33-meter-diameter crater east of the lunar module.
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Figure 11-7.- Diagram of lunar surface activity areas.
The contingency sample was taken in view of the sequence camera just outside quad IV
of the lunar module. Two scoopfuls filled the sample bag with approximately 1.03 kilo-
grams of surface material. The areas where the samples were obtained have been accurately
located on a frame (fig. 11-8) of the sequence film taken from the lunar module window.
Both scoopfuls included small rock fragments (figs. 11-9 and II-I0) visible on the sur-
face from the lunar module windows prior to sampling.
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Figure 11-8.- Locationof two
contingencysamplescoops.
Figure 11-9.- Rockscollected during
first contingencysamplescoop.
J . -=
Figure II-I0.- Rock collected during
second contingency sample scoop.
The Commander pushed the handle of the
scoop apparatus 15 to 20 centimeters into
the surface near the area of the first scoop.
Collection of the bulk sample included 17 or
18 scoopfuls taken in full view of the tele-
vision camera and at least five scoopfuls
taken within the field of view of the
sequence camera.
The two core-tube samples were taken in
the vicinity of the solar wind composition
experiment. The first core location was doc-
umented by the television camera and by two
individual Hasselblad photographs. The sec-
ond core-tube location, as reported by the
crew, was in the vicinity of the solar wind
composition experiment.
Approximately 20 selected, but unphoto-
graphed, grab samples (approximately 6 kilo-
grams) were collected in the final minutes of
the extravehicular activity. These specimens
were collected in a region I0 to 15 meters
south of the lunar module and near the east
rim of the large double crater.
The sites of three of the contingency
sample rocks have been located, and the
locations of two rocks have been tentatively
identified by comparing the shapes and sizes
shown in the lunar module window and surface
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photographswith photographstakenof the specimensat the LunarReceivingLaboratory.
Evidencefor the identification andorientation of rock A (fig. ll-9) was obtained from
the presence of a saddle-shaped notch on its exposed side. Rock C (fig. ll-lO) was
characterized by the pitlike depression visible on the photographs. Rock B (fig. ll-9)
is approximately 2 centimeters wide and at this time has not been correlated with the
specimens in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory. During bulk sampling, rock fragments were
collected primarily on the northeast rim of the large double crater southwest of the
lunar module.
Photographs taken of the documented sample locality (south of the plus Z footpad)
before and after the extravehicular activity were examined for evidence of rocks that
might have been included in the sample. Figures II-II and 11-12 illustrate that three
rather large rocks (up to several tens of centimeters) were removed from their respective
positions shown on the photographs taken before the extravehicular activity. A closer
view of these three rocks was obtained during the extravehicular activity (fig. 11-13).
Figure ll-ll.- Photograph taken before
extravehicular activity, showing
rocks collected (fig. ll-9).
Figure 11-12.- Photograph of area
shown in figure II-II after extra-
vehicular activity,
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Figure 11-13.- Photographof area shownin figures II-II and11-12, taken
during extravehicular activity.
Geologic handtools.- The geologic handtools included the contingency sample container,
a scoop, a hammer, an extension handle, two core tubes, tongs, two large sample bags, a
weighing scale, two sample return containers, and the gnomon. Also included were small
sample bags numbered for use in documentation. All handtools were used except the gnomon.
The crew reported that, in general, the handtools worked well.
The large scoop attached to the extension handle was used primarily during bulk
sampling to collect rocks and fine-grained material. The large scoop was used approxi-
mately 22 times in collecting the bulk sample. As expected from I/6-g simulations, some
lunar material tended to fall out of the scoop at the end of a scooping motion.
The hammer was used to drive the core tubes, which were attached to the extension
handle. Blows hard enough to dent the top of the extension handle could be struck. The
extension handle was attached to the large scoop for taking bulk samples and was attached
to the core tubes for taking core samples.
Two core tubes were driven, and each collected a satisfactory sample. Each tube had
an internally tapered bit that compressed the sample 2.2:1 inside the tube. One core
tube contained lO centimeters of sample, and the other contained 13 centimeters of sample.
The tubes were difficult to drive deeper than approximately 20 centimeters. This dif-
ficulty may have been partially caused by the increasing density of the fine-grained
material with depth or by other mechanical characteristics of the lunar regolith. The
difficulty of penetration was also a function of the tapered bit, which caused greater
resistance with increased penetration. One tube was difficult to attach to the extension
handle. When this tube was detached from the extension handle, the butt end of the tube
unscrewed and was lost on the lunar surface. The tubes were opened after the flight, and
the split liners inside both tubes were found to be offset at the bit end. The Teflon
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core follower in one tube was originally inserted upside down, and the follower in the
other tube was inserted without the expansion spring which holds the follower snugly
against the inside of the split tube.
The tongs were used to pick up the documented samples and to right the closeup
stereoscopic camera when it fell over on the lunar surface. One of the large sample bags
was used for stowage of documented samples. The other large bag, the weigh bag, was
used for stowage of bulk samples. The weighing scale was used only as a hook to suspend
the bulk sample bag from the lunar module during the collection of bulk samples.
Lunar Soil Mechanics Experiment
The lunar surface at the Apollo II landing site was similar in appearance, behavior,
and mechanical properties to the surface observed at the Surveyor maria landing sites.
Although the lunar surface material differs considerably in composition and in range of
particle shapes from a terrestrial soil of the same particle size distribution, it does
not appear to differ significantly in its engineering behavior.
A variety of data was obtained through detailed crew observations, photography,
telemetered dynamic data, and examination of the returned lunar surface material and rock
samples. This information permitted a preliminary assessment of the physical and mechan-
ical properties of the lunar surface materials. Simulations based on current data are
planned to gain further insight into the physical characteristics and mechanical behavior
of lunar surface materials.
Observed characteristics.- The physical characteristics of lunar surface materials
were first indicated during the lunar module descent. At that time, the crew noticed a
transparent sheet of dust resembling a thin layer of ground fog that moved radially out-
ward and caused a gradual decrease in visibility.
Inspection of the area below the descent stage after landing revealed no evidence
of an erosion crater and little change in the apparent topography. The surface immedi-
ately underneath the engine skirt had a singed appearance and was slightly etched
(fig. 11-14). The surface appearance indicated that the descent engine had caused a
sculpturing effect that entended outward from the engine. Visible streaks of eroded
material extended to a maximum distance of approximately 1 meter beyond the engine skirt.
During ascent, no visible signs of surface erosion were observed. The insulation
blown off the descent stage generally moved outward on extended flight paths in a manner
similar to that of the eroded surface particles during descent, although the crew re-
ported that the insulation was, in some cases, blown for several miles.
The landing gear footpads penetrated the lunar surface 2 to 8 centimeters, and there
was no discernible throwout from the footpads. Figures 11-15 to 11-18 show the footpads
of the plus Y, minus Z, and minus ¥ struts. The same photographs show the postlanding
condition of the lunar contact probes, which had dug into and were dragged through the
lunar surface, as well as some surface bulldozing caused by the minus Z footpad in the
direction of the left lateral motion during landing. The bearing pressure on each
footpad was 1 or 2 psi.
The upper centimeters of lunar surface material in the vicinity of the landing site
are characterized by a brownish, medium-gray, slightly cohesive granular material that
is largely composed of bulky grains in the size range of silt to fine sand. Angular to
subrounded rock fragments up to 1 meter in diameter are distributed throughout the area.
Some of these fragments were observed to lie on the surface, some were partially buried,
and others were barely exposed.
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Figure 11-14.- Lunarsurface under
descentstageengine.
Figure 11-15.- Interaction of the
_lus Y footpad andcontact probe
with lunar surface,
Figure 11-16.- Interaction of the minus
Z footpadwith lunar surface.
Figure 11-17.- Interaction of the
minusY footpad andcontact probe
with lunar surface.
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Figure 11-18.- Soil disturbance in the
minusY footpad area.
Thelunar surface is relatively soft to
depthsof 5 to 20 centimeters. Thesurface
canbeeasily scooped,offers low resistance
to penetration, andprovides slight lateral
support for staffs, poles, andcore tubes.
Beneaththis relatively soft surface, re-
sistance to penetration increasesconsider-
ably. Theavailable data indicate that this
increase is causedby an increase in the
density of material at the surface rather
than by the presenceof rock fragmentsor
bedrock.
Natural clods of fine-grained material
crumbledunder the crewmen'sboots. Thebe-
havior of the clods, while not fully under-
stood, indicates cementationor natural
cohesionbetweenthe grains (or both). In
nitrogen, returned lunar surface sampleswere
also foundto cohereto someextent after
being separated,although to a lesser degree
than observedon the lunar surface in the
vacuumenvironment.
Thelunar surfacematerial wasloose, powdery,andfine-grained andexhibited ad-
hesive characteristics. As a result, the material tendedto stick to anyobject with
which it camein contact, including the crewmen'sboots andsuits, the television cable,
andthe lunar equipmentconveyor. Duringoperation of the lunar equipmentconveyor,the
powderadheringto it wascarried into the spacecraft cabin. Also, sufficient fine-
grained material collected on the equipmentconveyorto causebinding.
Thethin layer of material adheringto the cre_en's boot soles causeda tendency
to slip on the ladder during ingress. Similarly, the powderycoating of the rocks on the
lunar surface causedsomeslipping. (Seesection 4.) A fine dust confined betweentwo
relatively hard surfaces, suchas a boot sole anda ladder run_ or a rock surface, would
be expectedto producea tendencyto slip. However,the lunar surface provided adequate
bearing strength for standing, walking, loping, or jumpingandsufficient traction for
starting, turning, or stopping.
Small, fresh crater walls having slope anglesof up to 15° could be readily nego-
tiated by the crew. Goingstraight downor upwasfoundto be preferable to traversing
these slopes sideways. Thefooting wasnot securebecausethe varying thicknessesof
unstable layer material tendedto slide in an unpredictablefashion.
Thematerial on the rims andwalls of larger size craters, with wall slopes ranging
up to 35° , appearedto bemorecompactandstable than that on the smaller craters.
Examinationof lunar material samples.- Preliminary observations were made of the
general appearance, structure, texture, color, grain-size distribution, consistency,
compactness, and mechanical behavior of the fine-grained material sampled by the core
tubes and collected during the contingency, bulk, and documented samplings. These in-
vestigations are reported in greater detail in other reports.
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Examinationof LunarSamples
A total of 22 kilogramsof lunar material wasreturned by the Apollo II crew;
II kilogramswererock fragmentsmorethan 1 centimeter in diameter, andII kilograms
weresmaller particulate material. Becausethe crewmanfilled the documentedsample
container by picking up selected rocks with tongs, the container held a variety of large
rocks (total weight, 6.0 kilograms). Thetotal bulk sampleweighed14.6 kilograms.
Thereturned lunar material maybe divided into the following four groups:
I. TypeA: fine-grained crystalline igneousrock containing vesicles (cavities)
2. TypeB: medium-grainedvuggy(small cavity) crystalline igneousrock
3. TypeC: breccia (rock consisting of sharpfragmentsimbeddedin a fine-grained
matrix) madeof small #ragmentsof gray rocks andfine material
4. TypeD: fines (mixturesof very small particles of various sizes)
Themajor findings of a preliminary examinationof the lunar samplesare as follows:
I. Basedon the fabric andmineralogy, the rocks canbe divided into two groups:(a) fine- andmedium-grainedcrystalline rocks of igneousorigin, probablyoriginally
depositedas lava flows, then dismemberedand redepositedas impactdebris and (b) brec-
cias of complexhistory.
2. Thecrystalline rocks are different from any terrestrial rock and frommete-
orites, as shownby the bulk chemistrystudies andby analysesof mineral concentration
in a specified area.
3. Erosionhasoccurredon the lunar surface, as indicated by the roundingonmost
rocks andby the evidenceof exposureto a processwhichgives the rocks a surface ap-
pearancesimilar to sandblastedrocks. Noevidenceexists of erosion by surface water,
4. Theprobablepresenceof the assemblageiron-troilite-ilmenite andthe absence
of anyhydratedphasesuggestthat the crystalline rocks wereformedunderextremely low
partial pressuresof oxygen,water, andsulfur (in the rangeof those in equilibrium
with mostmeteorites).
5. Theabsenceof secondaryhydratedminerals suggeststhat there hasbeenno sur-
face water at Tranquility Baseat any time since the rocks wereexposed.
6. Evidenceof shockor impactmetamorphismis commoni the rocks andfines.
7. All the rocks display glass-lined surface pits whichmayhavebeencausedby
the impactof small particles.
8. Thefine material and the breccia contain large amountsof all noble gaseswith
elementalandisotopic abundancesthat almost certainly werederived from the solar wind.
Thefact that interior samplesof the breccias contain thesegasesimplies that the
breccias wereformedat the lunar surface frommaterial previously exposedto the solar
wind.
9. The 40K/4OAr measurements on igneous rock indicate that those rocks crystal-
lized 3 to 4 billion years ago. Cosmic-ray-produced nuclides indicate that the rocks
have been within l meter of the surface for periods of 20 to 160 million years.
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I0. Thelevel of indigenousvolatilizable or pyrolyzable (or both) organic material
appearsto be extremelylow (considerably less than 1 ppm).
II. Thechemicalanalysesof 23 lunar samplesshowthat all rocks and fines are
generally similar chemically.
12. The elemental constituents of lunar samples are the same as those found in
terrestrial igneous rocks and meteorites. However, several significant differences in
composition occur: (a) Some refractory elements (such as titanium and zirconium) are
notably enriched, and (b) the alkalis and some volatile elements are depleted.
13. Elements that are enriched in iron meteorites (that is, nickel, cobalt, and
the platinum group) either were not observed or were low in abundance.
14. The chemical analysis of the fine material is in excellent agreement with the
results of the alpha-backscattering measurement at the Surveyor V site.
15. Of 12 radioactive species identified, two were cosmogenic radionuclides of
short half life (52Mn which has a half life of 5.7 days and 48V which has a half life
of 16.1 days).
16. Uranium and thorium concentrations were near the typical values for terrestrial
basalts; however, the potassium-to-uranium ratio determined for lunar surface material is
much lower than such values determined for either terrestrial rocks or meteorites.
17. The observed high concentration of 26AI is consistent with a long-cosmic-ray
exposure age inferred from the rare-gas analysis.
18. To date, no evidence of biological material has been found in the samples.
19. The lunar surface material at the lunar module landing site is predominantly
fine grained, granular, slightly cohesive, and incompressible. The hardness increases
considerably at a depth of 6 inches. The soil is similar in appearance and behavior to
the soil at the Surveyor landing sites.
Passive Seismic Experiment
The early Apollo scientific experiment package seismometer system met the require-
ments of the experiment for the first 2 weeks of its operation. No significant instru-
mental deficiencies were encountered, despite the fact that maximum operating temperatures
exceeded those planned for the instrument by as much as 50° F.
Analysis of calibration pulses and signals received from various crew activities in-
dicated that all four seismometers were operating properly. Instrument response curves
derived from calibration pulses are shown in figure 11-19.
During the first lunar day, data were acquired at 11:40:39 p.m.e.s.t., July 20,
1969, and transmission was stopped by command from Mission Control Center at 06:58:46 a.m.
e.s.t., August 3, 1969, when the predicted rate of solar panel output power drop occurred
at lunar sunset. This output power drop occurred approximately 4 hours 40 minutes before
the sunset time predicted for a flat surface, indicatin_ an effective slope of 2°20 ' up-
ward to the west at the deployment site.
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Figure II-19.- Response from passive
seismic experiment.
Except for the occasional occurrence
of transient signals, the background seis-
mic signal level on the long-period
vertical-component seismometer is below
system noise; that is, below 0.3 milli-
micron over the period range from 1 to
I0 seconds (figs. 11-21 and 11-22). This
level is between I00 and I0 000 times
less than the average background levels
observed on earth in the normal period
range for microseisms (6 to 8 seconds).
Continuous background motions of
relatively large amplitude (I0 to 30 mil-
limicrons peak to peak) were observed on
the records from both horizontal-
Seismic background noise.- A histogram
of seismic background level recorded by the
short-period seismometer is shown in fig-
ure 11-20. Immediately after turn-on, the
high-amplitude signal was produced in part
by crew activities and in part by a signal
generated within the lunar module, presum-
ably by venting processes. The levels
decreased steadily until the background
signal had disappeared completely by July 29,
1969 (8 days after turn-on). Thus, the con-
tinuous seismic background signal near
1 hertz is less than 0.3 millimicron, which
corresponds to system noise. Maximum signal
levels of 1.2 microns at frequencies of 7 to
8 hertz were observed during the period when
the crewmen were on the surface.
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Figure 11-20.- Signal-level history from
short-period Z-axis seismometer.
component seismometers. The amplitude of these motions decreased below the level of the
54-second oscillation for a 2- to 3-day interval centered near lunar noon when the rate
of change of external temperature with time would be at a minimum. The signals were of
low frequency (with a period of approximately 20 seconds to 2 minutes). It is assumed
that these signals correspond to tilting of the instruments. The tilting is caused by
a combination of thermal distortions of the metal pallet which serves as the instrument
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Figure II-21.- Diagram showing types of
noise transients observed on the
seismic and tidal outputs from the
long-period seismometers.
base and a rocking motion of the pallet pro-
duced by thermal effects in the lunar surface
material. However, the horizontal component
of true lunar seismic background level at
shorter periods (less than lO seconds) also
appears to be less than 0.3 millimicron.
Near seismic events.- Four types of high-
frequency signals produced by local sources
(within lO to 20 kilometers of the seismic
experiment package) have been tentatively
identified. Signals of the first type, those
produced by crew activities, were prominent
on the short-period seismometer from initial
turn-on until lunar module ascent. Such
signals were particularly large when the
crewmen were in physical contact with the
lunar module. The signal produced when the
Commander ascended the ladder to reenter
the lunar module is shown in figure II-23.
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Figure 11-23.- Seismometer response while
Commander was ascending ladder.
The predominant frequency of all of the
signals produced by crew activities is 7.2 to
Figure 11-22.- Histogram of long-period 7.3 hertz. The spectrum of the signal pro-
noise transients, duced by the Commander on the lunar module
ladder, shown in figure 11-23, contains this
prominent peak. This frequency is approxi-
mately equal to the fundamental resonant mode of vibration of the lunar module structure.
For comparison, the spectrum of the signal generated when one of the portable life sup-
port systems, which weighed 75 pounds, struck the ground after being ejected from the
lunar module is shown in figure 11-24. The spectrum again shows the 7.2-hertz peak; how-
ever, the two peaks at 11.3 and 12.3 hertz would be dominant if the spectrum were cor-
rected for instrument response. The signal at 7.2 hertz was presumably generated because
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the portable life support system struck
the lunar module porch and the ladder as
it fell to the surface.
The 7.2-hertz peak is shifted to
8.0 hertz in the spectra of signals gen-
erated after departure of the lunar mod-
ule ascent stage. It is expected that
resonances in the remaining descent stage
structure shifted to higher frequencies
when the mass of the ascent stage was
removed.
Some of the signals observed had the
same characteristics that landslides have
on earth. The signals have emergent on-
sets and last up to 7 minutes for the
largest trains. Low frequencies (I/tO to
1/15 hertz) associated with the largest
of these trains are also observed on the
seismograms from the long-period vertical-
component seismometer. As shown in
figure II-25, the events associated with
these signals began on July 25, 1969 (2 days
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Figure 11-24.- Seismometer response from
first portable life support system
impacting lunar surface.
before lunar noon), subsided during the lunar noon period, and continued after lunar noon
with more frequent and much smaller events. The activity is believed to be related in
some way to thermal effects. More than 200 of these events were identified.
lO0
3O0 600 -Noon
,,Lunar surfacetemperature
/
Sunset-
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July --_ August
Time, days
Figure II-25.- Lunar surface temperature and seismometer output signals.
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High-frequency signals from an undetermined source were observed. These signals
began with large amplitudes on the short-period seismometer and gradually decreased over
a period of 8 days until they disappeared completely on July 30, 1969. During the final
stages of this activity, the signals became repetitive, with nearly identical structure
from train to train. As mentioned previously, the predominant frequency of these signals
was approximately 7.2 hertz before the lunar module ascent and 8.0 hertz after the lunar
module ascent. The complete disappearance of these signals and their nearly identical
form have led to the tentative conclusion that they were produced by the lunar module
itself, presumably by venting processes.
Some of the observed high-frequency signals may have been from nearby meteoroid im-
pacts. An analysis is being made of several high-frequency signals which may correspond
to meteoroid impacts at ranges of a few kilometers or less from the passive seismic ex-
periment package. Substantive remarks on these events cannot be made until spectra of
the signals are computed.
Distant seismic events.- During the period July 22 to 24, 1969, three of the re-
corded signals appear to be surface waves, that is, seismic waves which travel along
the surface of the moon in contrast to body waves which would travel throuqh the interior
of the moon. Body waves (compressional and shear waves) produced by a given seismic
source normally travel at higher velocities than surface waves and, hence, are observed
on the record before the surface waves. No body waves were observed for distant seismic
events. The wave trains begin with short-period oscillations (2 to 4 seconds) which
gradually increase in period to 16 to 18 seconds when the train dispersed.
A wave train having similar characteristics has been observed on the long-period
vertical channel in association with a series of discrete pulses on the short-period
vertical channel. In this case, the long-period wave train observed on the record is
simply the summation of transients corresponding to these pulses and, hence, is of in-
strumental origin. A dispersion of this type is commonly observed on earth in various
types of surface waves. The dispersion, or gradual transformation of an initial impulsive
source to an extended oscillatory train of waves, is produced by propagation through a
wave guide of some type. The events observed appear only on the horizontal-component
seismometers. Such horizontally polarized waves, when observed on earth, would be called
Love waves. On earth, surface waves which have a vertical component of motion (Rayleigh
waves) are usually the most prominent waves on a record from a distant event. Several
possibilities are presently under study to explain these waves.
Engineering evaluation.- From acquisition of initial data to turn-off, the passive
seismic experiment package operated for 319 hours 18 minutes. The power and data sub-
systems performed extremely well, particularly in view of the abnormally high operating
temperatures. The output of the solar cell array was within 1 to 2 watts of the expected
value and was always higher than the 27-watt minimum design specification.
Approximately 99.8 percent of the data from the passive seismic experiment package
are preserved on tape. Several occurrences of data dropout were determined to be caused
by a source other than the seismic experiment system. The passive seismic experiment
showed good response in detection of the crewmen's footsteps, the portable life support
system ejection from the lunar module, and the movements by the crew in the lunar module
prior to lift-off.
Data from the dust and thermal radiation engineering measurement were obtained con-
tinuously except for brief turn-off periods associated with power/thermal management.
Nine hundred and sixteen commands were transmitted and accepted by the passive seismic
experiment package. Most of these commands were used to level the equipment, thereby
correcting for the thermal distortions of the supporting primary structure.
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Thedown-link signal strength received from the passiveseismic experimentpackage
agreeswith the predictions. For the 30-foot antennas,the strength rangedfrom -135 to
-139 dBm,andfor the 85-foot antennas,the strength rangedfrom -125 to -127 dBm.
Normaloperation was initiated on the secondlunar day by commandfrom Mission Con-
trol Center at I:00 a.m.e.s.t., August19, 1969, approximately20 hoursafter sunrise
at Tranquility Base. Transmissionstoppedat 6:08 a.m.e.s.t., SeptemberI, 1969,with
the loss of solar panel output powerat lunar sunset. Theloss of transmissionwasdis-
appointing; however,at the time of the loss, the passiveseismic experimentpackagehad
exceededthe designobjectives.
Data received, including seismometermeasurements,wereconsistent with those re-
cordedat correspondingsunelevation angleson the first lunar day. Operationcontinued
until the data systemdid not respondto a transmitted commandat 3:50 a.m.e.s.t.,
August25, 1969(approximatelynoonof the secondlunar day). Nocommandwasaccepted
by the passiveseismic experimentpackageafter that time, despite repeatedattempts
undera wide variety of conditions. Theinitial impactof the loss of commandcapability
wasthe inability to relevel the long-period seismic sensors. As a result, all three
axesbecameso unbalancedthat the data weremeaningless;however,meaningfuldata con-
tinued to be received from the short-period seismic sensor.
Valid short-period seismic sensorandtelemetry data continuedto be received and
recordedduring the remainderof the secondlunar day. Componenttemperaturesand power
levels continuedto be nominalandcorrespondedto values recordedat the samesunangles
on the first lunar day. Thepassiveseismic experimentwasautomatically switchedto the
standbymodeof operation whenthe powerdroppedat sunset.
Down-link transmissionwasacquiredduring the third lunar dayat 5:27 p.m.e.s.t.,
September16, 1969. Transmissionstoppedat 6:31 a.m.e.s.t., OctoberI, 1969,with the
loss of powerat lunar sunset. Efforts to restore commandcommunicationswereunsuccess-
ful. Thepassiveseismic experimentremainedin the standbymodeof operation, with no
seismic data output. Data from the dust andthermal radiation engineeringmeasurement
wentoff scale low at I0:00 p.m.e.s.t., September16, 1969, andremainedoff scale
throughoutthe day. Thedown-link signal strength, componenttemperatures,andpower
levels continuedto be nominalandcorrespondedto values recordedat the samesun angles
on previousdays.
Engineering conclusions.- Tentative conclusions based on a preliminary analysis of
data obtained during the first recording period (July 21 to August 3) are as follows:
I. The seismic background signal on the moon is less than the threshold sensitivity
of the instrument (0.3 millimicron). Seismometers are able to operate on the lunar sur-
face at I0 to I00 times higher sensitivity than is possible on earth.
2. Allowing for the difference in size between the earth and the moon, the occur-
rence of seismic events (moonquakes or impacts) on the moon is much less frequent than
the occurrence of earthquakes on the earth.
3. Despite the puzzling features of the possible surface wave trains, an attempt is
being made to find lunar models compatible with the data.
4. Erosional processes corresponding to landslides along crater walls may be oper-
ative within one or more relatively young craters located within a few kilometers of the
passive seismic experiment package.
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Laser RangingRetroreflector Experiment
Thelaser ranging retroreflector wasdeployedapproximately14 meterssouth-southwest
of the lunar modulein a relatively smootharea (fig. 11-26). Thebubblewasnot pre-
cisely in the center of the leveling device, but wasbetweenthe center and the innermost
division in the southwestdirection. This misalinementindicated anoff-level condition
of less than 30minutesof arc. Theshadowlines and suncompassmarkingswereclearly
visible, andthe crewreported that thesedevices showedthat the alinementwasprecise.
On August I, 1969, the Lick Observatory obtained reflected signals from the laser
ranging retroreflector. The signal continued to appear for the remainder of the night.
Between 5 and 8 J/pulse were transmitted at 6943 angstroms. When the 120-inch telescope
was used, each returned signal contained, on the average, more than one photoelectron,
a value that indicated that the condition of the retroreflector on the surface was
entirely satisfactory.
On August 20, 1969, the McDonald Observatory obtained reflected signals from the
retroreflector. The round-trip signal time was found to be 2.49596311 (±0.00000003) sec-
onds, an uncertainty equivalent to a distance variation of 4.5 meters.
Figure 11-26.- Laser ranging
retroreflector deployed.
The Lick Observatory and McDonald Observ-
atory observations, made a few days before
lunar sunset and a few days after lunar sun-
rise, show that the thermal design of the
retroreflector permits operation during sun-
illuminated periods and that the retroreflec-
tor survived the lunar night satisfactorily.
The observations also indicate that no serious
degradation of optical performance occurred
as a result of flaked insulation, debris,
dust, or rocket exhaust products which scat-
tered during the lunar module lift-off.
The scientific objectives of the laser
ranging retroreflector experiment-- studies
of gravitation, relativity, and earth and
lunar physics --can be achieved only by suc-
cessfully monitoring the changes in the dis-
tances from stations on earth to the laser
beam reflector on the moon with an uncertainty
of approximately 15 centimeters over a period
of many years. The McDonald Observatory is
being instrumented to make daily observations
with this accuracy, and it is expected that
several other stations capable of this rang-
ing precision will be established.
Solar Wind Composition Experiment
The solar wind composition experiment was designed to measure the abundance and the
isotopic compositions of the noble gases in the solar wind (3He, 4He, 2ONe, 21Ne, 22Ne,
36Ar , and 38Ar). The experiment consisted of a specially prepared aluminum foil with an
effective area of 0.4 square meter (fig. 11-27), The experiment was deployed approxi-
mately 6 meters from the lunar module. The staff of the experiment penetrated 13.5 cent-
imeters into the surface.
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Whenexposedto the solar wind at the
lunar surface, solar wind particles whichar-
rived with velocities of a few hundredkilo-
metersper secondpenetrated the foil to a
depth of several millionths of a centimeter
and becamefirmly trapped. Thefoil wasre-
trieved after a 77-minuteexposureto the
lunar environment. Thereturn unit wasplaced
into a special Teflon bag andreturned to
earth in the lunar samplereturn container.
A portion of the foil wascut out, placed in-
to a metal gasket vacuumcontainer, andheat
sterilized at 125° C for 39 hours. Theevolv-
ing atomswere then analyzedin statically
operatedmassspectrometers,and the absolute
and isotopic quantities of the particles were
determined.
Photography
During the mission, all nine of the
70-millimeter andall 13of th_ 16-millimeter
film magazinescarried on boardthe spacecraft
wereexposed. Approximately90 percent of the
photographicobjectives wereaccomplished,in-
cluding approximately85 percent of the re-
questedlunar photographyandapproximately
46 percent of the target-of-opportunity
photography.
Photographic objectives.- The lunar sur-
face photographic objectives were as follows:
I. Long-distance coverage from the com-
mand module
Figure 11-27.- Solar wind composition
experiment deployed.
2. Lunar mapping photography from orbit
3. Photography of the landed lunar
module location
4. Sequence photography during descent, lunar stay, and ascent
5. Still photographs through the lunar module window
6. Still photographs on the lunar surface
7. Closeup stereoscopic photography
Film description and processing.- Special care was taken in the selection, prepara-
tion, calibration, and processing of the film to maximize returned information. The
types of film included and exposed are listed in table II-II.
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TABLEII-II.- FILMTYPESUSED
Film type
S0-368,color
S0-168,color
3400, black
andwhite
Film size, mm
16
70
35
16
7O
70
Magazines
8
2
ASA
speed
64
(a)
40
Resolution lines/mm
High
contrast
80
63
170
Low
contrast
35
32
70
aExposedanddevelopedat ASAI000 for interior photographyandASA160for
lunar surface photography.
Photographic results.- Lunar photography from the command module consisted mainly
of photographs of specified targets of opportunity, together with a short strip of ver-
tical still photography from approximately 170 ° to 120 ° E longitude. Most of the other
70-millimeter command module photography was of the lunar surface features selected by
the crew.
The 16-millimeter sequence camera photography was generally excellent. The descent
film was used to determine the location of the landed lunar module. One sequence of
16-millimeter coverage taken from the lunar module window shows the lunar surface change
from a light to a dark color wherever the crew walked.
The quantity and quality of still photographs taken through the lunar module window
and on the lunar surface were very good. On some sequences, to ensure good photography,
the crew varied the exposures one stop in either direction from the exposure indicated.
The still photography on the surface indicates that the landing-site location determined
by use of the 16-millimeter descent film is correct.
The closeup stereoscopic photography provides good-quality imagery of 17 areas,
each 3 by 3 inches. These areas included various rocks, some ground surface cracks, and
rocks which appear to have been partially melted or splattered with molten glass.
Photographic lighting and color effects.- When the lunar surface was viewed from the
command module window, the color was reported to vary with the viewing angle. A high sun
angle caused the surface to appear brown, and a low sun angle caused the surface to ap-
pear slate gray. From the command module, distinct color variations were seen in the
maria, and these variations are very pronounced on the processed film. According to the
crew, the 16-millimeter photographs are more representative of the true surface color
than are the 70-millimeter photographs. However, prints from both film types have shown
tints of green and other shades which are not realistic. Underexposure contributes to
the green tint, and the printing process can increase this effect. Each generation away
from the original copy will cause a further increase in this tinting. On the original
film, the greenish tint in the dark, or underexposed, areas is a function of spacecraft
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windowtransmissioncharacteristics andlow sunangles. For Apollo 12, the master film
copies will becolor corrected, which shouldgreatly minimizeunrealistic tinting.
A 16-millimeter film sequencefrom the lunar modulewindowshowscrewactivities in
both gray andlight-brown areas. As the crewmenmoved,the gray area, which is apparently
softer, deepermaterial, turned almostblack, Thecrewmen'sfeet visibly sank in this
gray material as they kickedmoderatequantities. Thelight-brown area did not appreci-
ably changecolor with the crewmen'smovement.
Thecolor pictures in whichthe fine-grained parts of the lunar surface appeargray
are properly exposed,while those pictures in whichthe lunar surface is light brownto
light tan are generally overexposed. Therocks appearlight gray to brownishgray in
pictures that are properly exposedfor the rocks and vary from light tan to an off white
whereoverexposed. Thecrewreported that fine-grained lunar material and rocks appeared
to begray to dark gray. Thesematerials appearedslightly brownishgray whenobserved
near a zero phaseangle. Small brownish, tan, andgoldenreflections wereobservedon
rock surfaces.
Thetargets andassociatedexposurevalues for eachframeof the lunar surface film
magazineswerecarefully plannedbefore flight. Nearly all of the photographsweretaken
at the recommendedxposuresettings.
Preflight simulations andtraining photographyindicated that at shutter speedsof
1/125 secondor longer, a suited crewmancould induceexcessiveimagemotion during ex-
posure, A shutter speedof 1/250 secondwastherefore chosento reducethe unwanted
motion to an acceptablelevel, Correspondingf-stops were thendeterminedwhichwould
provide correct exposureunderpredicted lunar lighting conditions. At the completion
of the training program,the crewwasproficient at photographingdifferent subjects
undervarying lighting conditions.
To simplify cameraoperations, f-stops of 5.6 andII werechosenfor exposuresin
the cross-sunanddown-sundirections, respectively. This exposureinformation waspro-
vided on decals attached to the film magazinesandwasusedsuccessfully.
Thecrewmenchoseexposuresfor unusuallighting conditions. For example,the
photographsof the LunarModulePilot descendingthe ladder weretakenat an f-stop of
5.6 anda speedof 1/60 second,andthe best photographof the landing-leg plaquewas
takenat anexposureof 5.6 anda speedof 1/30 second. Whena high depth of field was
required, exposuresweremadewith smaller aperturesand correspondinglyslower shutter
speedsto maintain equivalent exposurevalues. Thecrewmenusually steadied the camera
against the remote-control-unit bracketson their suits during these slower speed
exposures.
A preliminary analysis of all lunar surface exposuresindicates that the nominal
shutter speedof 1/250secondappearsto be a goodcompromisebetweendepth of field and
crew-inducedimagemotion. In those specific instanceswherea slowershutter speedwas
required, either becauseof depth-of-field or lighting considerations, the crewwasable
to minimize imagemotion by steadying the camera. However,the selection of the
1/250-secondspeedwill be reevaluatedfor continuedgeneral photography. Figures 11-3,
11-4, and 11-18are representative of lunar surface photography.
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12. BIOMEDICALEVALUATION
This section is a summaryof the Apollo II quarantineproceduresandmedical find-
ings, basedupona preliminary analysis of biomedicaldata. Morecomprehensivevalua-
tions will be published in separatemedical reports.
Thethree crewmenaccumulated585man-hoursof spaceflight experience during the
lunar landing mission, including 2 hours 14 minutes and 1 hour 42 minutes on the lunar
surface for the Commander and the Lunar Module Pilot, respectively.
The crew's health and performance were excellent throughout the flight and the
18-day postflight quarantine period. No significant physiological changes were observed
after this mission, as has been the case on all previous missions, and no effects attrib-
utable to lunar surface exposure have been observed.
Bioinstrumentation and Physiological Data
The biomedical data were of very good quality. Only two minor problems occurred,
both late in the flight. Data from the Command Module Pilot's impedance pneumogram
became unreadable, and the Lunar Module Pilot's electrocardiogram signal degraded because
of drying of the electrode paste under the sensors. The Lunar Module Pilot replaced the
electrocardiogram leads in his bioinstrumentation harness with the spare set from the
medical kit, and proper readings were restored. No attempt was made tO correct the Com-
mand Module Pilot's respiration signal, because of entry preparations. Physiological
parameters were always within expected ranges, and sleep data were obtained on all three
crewmen during most of the mission.
The average heart rates during the entire mission were 71, 60, and 67 beats/min for
the Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot, respectively. During the
powered descent and ascent phases, the only data planned to be available were the Com-
mander's heart rates, which ranged from I00 to 150 beats/min during descent and from
68 to 120 beats/min during ascent, as shown in figures 12-I and 12-2, respectively.
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Figure 12-I.- Heart rates of the Commander during lunar descent.
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Figure 12-2.- Heart rates of the Commander during ascent.
Plots of heart rates during lunar surface exploration are shown in figure 12-3. The
average heart rates were II0 beats/min for the Commander and 88 beats/min for the Lunar
Module Pilot. The increase in the Commander's heart rate during the last phases of this
activity is indicative of an increased workload and body heat storage. The metabolic
production of each crewman during the extravehicular activity is reported in "Extrave-
hicular Activity" in this section.
I00
Terminate extravehicular activity •
lOg:O0 lO_O 10_} ItO:O0 110:20 1[0:40 tll:O0 11l:20 111:40
Time, hr:min
(a) Commander.
Figure 12-3.- Heart rates during extravehicular activities.
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Figure 12-3.- Concluded.
Medical Observations
Adaptation to weiqhtlessness.- The Commander reported that he felt less zero-g
effects, such as fullness of the head, than he had experienced on his previous flight.
All three crewmen commented that the lack of a gravitational pull caused a puffiness
underneath their eyes, and this condition caused them to squint somewhat. However, none
felt ill effects associated with this puffiness. In donning and doffing the suits, the
crewmen had no feeling of tumbling or the disorientation which has been described by the
Apollo 9 crew.
During the first 2 days of the flight, the Command Module Pilot reported that half
a meal was more than enough to satisfy his hunger, but his appetite subsequently returned.
Medications.- The Commander and the Lunar Module Pilot each took one Lomotil tablet
prior-to the sleep period to retard bowel movements before the lunar module activity.
The Commander and Lunar Module Pilot each carried extra Lomotil tablets into the lunar
module, but did not take them. At 4 hours before entry and again after splashdown, the
three crewmen each took antinausea tablets containing 0.3 milligram of Hyoscine and
5.0 milligrams of Dexedrine. The crewmen also took aspirin tablets, but the number of
tablets per individual was not recorded. The Lunar Module Pilot recalled that he had
taken two aspirin tablets almost every night to aid his sleep.
Sleep_.- It is interesting to note that the crewmen's subjective estimates of amount
of sleep were less than those based upon telemetered biomedical data, as shown in
table 12-1. By either count, the crewmen slept well in the command module. The simultan-
eous sleep periods during the translunar coast were carefully monitored, and the crew
arrived on the lunar surface well rested. Therefore, it was not necessary to wait until
after the first planned 4-hour sleep period before conducting the extravehicular activity.
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Thecrewmendid not sleep well in the lunar modulefollowing the lunar surface activity.(See"Lunar SurfaceOperations"in section 4.) However,the crewmenslept well durinn
all three transearth sleep periods.
TABLE12-1.-ESTIMATEDSLEEPDUEATIONS
Timeof
crewreport,hr:min
23:00
48:15
71:24
95:25
Total
Estimatedamountof sleep,hr:min
Telemetry Crewreport
CommanderCommandModulePilot LunarModulePilot Commander
I0:25 I0:I0
9:40 I0:I0
9:35 (a)
6:30 6:30
36:10 --
8:30
9:15
9:20
5:30
32:35
7:00
8:00
7:30
6:30
29:00
CommandModule
Pilot
7:00
9:00
7:30
6:30
30:00
Lunar Module
Pilot
5:30
8:00
6:30
5:30
25:30
aNo data available.
Radiation.- The personal radiation dosimeters were read at approximately 12-hour
intervals, as planned. The total integrated, but uncorrected, doses were 0.25, 0.26,
and 0.28 rad for the Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Module Pilot, respec-
tively. The Van Allen belt dosimeter indicated total integrated doses of 0.II rad for
the skin reading and 0.08 rad for the depth reading during the entire mission. Thus,
the total dose for each crewman is estimated to have been less than 0.2 rad, which is
well below the medically significant level. Results of the radiochemical assays of feces
and urine and an analysis of the onboard nuclear emulsion dosimeters will be presented in
a separate medical report.
The crewmen were examined with a total body gamma-radioactivity counter on August I0,
1969, after release from quarantine. No induced radioactivity was detected, based on
critical measurements and an integration of the total-body gamma spectrum. The examina-
tion for natural radioactivity revealed the levels of potassium-40 and cesium-137 to be
within the normal range.
Infli2ht exercise.- The planned exercise program included isometric and isotonic
exercises and the use of an exerciser. As in previous Apollo missions, a calibrated
exercise program was not planned. The inflight exerciser was used primarily for crew
relaxation. During transearth coast, the Lunar Module Pilot exercised vigorously for two
lO-minute periods. His heart rate reached 170 and 177 beats/min, and the partial pres-
sure of carbon dioxide increased approximately 0.6 mm Hg during these periods. The heart
rates and the carbon dioxide readings rapidly returned to normal levels when exercise
ceased.
_ack_.- Several problems concerning drug packaging developed during the
flight. All the medications in tablet and capsule form were packaged in individually
sealed plastic or foil containers. When the medical kit was unstowed in the command mod-
ule, the packages were blown up like balloons because the air had not been sufficiently
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evacuated during packaging. This ballooning increased the volume of the medical-kit con-
tents after the kit was opened and thus prevented restowage until a flap was cut away
from the kit. Venting of each of the plastic or foil containers will be accomplished for
future flights and should prevent this problem from recurring. The Afrin nasal spray bub-
bled out when the cap was removed and was therefore unusable. The use of cotton in the
spray bottle is expected to resolve this problem on future flights.
Water.- The eight inflight chlorinations of the command module water system were
accomplished normally and essentially as scheduled. Analysis of the potable water sam-
ples obtained approximately 30 hours after the last inflight chlorination showed a free-
chlorine residual of 0.8 milligram from the drinking dispenser port and 0.05 milligram
from the hot-water port. The iodine level in the lunar module tanks, based on preflight
sampling, was adequate for bacterial protection throughout the flight.
Chemical and microbiological analyses of the preflight water samples for both space-
craft showed no significant contaminants. Tests for coliform and anaerobic bacteria, as
well as for yeasts and molds, were negative during the postflight water analysis, which
was delayed because of quarantine restrictions.
A new gas/water separator was used with satisfactory results. The palatability of
the drinking water was greatly improved over that of previous flights because of the
absence of gas bubbles, which can cause gastrointestinal discomfort.
Food.- The food supply for the command module included rehydratable foods and bev-
erages, wet-packed foods, foods contained in spoon-bowl packages, dried fruit, and bread.
The new food items for this mission were candy sticks and jellied fruit candy; ham,
chicken, and tuna salad spreads packaged in lightweight aluminum, easy-open cans; and
cheddar cheese spread and frankfurters packaged in flexible foil as wet-packed foods.
A new pantry-type food system allowed real-time selection of food items based upon indi-
vidual preference and appetite. Four meal periods on the lunar surface were scheduled,
and extra optional items were included with the normal meal packages.
Prior to flight, each crewman evaluated the available food items and selected his
flight menus. The menus provided approximately 2300 kilocalories per man per day and
included 1 gram of calcium, 0.5 gram of phosphorus, and 80 grams of protein. The crew-
men were well satisfied with the quality and variety of the flight foods. They reported
that their food intake met their appetite and energy requirements.
The preparation and eating of sandwiches presented no problems. The only criticisms
of the food system were that the coffee was not particularly good and that the fruit-
flavored beverages tasted too sweet. The new gas/water separator was effective in reduc-
ing the amount of gas in the water and greatly improved the taste of the rehydratable
foods.
Extravehicular Activity
The integrated rates of Btu production and the accumulated Btu production during the
intervals of planned activities are listed in table 12-11. The actual average metabolic
production per hour was estimated to be 900 Btu for the Commander and 1200 Btu for the
Lunar Module Pilot. These values are less than the preflight estimates of 1350 and
1275 Btu for the respective crewmen.
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TABLE 12-II.- METABOLIC RATES DURING LUNAR SURFACE EXPLORATIONa
Event Starting Duration, Rate, Estimated Cumulative
time, min Btu/hr work, work,hr:min Btu Btu
Commander
Initial extravehicular activity
Environmental familiarization
Photography
Contingency sample collection
Monitoring and photography of Lunar Module Pilot
Television camera deployment on surface
U.S. flag deployment and President's message
Bulk sample collection
Lunar module inspection
Experiment package deployment
Documented sample collection
Transfer of sample return containers
Extravehicular activity termination
TOTAL
I09:13
I09:24
I09:27
I09:34
I09:39
I09:43
II0:06
110:18
llO:41
II0:59
lll:ll
III:30
III:37
II
3
7
5
4
23
12
23
18
12
19
7
2
146
900
800
875
675
850
750
825
850
675
775
1250
1450
1400
165 165
40 205
I02 3O7
56 363
57 420
288 708
165 873
326 I199
203 1402
155 1557
396 1953
169 2122
48 2170
2170
Lunar Module Pilot
Assistance and monitoring of Commander
Initial extravehicular activity
Environmental familiarization; television
cable deployment
Solar wind experiment deployment
U.S. flag deployment and President's message
Evaluation of extravehicular mobility unit
Lunar module inspection
Experiment package deployment
Documented sample collection; recovery of
solar wind experiment
Extravehicular activity termination, ingress,
and transfer of sample return containers
Assistance and monitoring of Commander
TOTAL
lOg:f3
I09:39
I09:44
I09:58
II0:04
llO:18
II0:34
II0:53
lll:ll
III:23
III:37
26
5
14
6
14
16
19
18
12
14
2
146
1200
1950
1200
1275
1350
850
875
1200
1450
1650
llO0
520
163
280
128
315
227
277
360
290
385
37
52O
683
963
I091
1406
1633
1910
2270
2560
2945
2982
2982
avalues are from the integration of three independent determinations of metabolic rate based on heart
rate, decay of oxygen supply pressure, and liquid cooling garment thermodynamics.
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Physical Examinations
Comprehensive medical evaluations were conducted on each crewman at 29, 15, and
5 days prior to the day of launch. Brief physical examinations were then conducted each
day until launch.
The postflight medical evaluation included the following: microbiology studies,
blood studies, physical examinations, orthostatic tolerance tests, exercise response
tests, and chest X-rays.
The recovery-day examination revealed that all three crewmen were in good health
and appeared to be well rested. They showed no fever and had lost no more than the
expected amount of body weight. Each crewman had taken antimotion sickness medication
4 hours prior to entry and again after landing, and no seasickness or adverse symptoms
were experienced.
Data from chest X-rays and electrocardiograms were within normal limits. The only
positive findings were small papules beneath the axillary sensors on both the Commander
and the Lunar Module Pilot. The Commander had a mild serous otitis media of the right
ear, but could clear his ears without difficulty. No treatment was necessary.
The orthostatic tolerance test showed significant increases in the immediate post-
flight heart-rate responses, but these increases were less than the changes seen in pre-
vious Apollo crewmembers. In spite of this apparent improvement, the return to preflight
values was slower than had been observed for previous Apollo crewmembers. The reasons
for this slower recovery are not clear at this time, but in general, these crewmembers
exhibited less decrement in oxygen consumption and work performed than was observed in
exercise response tests after previous Apollo flights.
Followup evaluations were conducted daily during the quarantine period in the Lunar
Receiving Laboratory, and the immunohematology and microbiology analyses revealed no
changes attributable to exposure to the lunar surface material.
Lunar Contamination and Quarantine
The two fundamental responsibilities of the lunar sample program were to preserve
the integrity of the returned lunar samples in the original or near-original state and
to make practical provisions to protect the earth from possible contamination by lunar
substances that might be infectious, toxic, or otherwise harmful to man, animals, or
plants.
The Public Laws and Federal Regulations concerning contamination control for lunar-
sample-return missions are described in reference 7. An interagency agreement between
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Department of Agriculture; the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Department of the Interior; and the
National Academy of Sciences (ref. 8) confirmed the existing arrangements for the pro-
tection of the earth and defined the Interagency Committee on Back Contamination. The
quarantine schemes for manned lunar missions were established by the Interagency Com-
mittee on Back Contamination (ref. 9).
The planned 21-day crew quarantine represented the period required in order to pre-
clude the development of infectious disease conditions that could generate volatile epi-
demic events. In addition, early signs of latent infectious diseases with longer
incubation periods would probably be detected through extensive medical and clinical
pathologica_ examinations. However, to provide additional assurance that no infectious
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diseaseof lunar origin is present in the Apollo II crewmembers,an extensive epidemio-
logical programwill continue for 1 year after their release from quarantine.
Lunar exposure.- Although each crewman attempted to clean himself and the equipment
before ingress, a fairly large amount of dust and grains of lunar surface material was
brought into the cabin. When the crewmen removed their helmets, they noticed a distinct,
pungent odor emanating from the lunar material. The texture of the dust was like pow-
dered graphite, and both crewmen were very dirty after they removed their helmets, over-
shoes, and gloves. The crewmen cleaned their hands and faces with tissues and with
towels that had been soaked in hot water. The Commander removed his liquid cooling gar-
ment in order to clean his body. One grain of material got into the Commander's eye,
but was easily removed and caused no problem. The dustlike material could not be removed
completely from beneath the crewmen's fingernails.
The cabin cleaning procedure involved the use of a vacuum-brush device and positive
air pressure from the suit supply hoses to blow remote particles into the atmosphere for
collection in the lithium hydroxide filters in the environmental control system.
The concern that particles remaining in the lunar module would float in the cabin
atmosphere at zero-g after ascent caused the crew to remain helmeted to prevent contami-
nation of the eyes and respiratory system. However, floating particles were not a prob-
lem. The cabin and equipment were further cleaned with the vacuum brush. The equipment
from the surface and the pressure garment assemblies were placed in bags for transfer to
the command module. Before transfer to the command module, the spacecraft systems were
configured to cause a positive gas flow from the command module through the hatch dump/
relief valve in the lunar module.
During the return to earth, the interior of the command module was cleaned at 24-hour
intervals by using the vacuum brush and towels. In addition, the circulation of the cabin
atmosphere through the lithium hydroxide filters continued to remove traces of particu-
late material.
Recovery_procedures.- The recovery procedures were successfully conducted with no
compromises of the planned quarantine techniques. The times of the major postlanding
events are listed in "Recovery Operations" in section 13.
After the command module was uprighted, four biological isolation garments and the
decontamination gear were lowered to one of two liferafts. One of the four swimmers
donned a biological isolation garment. The second liferaft was then moved to the space-
craft. The protected swimmer retired with the second liferaft to the original upwind
position. The hatch was opened, the crew's biological isolation garments were inserted
into the command module, and the hatch was closed.
After donning the biological isolation garments, the crew egressed. The protected
swimmer sprayed the upper deck and hatch areas with Betadine, a water-soluble iodine
solution, as planned in the quarantine procedure. After the four men and the liferaft
were wiped with a solution of sodium hypochlorite, the three swimmers returned to the
vicinity of the spacecraft to stand by during the helicopter pickup of the flightcrew.
The crewmen were brought up into the helicopter without incident and remained in
the aft compartment. As expected, a moderate amount of water was present on the floor
after retrieval, and the water was wiped up with towels. The helicopter crewmen were
also protected from possible contamination.
The helicopter was moved to the Mobile Quarantine Facility on the lower deck of the
recovery vessel. The crewmen walked across the deck, entered the Mobile Quarantine Facil-
ity, and removed their biological isolation garments. The descent steps and the deck
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area betweenthe helicopter and the Mobile QuarantineFacility weresprayedwith glutaral-
dehydesolution, whichwasmoppedup after a 30-minutecontact time.
After the crewmenhadbeenpicked up, the protected swimmerscrubbedthe upperdeck
aroundthe postlandingvents, the hatch area, and the flotation collar near the hatch
with Betadine. TheremainingBetadinewasemptiedinto the bottomof the recoveryraft.
Theswimmeremovedhis biological isolation garmentandplaced it in the Betadinein
the liferaft. Thedisinfectant sprayersweredismantledand sunk. After a 30-minute
contact time, the liferaft and remaining equipment were sunk.
Following egress of the flightcrew and a recovery surgeon from the helicopter, the
hatch of the helicopter was closed and the vehicle was towed to the flight deck for
decontamination with formaldehyde.
The crew became uncomfortably warm while they were enclosed in the biological isola-
tion garments in the environment (90 ° F) of the helicopter cabin. On two of the garments,
the visor fogged up because of the improper fit of the nose and mouth cup. To alleviate
this discomfort on future missions, consideration is being given to (I) replacing the
present biological isolation garment with a lightweight coverall, similar to whiteroom
clothing, with respirator mask, cap, gloves, and booties and (2) using a liquid cooling
garment under the biological isolation garment.
The command module was taken aboard the U.S.S. Hornet approximately 3 hours after
landing and was attached to the Mobile Quarantine Facility through a flexible tunnel.
The removal of lunar surface samples, film, data tape, and medical samples went well,
with one exception. Two of the medical sample containers leaked within the inner biologi-
cal isolation container. Corrective measures were promptly executed, and the quarantine
procedure was not violated.
Transfer of the Mobile Quarantine Facility from the recovery ship to a C-141 air-
craft and from the aircraft to the Lunar Receiving Laboratory at the NASA Manned Space-
craft Center was accomplished without any question of a quarantine violation. The
transfer of the lunar surface samples and the command module into the Lunar Receiving
Laboratory was also accomplished as planned.
quarantine.- A total of 20 persons on the medical support teams were exposed,
directly or indirectly, to lunar material for periods ranging from 5 to 18 days. Daily
medical observations and periodic laboratory examinations showed no signs or symptoms of
infectious disease related to lunar exposure.
No microbial growth was observed from the prime lunar samples after 156 hours of
incubation on all types of differential media. No micro-organisms which could be attrib-
uted to an extraterrestrial source were recovered from the crewmen or the spacecraft.
None of the 24 mice injected intraperitoneally with lunar material showed visible
shock reaction following injection, and all remained alive and healthy during the first
I0 days of a 50-day toxicity test. During the first 7 days of testing of the prime lunar
samples in germ-free mice, all findings were consistent with the decision to release the
crew from quarantine.
Samples from the crewmen were injected into tissue cultures, suckling mice, myco-
plasma media, and 6- and lO-day-old embryonated eggs. There was no evidence of viral
replication in any of the host systems at the end of 2 weeks. During the first 8 days
of testing the lunar material, all findings were compatible with crew release from
quarantine.
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Nosignificant trends werenoted in anybiochemical, immunological,or hematological
parametersin either the flightcrew or the medicalsupport personnel.
Thepersonnelin quarantineand in the CrewReceptionAreaof the LunarReceiving
Laboratorywereapprovedfor release from quarantineon AugustI0, 1969. Following decon-
taminationwith formaldehyde,the interior of the commandmoduleandthe groundservicing
equipmentutilized in the decontaminationprocedureswereapprovedfor release from quar-
antine on AugustI0, 1969. Thesamplesof lunar material andother items stored in the
biological isolation containers in the LunarReceivingLaboratorywerereleased to prin-
cipal scientific investigators in September1969.
167
13. HISSIONSUPPORTPERFORMANCE
Flight Control
Preflight simulations providedadequateflight control training for all mission
phases. Also, the flight controllers on the descentteamsupplementedthis training by
conductingdescentsimulations with the Apollo 12crew. Interfaces betweenMission
Control teammembersandthe flightcrew wereeffective, and nomajor operational problems
wereencountered. Thetwo-wayflow of information betweenthe flightcrew andthe flight
controllers waseffective. Theoverloadingof tile lunar moduleguidancecomputerduring
powereddescentwasassessedaccurately, andthe information provided to the flightcrew
permitted continuation of descent.
Theflight control responseto thoseproblemsidentified during the missionwas
basedon real-time data. Sections8, 9, and 16shouldbe consultedfor the postflight
analysesof these problems. Threeof the morepertinent real-time decisions are dis-
cussedin the following paragraphs.
At acquisition of signal after lunar orbit insertion, data showedthat the indicated
tank B nitrogen pressurewasapproximately300 psi lower than expected and that the
pressure had started to decrease at 80 seconds into the maneuver. (See "Service Pro-
pulsion Nitrogen Leak" in section 16.) To conserve nitrogen and to maximize system
reliability for transearth injection, it was recommended that the circularization
maneuver be performed, using tank A only. No further leak was apparent, and both tanks
were used normally for transearth injection.
Five computer program alarms occurred between 5 and i0 minutes after initiation of
powered descent. These alarms are symptoms of possible computer overloading. However,
it had been decided before flight that bailout-type alarms such as these would not
prevent continuation of the flight, even though the alarms could cause violations of
other mission rules, such as velocity differences. The alarms did not occur continually,
and proper computer navigation functions were being performed; therefore, a decision
was given to continue the descent.
During the crew rest period on the lunar surface, two checklist changes were recom-
mended, based on the events of the previous 20 hours: (I) the rendezvous radar would
remain off during the ascent firing and (2) the MODE-SELECT switch would not be placed
in the PRIMARY GUIDANCE position, thus preventing the computer from generating altitude
and altitude rate for the telemetry display. The reason for these changes was to prevent
computer overload during ascent, as had occurred during descent.
Manned Space Flight Network Performance
The Mission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network were placed on mission
status on July 7, 1969, and supported the lunar landing mission satisfactorily. Hardware,
communications, and computer support in the Mission Control Center was excellent. No
major data losses were attributed to these systems, and the few failures that did occur
had minimal impact on support operations. Air-to-ground communications were generally
good during the mission; however, a number of significant problems were experienced as a
result of procedural errors.
The support provided by the real-time computer complex was generally excellent, and
only one major problem was experienced. During translunar coast, a problem in updating
digital-to-television displays by the use of the primary computer resulted in the loss of
all real-time television displays for approximately an hour. The problem was isolated to
the interface between the computer and the display equipment.
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Figure 13-i depicts the U.S.S, Hornetandassociatedaircraft positions at the time
of commandmodulelanding at 195:18:35(16:50 G.m.t.). Thecommandmodulelandedat a
point calculated by recovery forces to be latitude 13o19' N andlongitude 169o9' W.
13" 49
__ 13o30)
130 15
169" 15'
Swim 1
I Target point
• Onboard computer landing point
• Landing point (recovery forcesl
Recovery l'm_
'a_ Swim 2
USS Hornet
169° Off
West longitude
Figure 13-1.- Landing and recovery data.
Relay
Air Boss 1
]6¢45'
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Operationsby the communicationsprocessorswereexcellent, and the few problemsthat
did occur causedonly minor losses of mission data.
Air-to-ground voice communicationsweregenerally good, although a numberof ground
problemscausedtemporaryloss or degradationof communications.Shortly after landing
on the lunar surface, the crewcomplainedabout the noise level on the S-bandvoice up
linked from the Goldstonestation. This problemoccurredwhile the Goldstonestation was
configured in the MannedSpaceFlight Networkrelay mode. Thesourceof the noise was
isolated to a breaking of squelchcontrol causedby high noise on the commandmoduledown
link beingsubsequentlyup linked to the lunar moduleby wayof the relay mode. The
noise waseliminated by disabling the relay mode. On several occasions during the mis-
sion, spacecraft voice on the Goddard conference loop was degraded by the voice-operated
gain-adjust amplifiers. In most cases, the problem was cleared by disabling the ampli-
fier unit at the remote site.
Command operations were good throughout tl_e mission. Of the approximately 3450 exe-
cution commands transmitted during the mission, only 24 were rejected by remote-site
command computers, and 21 were lost for unknown reasons. Approximately 450 command loads
were generated and successfully transferred to the Manned Space Flight Network stations,
and 58 of these were up linked to the spacecraft.
Both C- and S-band tracking support were good. Loss of tracking coverage was
experienced during translunar injection when the U.S.N.S. Mercury was unable to provide
high-speed trajectory data because of a temporary problem in the central data processor.
Some stations also experienced temporary S-band power amplifier failures during the
mission.
The Manned Space Flight Network support of the scientific experiment package was
good. A few hardware and procedural problems were encountered; however, the only signifi-
cant data loss occurred when the S-band parametric amplifier at the Canary Island station
failed only seconds before the lunar module ascent. Consequently, all seismic package
data were lost during this phase, since no backup stations were available for support.
Television support provided by Hanned Space Flight Hetwork and Jet Propulsion Lab-
oratory facilities, particularly that provided by the 210-foot stations at Parkes and
Goldstone, was good throughout the mission.
Recovery Operations
The Department of Defense provided recovery support commensurate with the probability
of landing within a specified area and with any special problems associated with such a
landing. Recovery force deployment was nearly identical to that for Apollo 8 and I0.
Support for the primary landing area in the Pacific Ocean was provided by the U.S.S.
Hornet. Air support consisted of four SH-3D helicopters from the U.S.S. Hornet, three
E-IB aircraft, three Apollo range instrumentation aircraft, and two HC-130 rescue air-
craft staged from Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. Two of the E-IB aircraft were designated
as "Air Boss," and the third was a communications relay aircraft. Two of the SII-3B heli-
copters carried the swimmers and the required recovery equipment. The third SH-3D
helicopter was used as a photographic platform, and the fourth, which carried the decon-
tamination swimmer and the flight surgeon, was used for crew retrieval.
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Thecommandmoduleimmediatelywent to the stable II (apexdown)flotation attitude
after landing. Theuprighting systemreturned the spacecraft to the stable I attitude
7 minutes40 secondslater. Oneor 2 quarts of water enteredthe spacecraft while it
wasin the stable II position. Theswimmersweredeployedto install the flotation col-
lar; the decontaminationswimmerthen passedthe biological isolation garmentsto the
flightcrew, assisted the crew into the liferaft, anddecontaminatedthe exterior surface
of the commandmodule. (See"Lunar ContaminationandQuarantine"in section 12.) After
the commandmodulehatchwasclosed anddecontaminated,the flightcrew anddecontamination
swimmerwashedeachother with the decontaminatesolution prior to being takenaboardthe
recovery helicopter. Thecrewarrived on boardthe U.S.S.Hornetat 17:53G.m.t. and
enteredthe MobileQuarantineFacility 5 minuteslater. Thefirst lunar samplesto be
returned wereflown to JohnstonIsland, placedaboarda C-141aircraft, and flown to
Houston. Approximately6-I/2 hours later, the secondsampleshipmentwasflown from the
U.S.S. Hornetdirectly to HickamAir ForceBase,llawaii, and placedaboarda rangeinstrumentation aircraft for transfer to Houston.
ThecommandmoduleandMobileQuarantineFacility wereoffloaded in llawaii on
July 27, 1969. TheMobileQuarantineFacility was loadedaboarda C-141aircraft and
flown to Houston,Texas,wherea brief ceremonywasheld. Theflightcrew arrived at the
LunarReceivingLaboratoryat i0:00 G.m.t. on July 28, 1969.
Thecommandmodulewastaken to Ford Island for deactivation. Uponcompletionof
deactivation, the commandmodulewasshippedto HickamAir ForceBase,Hawaii, andflown
on a C-133aircraft to Houston. A postrecoveryinspection showedno significant dis-
crepanciesin the spacecraft.
Table 13-I is a chronological listing of eventsduring the recovery andquarantine
operations.
TABLE13-I.- RECOVERYANDQUARANTINEEVENTS
Event Time,G.m.t.
July 24, 1969
Visual contact by aircraft
Radarcontact by U.S.S. Hornet
vhf voice andrecovery-beaconcontact
Commandmodulelanding (195:18:35g.e.t.)
Flotation collar inflated
Commandmodulehatch open
Crewegressin biological isolation garments
CrewaboardU.S.S.Hornet
16:39
16:40
16:46
16:50
17:04
17:21
17:29
17:53
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TABLE 13-I.- RECOVERY AND QUARANTINE EVENTS - Continued
Event Time, G.m.t.
July 24, 1969 - Continued
Crew in Mobile Quarantine Facility
Command module lifted from water
Command module secured to Mobile Quarantine Facility
transfer tunnel
Command module hatch reopened
Sample return containers I and 2 removed from command
module
Sample return container I removed from Mobile
Quarantine Facility
17:58
19:50
19:58
20:05
22:00
23:32
July 25, 196£
O0 :05Sample return container 2 removed from Mobile
Quarantine Facility
Sample return container 2 and film launched to
Johnston Island
Sample return container I, film, and biological
samples launched to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
Sample return container 2 and film arrived in Houston
Sample return container i, film, and biological
samples arrived in Houston
05:15
11:45
16:15
23:13
July 26, 1969
Command module decontaminated and hatch secured
Mobile Quarantine Facility secured
03:00
04:35
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TABLE13-I.- RECOVERYANDQUARANTINEEVENTS- Concluded
Event Time, G.m.t.
July 27, 1969
00:15MobileQuarantineFacility andcommandmodule
offloaded
Safing of commandmodulepyrotechnicscompleted
July 28, 1969
02:05
Mobile Quarantine Facility arrived at Houston
Flightcrew in Lunar Receiving Laboratory
06:00
10:00
July 30, 1969
Command module delivered to Lunar Receiving Laboratory 23:17
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14. ASSESSMENTOFMISSIONOBJECTIVES
Thesingle primary mission objective for the Apollo II mission (as defined in the
NASAHeadquartersdocumentOMSFM-DHA500-11(SE010-000-I) entitled "Apollo Flight
MissionAssignments"and preparedJuly II, 1969)wasto performa mannedlunar land-
ing and return safely to earth. In addition to the single primary objective, II sec-
ondaryobjectives weredelineated from the following two general categories:
I. To performselenological inspection and sampling
2. To obtain data to assessthe capability andlimitations of a manandhis
equipmentin the lunar environment
TheII secondaryobjectives are listed in table 14-I and are describedin detail in
NASAMannedSpacecraftCenterdocumentSPD9-R-038(entitled "Mission Requirements,
SA-506/CSM-IO7/LM-5,GTypeMission LunarLanding," April 17, 1969).
Thefollowing experimentswereassignedto the Apollo II mission:
I. Passiveseismic experiment(S-031)
2. Lunar field geology(S-059)
3. Laser ranging retroreflector (S-078)
4. Solar wind composition (S-080)
5. Cosmic ray detection (S-151)
The single primary objective was met. All secondary objectives and experiments
except for the following were fully satisfied:
I. Objective G: location of the landed lunar module
2. Experiment S-059: lunar field geology
These two items were not completely satisfied in the manner planned before flight. A
discussion of the deficiencies appears in the following paragraphs. A full assessment
of the Apollo II detailed objectives and experiments will be presented in separate
reports.
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TABLE 14-I.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIIIENTS
Objectives:
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
L
1,1
Experiments:
S-031
S-059
S-078
S-080
S-151
T-029
Description Completed
Contingency sample collection
Lunar surface extravehicular operations
Lunar surface operations with extravehicular
mobility unit
Landing effects on lunar module
Lunar surface characteristics
Bulk sample collection
Location of the landed lunar module
Lunar environment visibility
Assessment of contamination by lunar material
Television coverage
Photographic coverage
Passive seismic experiment
Lunar field geology
Laser ranging retroreflector experiment
Solar wind composition
Cosmic ray detection
Pilot description
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Partial
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Partial
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Location of the Landed Lunar ._1odule
It was planned to make a near-real-time determination of the location of the landed
lunar module, based on crew observations. Observations by the lunar module crew during
descent and after landing were to provide information for locating the landing point by
using onboard maps. In addition, this information was to be transmitted to the Command
Module Pilot, who was to use the sextant in an attempt to locate the landed lunar module.
Furthermore, if it were not possible for the Command Module Pilot to resolve the lunar
module in the sextant, he was to track a nearby landmark that had a known location rela-
tive to the landed lunar module (as determined by the lunar module crew or the ground
team).
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This near-real-time determinationof the landedlunar modulelocation by the lunar
modulecrewwasnot accomplishedbecausethe crew's attention wasconfined to the cabin
during mostof the visibility phaseof the descent. Consequently,their observations
of the lunar features during descentwerenot sufficient to allow themto judge their
position. Thecrew's observationof the large crater near the landing point did provide
an important clue to their location, but this clue wasnot sufficient to locate the
landing point with confidence.
Onseveral orbital passes,the CommandModulePilot usedthe sextant in an attempt
to locate the lunar module. His observationsweredirected to areaswhereground
data indicated the lunar modulecould havelanded. Theseattempts to locate the lunar
modulewere unsuccessful,and it is doubtful that the CommandModulePilot's observations
wereever directed to the area wherethe lunar modulewasactually located.
Nearthe endof the lunar surface stay, the location of the landedlunar modulewas
determinedfrom the lunar modulerendezvous-radartracking data (confirmedpostflight
by using descentphotographicdata). However,the CommandModulePilot's activities
did not permit his attempting another tracking passafter the lunar modulelocation had
beendeterminedaccurately.
LunarField Geology
For the Apollo II mission, the documentedsamplecollection (ExperimentS-059,
lunar field geology)wasassignedthe lowest priority of anyof the scientific objec-
tives andwasplannedas one of the last activities during the extravehicular activity
period. Twocore-tube sampleswerecollected as planned,and approximately15pounds
of additional lunar sampleswereobtainedas part of this objective. However,time
constraints on the extravehicular activity precludedcollection of these sampleswith
the degreeof documentationoriginally planned.
In addition, there wasnot sufficient time to allow the collection of a lunar
environmentsampleor a gasanalysis samplein the two special containers provided.
Althoughthese sampleswerenot obtained in their special containers, it waspossible
to obtain the desired results by using other samplescontained in the regular sample
return containers.
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15. LAUNCHVEHICLESUMMARY
Thetrajectory parametersof the AS-506launchvehicle from launch to translunar
injection wereall close to the expectedvalues. Thevehicle waslaunchedon an
azimuth90° east of north. A roll maneuverwasinitiated at 13.2 secondsin order to
place the vehicle on the plannedflight azimuthof 72.058° east of north.
Following lunar moduleejection, the S-IVB/instrumentunit maneuveredto a sling-
shot attitude that wasfixed relative to the local horizontal. Theretrograde velocity
necessaryto performthe lunar slingshot maneuverwasaccomplishedby a liquid oxygen
dump,an auxiliary propulsion systemfiring, and liquid hydrogenventing. Theclosest
approachof the vehicle to the lunar surface was1825miles at 78:42:00. A flight
evaluation report containing additional data on the launch vehicle performancehasbeen
publishedby the NASAMarshallSpaceFlight Center (entitled "Saturn V LaunchVehicle
Flight Evaluation ReportAS-506,Apollo II Mission, "Report MPR-SAT-FE-6g-9,Sept. 20,1969).
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16. ANOMALY SUMMARY
This section contains a discussion of the significant problems or discrepancies
noted during the Apollo II mission.
Command and Service Modules
Service_ropulsion nitroqen leak.- During the lunar orbit insertion firing, the
gaseous nitrogen in the redundant service propulsion engine actuation system decayed
from 2307 to 1883 psia (fig. 16-I), which indicated a leak downstream of the injector
prevalveo The normal pressure decay as experienced by the primary system is approximately
50 psia for each firing. Only one system was affected, and no performance degradation
resulted. This actuation system was used during the transearth injection firing, and no
leakage was detected.
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Figure 16-I.- Nitrogen pressure during initial lunar orbit insertion firing.
The fuel and oxidizer valves are controlled by actuators driven by nitrogen pressure.
Figure 16-2 is representative of both nitrogen control systems. When power is applied
to the service propulsion system in preparation for a maneuver, the injector prevalve is
opened; however, pressure is not applied to the actuators, because the solenoid control
valves are closed. When the engine is commanded on, the solenoid control valves are
opened, pressure is applied to the actuator, and the rack on the actuator shaft drives a
pinion gear to open the fuel and oxidizer valves. When the engine is commanded off, the
solenoid control valve vents the actuator and closes the fuel and oxidizer valves.
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Figure 16-2.- Control for service propulsion propellants.
The most probable cause of the problem was contamination of one of the components
downstream of the injector prevalve, which isolates the nitrogen supply during nonfiring
periods. The injector prevalve was not considered a problem source because it was
opened 2 minutes before ignition, and no leakage occurred during that period. The
possibility that the regulator and relief valve were leaking was also eliminated because
pressure was applied to these components when the prevalve was opened.
The solenoid control valves have a history of leakage, which has occurred either
because of improper internal airgap adjustment or because of seal damage caused by con-
tamination. The airgap adjustment could not have caused the leakage, because an improper
airgap with the prevalves open would have caused the leak to remain constant. Both of
the solenoid control valves in the leaking system had been found to be contaminated be-
fore flight and were removed from the system, rebuilt, and successfully retested during
the acceptance test cycle.
It is concluded that the leakage was due to a contamination-induced failure of a
solenoid control valve. The source of contamination is unknown; however, the contamina-
tion was apparently removed from the sealing surface during the valve closure for the
first lunar orbit insertion maneuver (fig. 16-2). The suspected source is a contaminated
facility manifold at the vendor's plant. Although an investigation of the prior failure
indicated that the flight valve was not contaminated, the facility manifold is still con-
sidered a possible source of the contaminants.
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Spacecraftfor Apollo 12andsubsequentmissionshaveintegral filters installed,
andthe facility manifoldsare controlled moreclosely; therefore, no further corrective
action wastaken.
This anomalyis closed.
Cry_9_genicheater failure.- The performance of the automatic pressure control system
indicated that one of the two heater elements in oxygen tank 2 was inoperative. Data
showing heater currents for prelaunch checkout verified that both heater elements were
operational through the countdown demonstration test. However, the readings recorded for
current during the tank pressurization in the launch countdown showed that one heater in
oxygen tank 2 had failed. This information was not made known to proper channels for
disposition prior to the flight because no specification limits were called out in the
test procedure.
Manufacturing records for all Block II oxygen tanks showed that there have been no
thermal-switch nor electrical-continuity failures in the program; two failures occurred
during the insulation resistance tests. One failure was attributed to moisture in the
connector. After this unit had been dried, it passed all acceptance tests. The other
failure was identified in the heater assembly before it was installed in a tank. This
failure, which was also an insulation problem, would not ,_ave prevented the heater from
functioning normally.
The cause of the flight failure was probably an intermittent contact on a terminal
board in the heater circuit. The 16-gage wiring at the board has exhibited intermit-
tencies several times in the past. This board is the same type of terminal board that
was found to be the cause of the control engine problem on Apollo II. (See "Failure of
Automatic Coil in Oqe Thruster" in this section.) Since the oxygen tank heaters are
redundant, no mission constraints were created other than a requirement for more frequent
quantity balancing.
The launch-site test requirements were changed to specify the amperage level neces-
sary to verify that both tank heaters were operational. Additionally, all launch-site
procedures were reviewed to determine whether specification limits are required in other
areas.
This anomaly is closed.
Failure of automatic coil in one thruster.- The minus-yaw engine in command module
reaction control system 1 produced low and erratic thrust in response to firing commands
through the automatic coils of the engine valves. The spacecraft rates verified that
the engine performed normally when fired by using the direct coils.
Electrical continuity through at least one of the parallel automatic coils in the
engine was evidenced by the fact that the stabilization and control system driver signals
were normal. This behavior, along with the fact that at least some thrust was produced,
indicates that one of the two valves was working normally.
At the launch site, another engine undergoing checkout had failed to respond to
commands during the valve signature tests. The problem was isolated to a faulty termi-
nal board connector. The faulty terminal board was replaced, and the systems were re-
tested satisfactorily. Because of this incident and because of the previous history of
problems with terminal boards, these connectors were prime suspects when engine problems
occurred.
Postflight tests showed that two pins in the terminal board (fig. 16-3) were loose
and caused intermittent continuity to the automatic coils of the engine valve. This type
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of failure has been noted previously on ter-
minal boards manufactured prior to Novem-
ber 1967. The faulty board was manufactured
in 1966.
The intermittent contact was caused by
improper clip position relative to the bus
bar counterbore. The improper positioning
resulted in loss of some side force and pre-
cluded proper contact pressure against the
bus bar. A design change was made to the
base gasket to ensure that the bus bar was
correctly positioned.
Pre-November 1967 terminal boards were
located from installation records, and it
was determined that none were in circuits
which would jeopardize crew safety. No
action was taken for Apollo 12.
This anomaly is closed.
Loss of electroluminescent seqment in
the entr_monitor system.- An electrolumi-
nescent segment on the numeric display of
the entry monitor system velocity counter
would not illuminate. The segment is independently switched through a logic network
that activates a silicon-controlled rectifier to bypass the light when it is not
illuminated. The power source is 115 volts, 400 hertz.
Four cases of similar malfunctions have been recorded. One case involved a segment
that would not illuminate, and three cases involved segments that would not turn off.
In each case, the cause was identified as misrouting of logic wires in the circuit con-
trolling the rectifiers. The misrouting bent the wires across terminal strips containing
sharp wire ends. These sharp ends punctured the insulation and caused shorts to ground
or to +4 volts, turning the segment off or on, respectively.
A rework of the affected circuits took place in the process of soldering crimp
joints that had been involved in an Apollo 7 anomaly. An inspection to detect mis-
routing was conducted at this time; however, because of potting restrictions, the in-
spection was limited. A number of other failure mechanisms exist in circuit elements
and leads; however, there is no associated failure history. A generic or design problem
is considered unlikely because of the number of satisfactory activations sustained to
date.
The preflight checkout program was examined to identify possibilities for improve-
ment in assuring proper operation of all segments throughout all operating conditions.
This anomaly is closed.
Ox__en flow master alarms.- During the initial lunar module pressurization, two
master alarms were activated when the oxygen flow rate was decreasing from full scale.
The same condition had been observed several times during altitude chamber tests and
during subsequent troubleshooting. The cause of the problem could not be identified
before launch, but the only consequence of the alarms was the nuisance factor.
Figure 16-4 shows the basic elements of the oxygen flow sensing circuit. Note in
figure 16-4 that, for a master alarm to occur, relay Kl must hold in for 16 seconds,
after which time relays K2 and K3 will close, activating a master alarm.
181
Oxygen Sel
f'_ I Rese_ I
U ............. -T
To
•_o ,'_o,-_ master
I alarm
Figure 16-4.- Oxygen flow sensing circuit.
The capacitor shown in figure 16-4 is
actually a part of an electromagnetic inter-
ference filter and is required to prevent
fluctuation of the amplifier output to the
voltage detector. Without the capacitor, a
slow change in flow rate in the vicinity of
the threshold voltage of relay K1 will cause
relay K1 to open and close continuously
(chatter). Relay K2 has a slower dropout
time than relay KI; therefore, if relay K1 is
chattering, relay K2 may not be affected, so
that the 16-second time delay continues to
time out. Consequently, master alarms can be
initiated without resetting of the 16-second
timer.
of these metalized Mylar capacitors associated with the flow sensors.
action was required.
The filter capacitor was open during
postflight tests, and the master alarms were
duplicated with slow, decreasing flow rates.
There has been no previous failure history
No corrective
This anomaly is closed.
Indicated closure of#_ro_nt isolation valves.- The propellant isolation valves
on quad B of the service module reaction control system closed during command and service
module separation from the S-IVB. A similar problem was encountered on the Apollo 9
mission. Tests after Apollo 9 indicated that a valve with normal magnetic latch forces
would close at shock levels as low as 87g with an ll-millisecond duration; however, with
durations in the expected range of 0.2 to 0.5 millisecond, shock levels as high as 670g
would not close the valves. The expected shock range is 180g to 260g.
Two valves having the nominal latching force of 7 pounds were selected for shock
testing. It was found that shocks of 80g for I0 milliseconds to shocks of lOOg for
1 millisecond would close the valves. The latching forces for the valves were reduced to
5 pounds, and the valves were shock tested again. The shock required to close the valves
at this reduced latching force was 54g for I0 milliseconds and 75g for 1 millisecond.
After completion of the shock testing, the valves were examined and tested, and no degra-
dation was noted. Higher shock levels may have been experienced in flight, and further
tests will be conducted.
A review of the checkout procedures indicates that the latching force can be degraded
only if improper procedures are implemented, such as the application of reverse current
or ac to the circuit. A special test on Apollo 12 indicated that the valve latching
force was not degraded.
Because there was no valve degradation when the valve was shocked closed and because
the crew checklist contained precautionary information concerning these valves, no further
action was necessary.
This anomaly is closed.
Odor in dockin 9 tunnel.- An odor similar to burned wire insulation was detected in
the tunnel when the hatch was first opened. No evidence of discoloration nor indications
of overheating of the electrical circuits could be found when the circuits were examined
by the crew during the flight. Several other sources of the odor were investigated,
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including burnedparticles from tower jettison, outgassingof a silicone lubricant used
on the hatchseal, andoutgassing of other components used in the tunnel area. Odors
from these sources were reproduced for the crew to compare with the odors detected
during flight. The crew stated that the odor from a sample of the docking hatch ablator
was similar to that detected in flight. Apparently, removal of the outer insulation
(TG-15000) from the hatch of Apollo II (and of subsequent spacecraft) resulted in higher
ablator temperatures and, therefore, a larger amount of outgassing odor than on previous
flights.
This anomaly is closed.
Low oxygen flow rate.- Shortly after launch, the oxygen flow rate indication was at
the lower limit of the instrumentation rather than at the nominal metabolic rate of
0.3 Ib/hr. Also, during water separator cyclic accumulator cycles, the flow rate
indication was less than the expected full measurement output of 1.0 Ib/hr.
Analysis of associated data indicated that the oxygen flow was normal, but that the
indicated flow rate was negatively biased by approximately 1.5 Ib/hr. Postflight tests
of the transducer confirmed this bias, and the cause was associated with a change in the
heater winding resistance within the flow sensor bridge (fig. 16-5). The resistance of
the heater had increased from I000 to 1600 ohms, therefore changing the temperature of
the hot wire element that supplies the reference voltage for the balance of the bridge.
Further testing to determine the cause of the resistance change was not practical because
of the minute size of the potted resistive element. Deporting of the element would de-
stroy available evidence of the cause of failure. Normally, heater resistance changes
occur early in the lO0-hour burn-in period during which heater stability is achieved.
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Figure 16-5.- Oxygen flow sensor.
A design problem was not indicated;
therefore, no action was taken.
This anomaly is closed.
Forward heat shield mortar lanyard
untied.- During postflight examination of
the ]_-pollo II spacecraft, an apparent in-
stallation error was found on the mortar
umbilical lanyard of the forward heat shield.
That is, all but one of the tie-wrap knots
were untied. This series of knots secures
the tie-wraps around the electrical bundle,
and its function is to break the wraps during
heat shield jettison.
The knots should be two closely tied
half-hitches that secure the tie-wrap to the
lanyard (fig. 16-6). Examination of the Apollo I0 lanyard indicated that these knots
were not two half-hitches but a clove hitch (fig. 16-6). Spacecraft II0 and III were
examined, and it was found that a clove hitch was erroneously used on these vehicles also.
After the lanyard breaks the tie-wraps, if the fragment of tie-wrap pulls out of
the knot, the clove hitch knot can untie, thus lengthening the lanyard. Lengthening this
lanyard as the umbilical cable pays out can allow transfer of some loading into the umbil-
ical disconnect fittings. Should a sufficient load be transferred to the disconnect fit-
ting to cause shearpins to fail, the mortar umbilical of the forward heat shield could be
disconnected prior to the mortar firing. This disconnection would prevent deployment of
the forward heat shield separation-augmentation parachute, and there would be a possi-
bility of forward heat shield recontact with the command module. Examination of the
forward heat shield recovered from Apollo I0 confirmed that the mortar had fired and
that the parachute was properly deployed.
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J(a) Proper. (b) Improper.
Figure 16-6.- Tie-wraps on lanyards.
A step-by-step procedure for correct lanyard knot tying and installation was
developed for spacecraft 112. Apollo 12 and 13 were reworked accordingly.
This anomaly is closed.
Glycol temperature control valve.- During lunar orbit operations, the glycol temper-
ature control valve did not control the evaporator inlet temperature. The temperature of
the water/glycol entering the evaporator is normally maintained above 42° F by the gly-
col temperature control valve, which mixes hot water/glycol with water/glycol returning
from the radiators (fig. 16-7). As the radiator outlet temperature decreases, the tem-
perature control valve opens to allow more hot glycol to mix with the cold fluid return-
ing from the radiator. This procedure is followed to maintain the evaporator inlet
temperature at 42 ° to 48 ° F. The control valve starts to close as the radiator outlet
temperature increases and closes completely at evaporator inlet temperatures above 48 ° F.
If the automatic temperature control system fails, manual operation of the temperature
control valve is available by deactivating the automatic mode. This deactivation is
accomplished by positioning the glycol evaporator temperature inlet switch from AUTO to
MANUAL, which removes power from the control circuit.
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Figure 16-7.- Primary water/glycol
coolant loop.
Two problems occurred on Apollo II dur-
ing lunar orbit operations. First, as the
temperature of the water/glycol returning
from the radiators increased, the temperature
control valve did not close fast enough;
thus, an early rise was produced in evapo-
rator outlet temperature. Second, the
evaporator outlet temperature decreased to
31 ° F during revolution 15 as the radiator
outlet temperature was rapidly decreasing
(fig. 16-8). Figure 16-8 also shows normal
operation of the valve and control system
after the problem. Both anomalies dis-
appeared at approximately the time during
revolution 15 that the glycol evaporator
temperature inlet switch was cycled by the
crew. The temperature control valve and re-
lated control system continued to operate sat-
isfactorily for the remainder of the mission.
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Figure 16-8.- Comparison of radiator and evaporator outlet temperatures.
The control valve was removed from the spacecraft, disassembled, and inspected. A
bearing within the valve gear train was found to have its retainer disengaged from the
race so that the retainer interfered with the worm gear travel (fig. 16-9).
The valve gear train is driven into mechanical stops and is stalled when the valve
is commanded full open or closed. Analysis of the failed bearing and the gear train de-
sign indicates that high static thrust loads (74 pounds) applied to the bearing when the
gear train is stalled caused the failure. The bearing is rated for 20 pounds of static
thrust.
The capability to set the valve manually at a position that will maintain the nor-
mal temperature range of the system precludes the necessity of a redesign.
This anomaly is closed.
Service module entrx.- The service module jettisoning sequence was designed with
the intention that the service module, upon being jettisoned on a lunar return flight,
would enter the atmosphere of the earth to between 300 and 400 thousand feet of altitude
and then skip out into a highly elliptical earth orbit. Thus, the risk of recontact
with the command module during entry would be eliminated. However, on the Apollo 8, lO,
and II missions, the service module did not skip out as expected.
Tracking data obtained by C-band radar on the Apollo II mission indicated that the
separation velocity was much less than that expected. During the Apollo II mission, the
service module was seen by the crew approximately 5 minutes after it had been jettisoned;
this sighting could not have occurred if the service module had followed its expected
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Figure 16-9.- Temperature control valve.
trajectory. (The crew noted at the time of
the sighting that the reaction control system
thrusters were still firing.) Photographs
obtained from aircraft showed the service
module entering the atmosphere of the earth
and disintegrating near the command module.
The service module jettisoning sequence
required that the four negative-X-translation
reaction control system engines commence
thrusting at separation and continue until
propellant depletion. Two seconds after
separation, four reaction control system
roll engines fired for 5-I/2 seconds to spin
stabilize the service module about its
X-axis. A minimum separation velocity of
approximately 300 ft/sec should have been
obtained for a stable service module, and
this separation velocity is more than suf-
ficient to cause the service module to skip
out. The separation velocity for the
Apollo I0 mission was approximately 60 ft/
sec (30 ft/sec less than the miniumum ve-
locity required for skip out.)
Hardware failure resulting in failure
of one reaction control system engine or in
early termination of thrusting is highly
unlikely because of the redundancy in the
control circuits and the consistency in
successive missions of the occurrence of the
failure of the service module to skip out.
Analysis of propellant sloshing shows, how-
ever, that the service module can become unstable, which results in low net separation
velocities. Pictorial representation of the sloshing is shown in figure 16-10. The
analyses indicate that tip-off moments applied to the service module at jettison cause
the spin vector to precess about the service module X-axis. The precession excites
longitudinal sloshing of the propellants in the tanks. Initial propellant locations are
shown in heavy shading in figure 16-10. When the spin vector precesses to the other side
of the X-axis, the propellants are driven to the other ends of the tanks, as shown in
light shading. The sloshing then causes the spin vector to approach a position normal
to the service module X-axis. The sloshing effects can cause a reduction in separation
velocity, and during the 300-second thrusting period, the service module attitude can be
reversed 180 °, This condition introduces a remote possibility of recontact between the
service module and the command module.
Analysis showed that the optimum separation velocity for a range of propellant loads
can be obtained by restricting the roll thrusting to a period of 2 seconds and the X-axis
thrusting to a period of 25 seconds. Therefore, beginning with the Apollo 13 mission,
the service module jettison controller was modified to give the following jettison
sequence.
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This anomaly is closed.
Lunar Module
Mission timer stopped.- The crew re-
ported shortly after lunar landing that the
mission timer had stopped. They could not
restart the clock at that time, and the
power to the timer was turned off to allow
the timer to cool. Eleven hours later, the
timer was restarted and functioned normally
for the remainder of the mission.
Based on the characteristic behavior
of the mission timer and the similarity to
previous timer failures, the most probable
cause of the failure was a cracked solder
joint. The reason for the cracked solder
joint was the cordwood construction; that
is, electrical components (resistors, capacitors, diodes, etc.) were soldered between two
circuit boards, and the void between the boards was filled with potting compound
(fig. 16-11). The differential expansion between the potting compound and the component
leads caused the solder joints to crack and break electrical contact. Presumably, the
ll-hour period the timer was off allowed the timer to cool sufficiently for the cracked
joint to make electrical contact, and the timer then operated normally.
There was no practical solution to the problem for units that were installed for
the Apollo 12 mission. However, to decrease the probability of failure, a screening pro-
cedure (vibration and thermal test and 50 hours of operation) has been used to select
timers for vehicle installation. The Apollo II timer was exposed to vibration and thermal
tests and to 36 hours of operation prior to installation.
New mission timers and event timers that will be mechanically and electrically inter-
changeable with present timers are being developed. These new timers will use integrated
circuits welded on printed circuit boards instead of the cordwood construction and will
include design changes associated with the other timer problems such as cracked glass
and electromagnetic interference susceptibility. The new timers will be incorporated
into the spacecraft when qualification testing is complete.
This anomaly is closed.
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High fuel interface pressure after
landing.- During simultaneous venting of the
descent propellant and supercritical helium
tanks, fuel in the fuel/helium heat exchanger
was frozen by the helium flowing through the
heat exchanger. Subsequent heat soakback
from the descent engine caused expansion of
the fuel trapped in the section of line be-
tween the heat exchanger and the engine
shutoff valve (fig. 16-12). The result was a
pressure rise in this section of line. The
highest pressure in the line was probably in
the range of 700 to 800 psia. (The inter-
face pressure transducer range is 0 to
300 psia.) The weak point in the system is
the bellows links, which yield at pressures
greater than 650 psia and fail at approxi-
mately 800 to 900 psia. Failure of.the links
would allow the bellows to expand and relieve
the pressure without external leakage. The
heat exchanger, which is located in the en-
gine compartment, thawed within approximately
0.5 hour and allowed the line pressure to
decay.
On future missions, the solenoid valve
(fig. 16-12) will be closed prior to fuel
venting and opened some time prior to lift-
off. This procedure w_ll prevent freezing
of fuel in the heat exchanger and will allow
the supercritical helium tank to vent later.
The helium pressure rise rate after landing
is approximately 3 to 4 psi/hr and consti-
tutes no constraint to presently planned mis-
sions. Appropriate changes will be made to
operational procedures.
This anomaly is closed.
Indication of high carbon dioxide par-
tial pressure.- Shortly after the lunar mod-
ule ascent, the crew reported that the carbon
dioxide partial pressure indication was high
and erratic. The secondary lithium hydroxide
canister was selected, with no effect on the
indication. The primary canister was then
reselected, and a caution and warning alarm
was activated.
Prior to extravehicular activity, the
environmental control system had been de-
activated. This deactivation stopped the
water separator and allowed the condensate
that had collected in the separator to drain
into a tank (fig. 16-13). The drain tank contained a honeycomb material designed to re-
tain the condensate. If the amount of condensate exceeded the effective surface of the
honeycomb, water could have leaked through the vent line and into the system just up
stream of the sensor. (Before the sensor became erratic, the Commander had noted water
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in his suit.) Free water in the optical section of the sensor will cause erratic per-
formance. The carbon dioxide content is sensed by measuring the light transmission
across a stream of suit-loop gas. Any liquid in the element affects the light transmis-
sion and thus gives improper readings. To preclude water being introduced into the
sensor from the drain tank, the vent line was relocated to an existing boss upstream of
the fans, effective on Apollo 13 (fig. 16-13).
This anomaly is closed.
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Steerable antenna acquisition.- When the steerable antenna was selected after acqui-
sition on revolution 14, difficulty was encountered in maintaining communications. The
down-link signal strength was lower than predicted and several times decreased to the
level at which lock was lost. However, the nominal performance of the steerable antenna
before and after the time in question indicated that the antenna hardware operated
properly.
For the pointing angles used, errors were discovered in the antenna coverage re-
striction diagram in the Spacecraft Operational Data Book. In addition, the diagram
failed to include the thruster plume deflectors, which were added to the lunar module at
the launch site. Figure 16-14 shows the correct blockage diagram and the diagram that was
used in the Spacecraft Operational Data Book prior to flight. The pointing angles of the
antenna were in an area of blockage or sufficiently close to blockage to affect the cover-
age pattern. As the antenna boresight approaches the vehicle structure, the on-boresight
gain is reduced, the selectivity to incoming signals is reduced, and sidelobe interfer-
ence is increased. Furthermore, a preflight analysis showed that the multipath signal, or
reflected ray (fig. 16-15), from the lunar surface to the vehicle flight trajectory would
be sufficient to cause some of the antenna tracking losses. Also, the reduction in an-
tenna selectivity caused by vehicle blockage increases the probability of multipath inter-
ferences in the antenna tracking circuits. In conclusion, both the vehicle blockage and
the multipath signals probably contributed to the reduced measured signal.
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Figure 16-14.- Coverage restrictions
for S-band steerable antenna.
For future missions, the correct vehi-
cle blockage and multipath conditions will
be determined for the predicted flight tra-
jectory. Operational measures can be em-
ployed to reduce the probability of the
recurrence of this problem by selecting
vehicle attitudes that orient the antenna
away from vehicle blockages and by selecting
vehicle attitude hold with the antenna track
mode switch in the SLEW or MANUAL position
throughout the time periods when this problem
may occur.
This anomaly is closed.
Com_uter alarms durin_ descent.- Five
computer program alarms occurred during
descent prior to the low-gate phase of the
trajectory. The performance of guidance and
control functions was not affected.
The alarms were of the Executive over-
flow type, which signify that the guidance
computer cannot accomplish all of the data
processing requested in a computation cycle.
The alarms indicated that more than I0 per-
cent of the computation capacity of the com-
puter was preempted by unexpected counter
interrupts of the type generated by the
coupling data units which interface with the
rendezvous-radar shaft and trunnion
resolvers (fig. 16-16).
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The computer is organized such that
input/output interfaces are serviced by a
central processor on a time-shared basis with
other processing functions. High-frequency
data such as accelerometer and coupling data
unit inputs are processed as counter inter-
rupts, which are assigned the highest priority
in the time-sharing sequence. Whenever one
of these pulse inputs is received, any lower
priority computation task being performed by
the computer is temporarily suspended or in-
terrupted for 11.72 microseconds while the
pulse is processed; then, control is returned
to the Executive program for resumption of
routine operations.
Figure 16-16.- Interfaces from rendezvous- The Executive program is the job-
radar antenna to primary guidance scheduling and job-supervising routine which
system, allocates the required erasable memory stor-
age for each job request and decides which
job is given control of the central processor.
The Executive program schedules the various repetitive routines or jobs (such as Servicer,
the navigation and guidance job which is done every 2 seconds) on an open-loop basis with
respect to whether the job scheduled on the previous cycle was completed. Should the
completion of a job be slowed because high-frequency counter interrupts usurp excessive
central processor time, the Executive program will schedule the same job again and re-
serve another memory storage area for its use. When the Executive program is requested
to schedule a job and all locations are assigned, a program alarm is displayed and a
software restart is initiated. A review of the jobs that can run during descent led to
the conclusion that multiple scheduling of the same job produced the program alarms.
The cause for the multiple scheduling of jobs has been identified by analyses and simula-
tions to be primarily counter interrupts from the rendezvous-radar coupling data unit.
The interrupts during the powered descent resulted from the configuration of the
rendezvous-radar/coupling data unit/computer interface. A schematic of the interface is
shown in figure 16-16. When the rendezvous-radar mode switch is in the AUTO or SLEW
position, the excitation for the radar shaft and trunnion resolvers is supplied by a
28-volt, 800-hertz signal from the attitude and translation control assembly. When the
switch is in the LGC position, the positioning of the radar antenna is controlled by the
guidance computer, and the resolver excitation is supplied by a 28-volt, 800-hertz source
in the primary guidance and navigation control system. The output signals of the shaft
and trunnion resolvers interface with the coupling data units, regardless of the exci-
tation source. The attitude and translation control assembly voltage is locked in fre-
quency with the primary guidance and navigation control system voltage through control
(by the primary guidance and navigation control system) of the PCM and timing electronics
frequency, but it is not locked in phase. When a mode switch is not in LGC, the attitude
and translation control assembly voltage is the source for the resolver output signals
to the coupling data units, while the primary guidance and navigation control system
800-hertz voltage is used as a reference voltage in the analog-to-digital conversion
portion of the coupling data unit. Any difference in phase or amplitude between the
two 800-hertz voltages will cause the coupling data unit to recognize a change in shaft
or trunnion position, and the coupling data unit will "slew" (digitally). The "slewing"
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of the data unit results in the undesirableandcontinuoustransmissionof pulses rep-
resenting incrementalangular changesto the computer. Themaximumrate for the pulses
is 6.4 kpps, and the pulses are processedas counter interrupts. Eachpulse received
by the computerequires onememorycycle time (11.7 microseconds)to process. If a maxi-
mumof 12.8 kppsis received (two radar coupling data units), 15 percent of the available
computertime will be spent in processingthe radar interrupts. (Thecomputernormally
operatesat approximately90 percent of capacity during the peakactivity of poweredde-
scent.) Whenthe capacity of the computeris exceeded,somerepetitively scheduledrou-
tines will not be completedprior to the start of the next computationcycle. The
computerthen generatesa software restart anddisplays anExecutiveoverflow alarm.
Themeaninglesscounter interrupts from the rendezvous-radarcoupling data unit will
not beprocessedby the LuminaryIB programusedon future missions. Whenthe radar is
not poweredup or the modeswitch is not in the LGCposition, the data units will be
zeroed, andcounter interrupts will not begeneratedby the radar coupling data units.
Anadditional changewill permit the crew to monitor the descentwithout requiring as
muchcomputertime as wasrequired in LuminaryIA.
This anomalyis closed.
Slowcabin decompression.- The decompression of the cabin prior to extravehicular
activity required longer than had been anticipated. In analysis of the seriousness of
this problem, it was determined that the crew cannot damage the hatch by trying to open
it prematurely. Static tests show that a handle force of 78 pounds at 0.25 psid and
118 pounds at 0.35 psid is required to permit airflow past the seal. The hatch deflected
only in the region of the handle. A handle pull of 300 pounds at 2 psid did not damage
either the handle or the hatch. In addition, neutral buoyancy tests showed that suited
subjects in a I/6-g environment could pull a maximum of 102 pounds.
On Apollo 12 and subsequent vehicles, the bacteria filter was not to be used; thus,
the time for decompression was reduced from approximately 5 minutes to less than 2 minutes.
The altitude chamber test for Apollo 13 included a partial cabin vent procedure that
verified satisfactory valve assembly operation without the bacteria filter installed.
This anomaly is closed.
Electroluminescent segment on display inoperative.- An electroluminescent segment
on the numeric display of the abort guidance system data entry and display assembly was
reported inoperative. The affected digit is shown in figure 16-17. With this segment
inoperative, it was impossible to differentiate hetween the numerals 3 and 9. The crew
was still able to use the particular digit; however, there was some ambiguity on the
readout.
Each segment on the display is switched independently through a logic network that
activates a silicon-controlled rectifier placed in series with the segments. In this
respect, the control circuit is different from that used in the entry monitor system
velocity counter, although both units are made by the same manufacturer. (See "Loss of
Electroluminescent Segment in Entry Monitor System" in this section.) The power source
is 115 volts, 400 hertz, and can be varied for intensity control.
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Figure 16-17.- Inoperative segment in one
digit of the data entry and display
assembly.
One similar failure occurred on a delta
qualification unit. The cause was a faulty
epoxy process which resulted in a cracked and
open electrode in the light-emitting element.
Circuit analysis shows several component and
wiring failures that could account for the
failure; however, there is no history of
these types of failure. The number of satis-
factory activations of all the segments does
not indicate the existence of a generic prob-
lem. To ensure proper operation under all
conditions, for future missions a prelaunch
test will activate all segments; then, the
intensity will be varied through the full
range while the display is observed for
faults.
This anomaly is closed.
Voice breakup during extravehicular
activitL.- Voice-operated relay operation
during extravehicular activity caused break-
up of voice received by the Manned Space
Flight Network. This breakup was associated
with both crewmen, but primarily with the
Lunar Module Pilot.
In ground tests, the conditions experi-
enced during the extravehicular activity were
duplicated by decreasing the sensitivity of
the lunar module down-link voice-operated
keying control from 9 (maximum) to 8, a de-
crease of approximately 7 decibels. During
chamber tests, lunar module keying by the extravehicular communications system was demon-
strated when the sensitivity control was set at 9. The crew indicated that the pre-
extravehicular activity adjustment should have been set in accordance with the onboard
checklist (maximum increase). The crewmen also verified that they did not experience any
voice breakup from each other or from the Manned Space Flight Network, which indicated
that the breakup was probably caused by marginal keying of the voice-operated keying
circuits of the lunar module down-link relay.
Voice tapes of the Apollo II crew obtained during altitude chamber tests were used
in an attempt to duplicate the problem by simulating voice modulation characteristics
and levels being fed into the lunar module con_nunications system during the extravehicu-
lar activity. These voice tapes modulated a signal generator that was received by and
relayed through a breadboard (mockup) of the lunar module communications system. No
discernible breakup of the relayed voice occurred with the sensitivity control set at 9.
All analysis and laboratory testing to date indicates that the voice breakup experi-
enced during the extravehicular activity was not an inherent system design problem.
Testing has shown that any voice that will key the extravehicular communications system
will also key the lunar module relay if the sensitivity control is set at 9.
The most probable cause of the problem is an inadvertent low setting of the Com-
mander's sensitivity control. During extravehicular activity, both crewmen use the Com-
mander's lunar module voice-operated circuit when talking to the ground. Other less
likely causes are degraded modulation from the extravehicular communications system or
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degradationof the lunar modulecircuit gain betweenthe vhf receiver andthe Commander's
amplifier. However,no knownprevious failures haveresulted in degradedextravehicular
communicationsmodulationlevels or degradedlunar modulekeying performance.
This anomalyis closed.
Echo durin_ extravehicular activity_.- A voice turnaround (echo) was heard during
extravehicular activity, At that time, the lunar module was operating in a relay mode.
Up-link voice from the S-band was processed and retransmitted to the two extravehicular
crewmen by means of the lunar module vhf transmitter. Crew voice and data were received
by the lunar module vhf receiver and relayed to the earth by means of the lunar module
S-band transmitter (fig. 16-18). The echo, which was duplicated in the laboratory,
resulted from mechanical acoustical coupling between the communications carrier earphone
Figure 16-18.- Communications relays during extravehicular activity,
194
andmicrophone(fig. 16-19). Thecrewmenindicated that their volumecontrols wereset
at maximumduring the extravehicular activity. This setting wouldprovide a level of
approximately+16dBminto eachcrev_nan'searphones. Isolation betweenearphonesand
microphones,exclusive of airpath coupling, is approximately48decibels. Therefore,
at the microphoneoutput, the groundvoice signal wouldappearat a level of approximately
-32 dBm. If it is assumedthat extravehicular communicationskeyingwasenabled, this
signal wouldbe processedandtransmitted by the extravehicular communicationsystemand
wouldprovide a level of approximately-12 dBmat the output of the lunar modulevhf re-
ceiver. If the lunar modulerelay wasenabled, this signal wouldbe amplified andrelayed
to earth by meansof the S-bandat a nominaloutput level.
Earpiece with /-
microphone and ..'"
earph°nedriverS"'/moldedin "" _-- "/_,
Communications system connector"
Figure 16-19.- Communications carrier.
When the lunar module voice-operated
keying circuit is properly adjusted, any sig-
nal that keys the extravehicular communica-
tions system will also key the lunar module
relay. There are indications that the lunar
module voice-operated keying sensitivity was
set below maximum, as evidenced by the re-
layed voice breakup experienced by the Lunar
Module Pilot. (See "Voice Breakup During
Extravehicular Activity" in this section.)
Therefore, it would have been possible for
the extravehicular communications system to
have been keyed by breathing or by suit air-
flow without this background noise being re-
layed by the lunar module. However, the
up-link turnaround voice could have provided
the additional lunar-module-received audio
signal level to operate the voice-operated
keying circuits, which would have permitted
the signal to be returned to earth. The crew
indicated that the voice-operated keying cir-
cuits in the extravehicular communications
system were activated by suit airflow for
some positions of the head in the helmet.
Both voice-operated keying circuits were also keyed by bumping or rubbing of the communi-
cations carrier against the helmet. The random echo problem is inherent in the communi-
cations system design, and there does not appear to be any practical way to eliminate
random voice-operated keying or to significantly reduce the acoustical coupling in the
communications carrier.
A procedure to inhibit the remoting of down-link voice during periods of up-link
voice transmissions will be accomplished to eliminate the echo. The capsule communica-
tor's console will be modified to allow capsule-communicator simplex operation (up link
only, down link disabled) during up-link transmissions as a backup mode of operation if
the echo becomes objectionable. However, the ground system will still have the echo of
the capsule communicator when the simplex mode is used.
This anomaly is closed.
Onboard recorder failure.- The data storage electronics assembly did not record
properly in flight. Postflight playback of the tape revealed that the reference tone
was recorded properly; however, the voice signal was low and recorded with a 400-hertz
tone and strong background noise. Occasionally, the voice level was normal for short
periods. In addition, only the 4.6-kilohertz timing signal was recorded. This signal
should have switched between 4.2 and 4.6 kilohertz in order to record the timing code.
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Duringpostflight tests, the recorder functionedproperly for the first 2 hours of
operation. Then, the voice channelfailed and recordedno voice or backgroundnoise,
although timing andreference toneswererecordedproperly. This failure doesnot dupli-
cate the flight results, which indicated that the failure did not exist in flight.
Testswith the recorder installed in a lunar modulewereperformedto determinethe
vehicle wiring failures that could causethe signals foundon the flight tape. Anopen
circuit in both the timing signal return line andthe voice signal line wouldduplicate
the problem. Similar brokenwires were foundin LTA-8during thermal/vacuumtests. The
most probablecauseof the failure wastwo brokenwires (26gage) in the vehicle harness
to the recorder. For Apollo 12 to 15, the wire harnessat the recorder connectorwill
bewrappedwith tape to stiffen the connectorandprovide protection against flexure
damage.For Apollo 16 andsubsequentmissions, a sheet-metalcoverwill be addedto
protect the harness.
Preflight data from the launch-site checkoutprocedureshowthat both the timing
inputs andthe internally generatedreference frequencywerenot within specification
tolerances, whichmaybe indicative of a preflight problemwith the system. Theprocedure
did not specify acceptablelimits but hasnowbeencorrected.
This anomalyis closed.
Brokencircuit breaker knob.- The crew reported after the completion of extravehicu-
lar activity that the knob on the engine arm circuit breaker was broken and that two
other circuit breakers were closed. The engine arm circuit breaker was successfully
closed when required for ascent, but loss of the knob would not allow manual opening of
the breaker.
The most probable cause of the damage was impact with the oxygen purge system (aft
edge) during preparation for extravehicular activities; such an impact was demonstrated
in simulations in a lunar module. Circuit breaker guards will be installed on Apollo 12
and subsequent vehicles to prevent the oxygen purge system from impacting with the circuit
breakers.
This anomaly is closed.
Thrust chamber pressure switches.- The switch used to monitor the quad 2 aft-firing
engine--(A2A) exhibited slow response to jet driver commands during most of the mission.
During an 18-minute period just prior to terminal phase initiation, the switch failed to
respond to seven consecutive minimum-impulse commands. This failure resulted in a master
alarm and a thruster warning flag, both of which were reset by the crew. The engine oper-
ated normally, and the switch failure had no effect on the mission. The crew did not
attempt any investigative procedures to determine whether the engine had actually failed.
A section drawing of the switch is shown in figure 16-20.
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Figure 16-20.- Chamber pressure switch.
This failure was the first of its type to be observed in flight or in ground testing.
The switch closing response (time of jet driver ON command to switch closure) appeared
to increase from an average of approximately 15 to 20 milliseconds during station keeping
to 25 to 30 milliseconds at the time of failure. Normal switch closing response is I0 to
12 milliseconds, based on ground test results. The closing response remained at the
25- to 30-millisecond level following the failure, and the switch continued to fail to
respond to some minimum-impulse commands. The switch opening time (time from jet driver
OFF command to switch opening) appeared to be normal throughout the mission. In view of
these results, the most probable cause of the switch failure was particulate contamina-
tion in the inlet passage of the switch. Contamination in this area would reduce the
flow rate of chamber gases into the diaphragm cavity, thereby reducing the switch closing
response. However, the contamination would not necessarily affect switch opening response
because normal chamber pressure tailoff requires approximately 30 to 40 milliseconds in
order to decrease from approximately 30 psia to the normal switch opening pressure of
approximately 4 psia. The 30- to 40-millisecond time would probably be sufficient to
allow the gases in the diaphragm cavity to vent such that the switch would open normally.
The crews for future missions will be briefed to recognize and handle similar situations.
This anomaly is closed.
Water in one suit.- After the lunar module achieved orbit, water (estimated to be
1 tablespoonful i beg_to enter the Commander's suit in spurts at approximately l-minute
intervals. The Commander immediately selected the secondary water separator, and the
spurts stopped after 15 to 20 minutes. The spurts entered the suit through the suit
half-vent duct when the crewmen were not wearing their helmets. The pressures in all
liquid systems that interface with the suit loop were normal, which indicated no leakage.
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Thepossible sourcesof free water in the suit loop are the water separator drain
tank, an inoperative water separator, local condensationin the suit loop, and leakage
throughthe water separator selector valve (fig. 16-13). Anevaluation of eachof these
possible sourcesindicated that leakagethrough the water separator selector valve was
the most probable source of the free water.
The flapper-type valve is located in a Y-duct arrangement and is used to select one
of two water separators. Leakage of this valve would allow free water to pass through
the idle water separator and subsequently enter the suit hose. This leakage would most
probably result from a misalinement and binding in the slot of the selector valve actua-
tion linkage (fig. 16-21).
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Figure 16-21.- Water separator selector
valve.
The allowable actuation force after
linkage rigging was 15 pounds. The usual
actuation forces have been 7 to 8 pounds,
but 12.5 pounds were required on the Apol-
lo II mission. The allowable actuation
force has been lowered to lO pounds, and in-
spections for linkage binding have been in-
corporated into procedures at the factory
and the launch site.
This anomaly is closed.
Reaction control system warning flags_.-
The crew reported thrust chamber assembly
warning flags for three engine pairs. Quad 2
and quad 4 warning flags for system A occurred
simultaneously during lunar module station
keeping prior to descent orbit insertion. The
quad 4 flag for system B appeared shortly
thereafter and also twice just before powered
descent initiation. The crew believed these
flags were accompanied by master alarms. The
flags were reset by cycling of the caution
and warning electronics circuit breaker. Suf-
ficient data are not available to confirm any
of the reported conditions.
One of the following may have caused
the flag indications:
I. The thrust chamber pressure switch
may have failed to respond to thruster
firings.
2. Firing of opposing thrusters may
have caused a thrust-chamber-on failure indi-
cation.
3. Erroneous caution and warning system or display flag operation may have occurred.
The first two possible causes are unlikely because simultaneous multiple failures
would have to occur and subsequently be corrected. The third possible cause is the most
likely to have occurred where a single-point failure existed. Ten of the 16 engine
pressure switch outputs are conditioned by the I0 buffers in one module in the signal
conditioner electronics assembly (fig. 16-22). This module is supplied with +28 V dc
through one wire. In addition, the module contains an oscillator that provides an
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Figure 16-22.- Reaction control system malfunction-detection circuits.
ac voltage to each of the I0 buffers. If either the +28 V dc is interrupted or the
oscillator fails, none of the I0 buffers will respond to pressure switch closures.
engines monitored by these buffers are then commanded on, the corresponding warning
flags will appear, and a master alarm will occur.
If
If plus X translation were commanded
(fig. 16-23), the down-firing engines in
quads 2 and 4 of system A could fire, and
flags 2A and 4A would appear. A subsequent
minus X rotation could fire the forward-
firing thruster in quad 4 of system B and
the aft-firing thruster in quad 2 of sys-
tem A, and flag 4B would appear, The aft-
firing engine in quad 2 of system A (A2A) is
not monitored by one of the tO buffers pos-
tulated as having failed. The failure, then,
could have cleared itself. The response of
the. vehicle to thruster firings would have
been normal under these conditions. There
is no history of similar failures either at
package or module level in the signal condi-
tioner electronics assembly. No corrective
action was taken.
This anomaly is closed.
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Figure 16-23.- Reaction control
system geometry.
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Government-FurnishedEquipment
Television cable retained coiled shape.- The cable for the lunar surface television
camera retained its coiled shape after being deployed on the lunar surface. Loops
resulting from the coils represented a potential tripping hazard to the crew.
All the changes that have been investigated relative to changes in cable material
and in stowage and deployment hardware have indicated only minimal improvement in deployed
cable form, together with a weight penalty for the change. No hardware changes are
planned.
This anomaly is closed.
Mating of remote control unit to portable life support system.- During preparation
for extravehicular activity, the crew experienced considerable difficulty in mating the
electrical connectors from the remote control unit to the portable life support system.
For rotational polarization alinement, it was necessary to grasp the cable insulation
because the coupling lock ring was free for unlimited rotation on the connector shell
(fig. 16-24).
Flanged female hall Male half mounted on
mounted on por|able cable to remote control
life support system unit
• Polarization
•" mating keys,
//"
, Coupling-lock ring
/,'"
Figure 16-24.- Connector between remote
control unit and portable life sup-
port system.
For future missions, the male half of
the connector has been replaced with one
that has a coupling lock ring with a positive
rotational position with the connector shell
and that can be grasped for firm alinement
of the two halves. The ring is then rotated
90° in order to capture and lock the two
halves. In addition, easier insertion has
been attained with conical-tipped contact
pins in place of hemispherical-tipped pins.
This anomaly is closed.
Difficulty in closing sample return con-
tainers.- The force required to close the
sample return containers was much higher than
expected. This high closing force, together
with the instability of the descent stage
work table and the lack of adequate retention
provisions, made closing of the containers
very difficult.
Because of the type of container seal, the force required to close the cover
reduces with each closure. The crew had extensive training with a sample return con-
tainer which had been opened and closed many times, resulting in closing forces lower
than the maximum limit of 32 pounds.
The container used for the flight had not been exercised, as had the container used
for training. In addition, the cleaning procedures used by the contractor before delivery
removed all lubricant from the latch linkage sliding surfaces. Tests with similar con-
tainers have shown that the cleaning procedure caused an increase in the closing force
of as much as 24 pounds.
A technique for burnishing on the lubricant after cleaning has been incorporated.
As a result, containers now being delivered require closing forces no greater than
25 pounds. Overcenter locking mechanisms for retaining the containers on the work table
will be installed on a mockup table and will be evaluated for possible incorporation on
Apollo 13 and subsequent missions.
This anomaly is closed.
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17. CONCLUSIONS
The Apollo II mission, which included a manned lunar landing and lunar surface ex-
ploration, was conducted with skill, precision, and relative ease. The excellent per-
formance of the spacecraft in the preceding four flights and the thorough planning in all
aspects of the program permitted the safe and efficient execution of this mission. The
following conclusions are drawn from the information contained in this report.
I. The effectiveness of preflight training was reflected in the skill and precision
with which the crew executed the lunar landing. Manual control while maneuvering to the
desired landing point was satisfactorily exercised.
2. The planned techniques involved in the guidance, navigation, and control of the
descent trajectory were good. Performance of the landing radar met all expectations in
providing the information required for descent.
3. The extravehicular mobility units were adequately designed to enable the crew
to conduct the planned activities. Adaptation to the I/6-g environment was relatively
quick, and mobility on the lunar surface was easy.
4. The two-man prelaunch checkout and countdown for ascent from the lunar surface
were well planned and executed.
5. The time-line activities for all phases of the lunar landing mission were well
within the crew's capability to perform the required tasks.
6. The quarantine operation from spacecraft landing until release of the crew,
spacecraft, and lunar samples from the Lunar Receiving Laboratory was accomplished suc-
cessfully and without any violation of the quarantine.
7. No micro-organisms from an extraterrestrial source were recovered from either
the crew or the spacecraft.
8. The hardware problems experienced on the Apollo II mission, as on previous
manned missions, were of a nature that did not unduly hamper the crew or result in the
compromise of safety or mission objectives.
9. The I1ission Control Center and the Manned Space Flight Network proved to be
adequate for controlling and monitoring all phases of the flight, including the descent,
surface activity, and ascent phases of the mission.
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APPENDIXA
APOLLOSPACECRAFTFLIGHTHISTORY
Mission Spacecraft Description Launchdate Launchsite
PA-I BP-6 First padabort Nov.7, 1963
A-O01
AS-IOI
AS-I02
A-O02
AS-I03
A-O03
AS-I04
PA-2
AS-I05
A-O04
AS-201
BP-12
BP-13
BP-15
BP-23
BP-16
BP-22
BP-26
BP-23A
BP-9A
SC-002
SC-009
Transonicabort
Nominallaunchand
exit environment
Nominalaunchand
exit environment
Maximumdynamic
pressureabort
May13, 1964
May28, 1964
Sept. 18, 1964
Dec.8, 1964
WhiteSands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
WhiteSands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
WhiteSands
Missile Range,
Micrometeoroid
experiment
Feb. 16, 1965
N. Mex.
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
Low-altitude abort(plannedhigh-
altitude abort)
Micrometeoroid
experimentand
service module
RCSlaunch
Secondpadabort
Micrometeoroid
experimentand
service module
RCSlaunch
environment
Power-ontumbling
boundaryabort
Supercircular
entry with high
heat rate
May19, 1965
May25, 1965
June29, 1965
July 30, 1965
Jan. 20, 1966
Feb. 26, 1966
WhiteSands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
WhiteSands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
White Sands
Missile Range,
N. Mex.
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
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APOLLOSPACECRAFTFLIGHTHISTORY- Concluded
Mission Spacecraft Description Launchdate Launchsite
AS-202 SC-OII Aug.25, 1966
Apollo 4
Apollo 5
Apollo 6
Apollo 7
Apollo 8
Apollo 9
Apollo I0
Apollo II
SC-017
LTA-IOR
LM-I
SC-020
LTA-2R
CSM101
CSM103
CSM104
LM-3
CSM106
LM-4
CSM107
LM-5
Supercircular
entry with high
heat load
Supercircular
entry at lunar
return velocity
First lunar
moduleflight
Verification of
closed-loop
emergencydetec-
tion system
First manned
flight; earth
orbital
First mannedlunar
orbit flight;
first manned
SaturnV launch
First mannedlunar
moduleflight;
earth orbit ren-
dezvous;extra-
vehicular
activity
First lunar orbit
rendezvous;low
passover lunar
surface
First lunar
landing
Nov. 9, 1967
Jan. 22, 1968
April 4, 1968
Oct. II, 1968
Dec. 21, 1968
Mar. 3, 1969
May18, 1969
July 16, 1969
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
KennedySpace
Center, Fla.
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
KennedySpace
Center, Fla.
CapeKennedy,
Fla.
KennedySpace
Center, Fla.
KennedySpace
Center, Fla.
KennedySpace
Center, Fla.
KennedySpace
Center, Fla.
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APPENDIXB
VEHICLEDESCRIPTIONS
TheApollo II spacevehicle containedfew changesfrom the Apollo I0 configuration.
Thelaunchescapesystemandthe spacecraft/launchvehicle adapterwere identical to
those for Apollo I0. Thefew minor changesto the commandandservice modules,the lunar
module,andthe SaturnV launchvehicle are discussedin the following paragraphs. A
description of the extravehicular mobility unit and the lunar surface experimentequip-
mentanda listing of spacecraftmassproperties are also presented.
Commandand Service Modules
Theinsulation in the area of the commandmoduleforward hatchwasmodified to pre-
vent the flaking whichoccurredduring the Apollo I0 lunar modulepressurization. The
feedbackcircuit in the high-gain antennawasslightly changedto reduceservodither.
In the Apollo I0 commandmodule,oneof the three entry batteries wasmodified to make
useof cellophaneseparators. Theflight results provedthis cellophaneseparator to
be superior to the Permion-typeseparatorspreviously used, andthe Apollo II command
modulehadthe cellophaneseparatorson all three entry batteries. Thebattery chargers
weremodified to producea higher chargingcapacity. Thesecondarybypassvalves for the
fuel cell coolant loop werechangedfrom an angle-coneseat design (block II) to a single-
angleseat design (block I) to reducethe possibility of particulate contamination. As
a replacementfor the water/gasseparation bag,which provedineffective during Apollo I0,
an in-line dual-membraneseparationdevice wasaddedto both the water gunand the foodpreparation unit.
LunarModule
Structural changes.- The most significant structural change to the lunar module was
the added provisions for the functional early Apollo scientific experiments package and
the modular equipment stowage assembly, both of which housed the experiments and tools
used during the lunar surface activities. Another change was the addition of the reaction
control system plume deflectors.
Changes to the landing gear included (I) removing the lunar surface sensing probe
on the plus Z gear and lengthening the remaining probes and (2) increasing the sliding
clearance of the landing gear struts to permit full stroke at extreme temperature
conditions.
Thermal changes.- A change from Kapton to KeI-F was made to the descent stage base
heat shield to preclude the possibility of interference with the landing radar. Also,
insulation was added to the landing gear and the probes to accommodate the requirement
for descent engine firing until touchdown.
Communications systems changes.- The major modifications to the communications sys-
tems included the addition of an extravehicular activity antenna to the lunar module for
lunar communications between the crew and the lunar module and the addition of an S-band
erectable antenna to the lunar module to permit communications through the lunar module
communications system (fig. 16-16) while the crew was on the surface. A television
camera similar to that used on the Apollo 9 mission was stowed in the descent stage to
provide television coverage of the lunar surface activities.
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Guidance and control system changes.- The major difference in the guidance and con-
trol system was the redesign of the gimbal drive actuator to a constant damping system
rather than a brake. The actuator was redesigned as a result of the brake failing in
both the disengaged and the engaged positions. This change also required modification of
the descent engine control assembly and the phase-correcting network to eliminate the
possibility of inadvertent caution and warning alarms. The exterior tracking light had
improvements in the flash head and in the pulse-forming network. The pushbuttons for the
data entry and display assembly were rewired to preclude the erroneous caution and warn-
ing alarms that occurred on the Apollo lO flight. The guidance and navigation optics
system was modified by the addition of Teflon locking rings to the sextant and to the
scanning telescope to prevent the rotation of eye guards under zero-g conditions. The
deletion of unmanned control capability permitted removal of the ascent engine aiming
assembly.
Ascent propulsion system changes.- The injector filter for the ascent propulsion
system was modified because the fine mesh in the original filter caused a change in the
mixture ratio. An additional change was the incorporation of a lightweight thrust
chamber.
Environmental control system changes.- In the environmental control system, a suit
cooling assembly an_ water hose umbilicals were added to the air revitalization section
to provide additional crew cooling capability. As a result, the cabin air recirculation
assembly, the cabin temperature control valve, and the regenerative heat exchanger were
deleted. Also, a redundant water regulator was added to the secondary coolant loop in
the water management section. In the environmental control system relay box in the oxy-
gen and cabin pressure control section, a pressure transducer was replaced by a suit
pressure switch to improve reliability.
Radar changes.- The landing-radar electronics assembly was reconfigured to protect
against a computer strobing pulse that was providing what appeared to be two pulses to
the radar. Another modification permitted the crew to break tracker lock and to start a
search for the main beam in the event the radar pulse locked onto the structure or onto
a side lobe. The lunar reflectivity attenuation characteristics were updated in the radar
electronics to account for the updated Surveyor data and for landing-radar flight tests.
For correlation between the Manned Space Flight Network and the inertial measurement unit
of the primary guidance system, a logic change permitted the lateral velocity to be an
output signal of the landing radar. A further design change was made to prevent the land-
ing radar from accepting noise spikes as a pulse in the velocity bias error signal train.
The rendezvous-radar design changes included a new self-test segment to provide low-
temperature stability with the low-frequency and mid-frequency composite signal. In
addition, heaters were added to the gyro assembly and the cable wrap to accommodate the
lunar-stay temperature requirements. A manual voting override switch permitted the crew
to select either the primary or the secondary gyro inputs.
Di___ss_layand control changes.- A circuit breaker was added for the abort electronics
assembly to protect the dc bus, and another circuit breaker was added to accommodate the
transfer of the utility light to the dc bus to provide redundant light.
The circuit breaker for the environmental control system suit and cabin repressuriza-
tion function was deleted in conjunction with the modification of the suit cooling assem-
bly. In addition, a low level caution and warning indication on the secondary water/
glycol accumulator has been provided.
Changes to the caution and warning electronics assembly included the inhibition of
the landing-radar temperature alarm and the prevention of a master alarm during inverter
selection and master alarm switching.
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Master alarm functions which were eliminated include the descent helium regulator
warning prior to pressurization with the descent engine control assembly; the reaction-
control-system thrust-chamber-assembly warning with quad circuit breakers open; the
rendezvous-radar caution when the mode select switch is placed in the AUTO-TRACK posi-
tion; and the reaction-control-system quad temperature alarm. Caution and warning
functions which were deleted include the landing-radar velocity "data no good" warning
and the descent propellant low-level quantity warning, which was changed to a low-level
quantity indication light only.
A further change included the added capability of resetting the abort electronics
assembly caution and warning channel with the water quantity test switch. A modifica-
tion was made to the engine-stop-switch latching mechanism to ensure positive latching
of the switch.
Crew provision changes.- The waste management system was changed to a one-large
and five-small urine container configuration. Additional stowage included provisions
for a second Hasselblad camera, for two portable life support systems and remote control
units, for two pairs of lunar overshoes, and for a feedwater collection bag. The Com-
mander had an attitude-controller-assembly lock mechanism added.
Extravehicular Mobility Unit
The extravehicular mobility unit provides life support in a pressurized or unpres-
surized cabin and up to 4 hours of extravehicular activity life support.
In its extravehicular configuration, the extravehicular mobility unit was a closed-
circuit pressure vessel that enveloped the crewman. The environment inside the pressure
vessel consisted of lO0-percent oxygen at a nominal pressure of 3.75 psia. The oxygen
was provided at a flow rate of 6 cubic feet per minute. The extravehicular life support
equipment configuration is shown in figure B-l.
Liquid cooling garment.- The crewmen wore the liquid cooling garment while in the
lunar module and during all extravehicular activity. The garment provided cooling during
extravehicular and intravehicular activity by absorbing body heat and by transferring
excessive heat to the sublimator in the portable life support system. The liquid cooling
garment was a one-piece, long-sleeved, integrated stocking undergarment of netting mate-
rial. It consisted of an inner liner of nylon chiffon to facilitate donning and an outer
layer of nylon Spandex into which a network of Tygon tubing was woven. Cooled water,
supplied from the portable life support system or from the environmental control system,
was pumped through the tubing.
Pressure _arment assembly.- The pressure garment assembly was the basic pressure
vessel of the extravehicular mobility unit. This assembly would have provided a mobile
life support chamber if cabin pressure had been lost because of leaks or puncture of the
vehicle. The pressure garment assembly consisted of a helmet, a torso and limb suit,
intravehicular activity gloves, and various controls and instrumentation to provide the
crewman with a controlled environment.
Torso and limb suit.- The torso and limb suit was a flexible pressure garment that
encompassed the entire body except the head and hands. It had four gas connectors, a
multiple water receptacle, and electrical connector, and a urine transfer connector.
The connectors had positive locking devices and could be connected and disconnected
without assistance from another crewman. The gas connectors comprised an oxygen inlet
and outlet connector on each side of the suit front torso. Each oxygen inlet connector
had an integral ventilation diverter valve. The multiple water receptacle, mounted on
the suit torso, served as the interface between the environmental control system water
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supply and the water connectorsfor the liquid cooling garmentand t}}e portable life
support system. Theelectrical connector,whenmatedwith the vehicle or with the
electrical umbilical of the portable life support system,provideda communications,
instrumentation, andpowerinterface to the pressuregarmentassembly. Theurine
transfer connectorwasusedto transfer urine from the urine collection transfer
assemblyto the wastemanagementsystem.
Theurine transfer connectoron the suit right leg permitted dumpingof the urine
collection bagwithout depressurizingthe pressuregarmentassembly. A pressurerelief
valve on the suit sleeve, near the wrist ring, vented the suit in the event of overpres-
surization. Thevalve openedat approximately4.6 psig andreseatedat 4.3 psig. If the
valve did not open, it could have been manually overridden. A pressure gage on the other
sleeve indicated suit pressure.
Helmet.- The helmet was a Lexan (polycarbonate) shell with a bubble-type visor, a
vent pad assembly, and a helmet-attaching ring. The vent pad assembly permitted a con-
stant flow of oxygen over the inner front surface of the helmet. The helmet did not turn
independently of the torso and limb suit; however, the crewman could turn his head within
the helmet neck-ring area. The helmet had provisions on each side for mounting an extra-
vehicular visor assembly.
Communications carrier.- The communications carrier was a polyurethane foam headpiece
with two independent earphones and microphones which were connected to the suit 21-pin
communications electrical connector. The communications carrier could be worn with or
without the helmet during intravehicular operations. It was worn with the helmet during
extravehicular operations.
Integrated thermal micrometeoroid 9arment.- The integrated thermal micrometeoroid
garment, which wa-s _ over the pressure garment assembly, protected the crewman from
harmful radiation, heat transfer, and micrometeoroid activity. The integrated thermal
micrometeoroid garment was a one-piece, form-fitting multilayered garment that was laced
over the pressure garment assembly and remained with it. The extravehicular activity
visor assembly, gloves, and boots were donned separately. From the outer layer in, the
integrated thermal micrometeoroid garment consisted of a protective cover, a
micrometeoroid-shielding layer, a thermal-barrier blanket (multiple layers of aluminized
Mylar), and a protective liner. A zipper on the integrated thermal micrometeoroid gar-
ment permitted connection or disconnection of umbilical hoses. For extravehicular activ-
ity, the pressure garment assembly gloves were replaced with the extravehicular activity
gloves. The extravehicular activity gloves were made of the same material as the integra-
ted thermal micrometeoroid garment to permit handling of intensely hot or cold objects
outside the cabin and for protection against lunar temperatures. The extravehicular ac-
tivity boots were worn over the pressure garment assembly boots. They were made of the
same material as the integrated thermal micrometeoroid garment. The soles had additional
insulation for protection against intense temperatures.
Extravehicular activity visor assembly.- The extravehicular activity visor assembly
provided protection against solar heat, space particles, and radiation and helped to
maintain thermal balance. The two pivotal visors of the extravehicular activity visor
assembly could be attached to a pivot mounting on the pressure garment assembly helmet.
The lightly tinted (inner) visor reduced fogging in the helmet. The outer visor had a
vacuum-deposited gold-film reflective surface, which provided protection against solar
radiation and space particles. The extravehicular activity visor assembly was held snug
to the pressure garment assembly helmet by a tab-and-strap arrangement that allowed the
visors to be rotated approximately 90 ° up or down, as desired.
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Portable life support system.- The portable life support system (fig. B-2) contained
the expendable materials and the communications and telemetry equipment required for
extravehicular operation. The system supplied oxygen to the pressure garment assembly
and cooling water to the liquid cooling garment and removed solid and gas contaminants
from returning oxygen. The suited crewman wore the portable life support system, attached
with a harness, on his back. The total system contained an oxygen ventilating circuit,
water feed and liquid transport loops, a primary oxygen supply, a main power supply,
communications systems, displays and related sensors, switches, and controls. A cover
encompassed the assembled unit, and the top of the portable life support system supported
the oxygen purge system.
Remote control unit.- The remote control unit was a display and control unit, chest-
mounted for easy access. The controls and displays consisted of a fan switch, pump
switch, space-suit communication-mode switch, volume control, oxygen quantity indicator,
and oxygen purge system actuator.
Oxygen purge system.- The oxygen purge system provided oxygen and pressure control
for certain extravehicular emergencies and was mounted on top of the portable life support
system. The system was self-contained, independently powered, and nonrechargeable. It
was capable of 30 minutes of regulated (3.7 ± 0.3 psid) oxygen flow at 8 Ib/hr to prevent
excessive carbon dioxide buildup and to provide limited cooling. The system consisted of
two interconnected spherical 2-pound oxygen bottles, an automatic temperature control
module, a pressure regulator assembly, a battery, oxygen connectors, and the necessary
checkout instrumentation. The oxygen purge system provided the hard mount for the
vhf antenna.
Experiment Equipment
Solar wind composition.- The purpose of the solar wind composition experiment was to
determine the elementaland isotopic composition of noble gases and other selected elements
present in the solar wind. This objective was to be accomplished by trapping particles of
the solar wind on a sheet of aluminum foil exposed on the lunar surface.
Physically, the experiment consisted of a metallic telescoping pole approximately
1.5 inches in diameter and approximately 16 inches in length when collapsed. When ex-
tended, the pole was approximately 5 feet long. In the stowed position, the foil was
enclosed in one end of the tubing and rolled up on a spring-driven roller. Only the foil
portion was recovered at the end of the lunar exposure period. The foil was rolled on
the spring-driven roller and stowed in the sample return container for return to earth.
Laser ranqing retroreflector.- The laser ranging retroreflector experiment (fig. B-3)
was a retroreflector a rrayof-fus--ed silica cubes. A folding support structure was used
for aiming and alining the array toward earth. The purpose of the experiment was to re-
flect laser ranging beams from earth to their point of origin for precise measurement of
earth-moon distances, the center of the lunar mass motion, and the lunar radius; for earth
geophysical information; and for development of space communication technology.
Earth stations that can beam lasers to the experiment include the McDonald Observatory
at Fort Davis, Texas; the Lick Observatory at Mount Hamilton, California; and the Catalina
Station of the University of Arizona. Scientists in other countries also plan to bounce
laser beams off the retroreflector.
Passive seismic experiment package.- The passive seismic experiment (fig. B-4) con-
sisted of three long-period seismometers and one short-period vertical seismometer for
measuring meteoroid impacts and moonquakes and for gathering information on the lunar
interior (for example, whether a lunar core and mantle exist). The passive seismic ex-
periment package had four basic subsystems: the structure/thermal subsystem to provide
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shock, vibration, and thermal protection; the electrical power subsystem to generate
34 to 46 watts by solar panel array; the data subsystem to receive and decode Manned
Space Flight Network up-link commands and down-link experiment data and to handle power
switching tasks; and the passive seismic experiment subsystem to measure lunar seismic
activity with long-period and short-period seismometers which could detect inertial mass
displacement. Also included in the package were 15-watt radioisotope heaters to maintain
the electronic package at a mimimum of 60° F during the lunar night.
A solar panel array of 2520 solar cells provided approximately 40 watts to operate
the instrument and the electronic components, including the telemetry data subsystem.
Scientific and engineering data were to be telemetered down link while ground commands
initiated from the Mission Control Center at the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center were to
be transmitted up link by using Manned Space Flight Network remote sites.
Lunar field geology.- The primary aim of the Apollo lunar field geology experiment
was to collect lunar samples. The tools described in the following paragraphs and shown
in figure B-5 were provided for this purpose.
A calibrated Hasselblad camera and a gnomon were to be used to obtain the geometric
data required to reconstruct the geology of the site in the form of geologic maps and to
recover the orientation of the samples for erosion and radiation studies. The sample
bags and camera frame numbers were provided to aid in identifying the samples and relat-
ing them to the crew's description.
Core tubes, in conjunction with hammers, were to provide samples in which the stra-
tigraphy of the uppermost portion of the regolith would be preserved for return to earth.
A sample scoop was provided for collecting particulate material and individual rock frag-
ments and for digging shallow trenches for inspection of the regolith. The tongs were
provided for collecting rock fragments and for retrieving tools that might have been
dropped. Lunar environment and gas analysis samples were to be collected, sealed in
special containers, and returned for analysis.
Launch Vehicle
Launch vehicle AS-506 was the sixth in the Apollo-Saturn V series and was the fourth
manned Apollo-Saturn V vehicle. The AS-506 launch vehicle was configured the same as the
AS-505 launch vehicle used for the Apollo lO mission, except for the differences described
in the following paragraphs.
In the S-IC stage, the prevalve accumulator bottles were removed from the control
pressure system, and various components of the research and development instrumentation
system were removed or modified. In the S-II stage, the components of the research and
development instrumentation system were removed, and excess weld doublers were removed
from the liquid-oxygen-tank aft bulkhead.
In the S-IVB stage, five additional measurements were used to define the low-frequency
vibration that had occurred during the Apollo lO mission. In the propulsion system, a
liner was added to the liquid hydrogen feed duct, an oxygen/hydrogen injector was changed,
the shutoff valve on the pneumatic power control module was modified by the addition of a
block point, and a new configuration of the cold helium shutoff and dump valves and a
pneumatic shutoff valve solenoid were installed.
In the instrument unit, the FM/FM telemetry system was modified to accommodate the
five added S-IVB structural vibration measurements. Tee sections, clamps, and thermal
switch settings were minor modifications in the environmental control system. The flight
program was changed to accommodate the requirements of the Apollo II mission.
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Mass Properties
Spacecraft mass properties for the Apollo II mission are summarized in table B-I.
These data represent the conditions as determined from postflight analyses of expendable
loadings and usage during the flight. Variations in spacecraft mass properties are de-
termined for each significant mission phase from lift-off through landing. Expendables
usage is based on reported real-time and postflight data, as presented in other sections
of this report. The weights and centers of gravity of the individual command and service
modules and of the lunar module ascent and descent stages were measured prior to flight,
and the inertial values were calculated. All changes incorporated after the actual weigh-
ing were monitored, and the spacecraft mass properties were updated.
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TABLE B-I.- MASS PROPERTIES
Weight_
Event Ib
Lift-off I09 666.6
Earth orbit insertion lO0 756.4
Transposition and docking
Command and service 63 473.0
modules
Lunar module 33 294.5
Total docked 96 767.5
Separation maneuver 96 566.6
First midcourse correction
Ignition 96 418.2
Cut-off 96 204.2
Lunar orbit insertion
Ignition 96 061.6
Cut-off 72 037.6
Circularization
Ignition 72 Olg.g
Cut-off 70 905.9
Separation 70 760.3
Docking
Command and service
modules 36 847.4
Ascen_ stage 5 738.0
Total after docking
Ascent stage manned 42 585.4
Ascent stage unmanned 42 563.0
Total after ascent stage 37 100.5
jettison
Transearth injection
Ignition 36 965.7
Cut-off 26 792.7
Command and service
module separation
Before 26 656.5
After
Service module 14 549.1
Command module 12 107.4
Entry 12 095.5
Drogue deployment II 603.7
Main parachute II 318.9
deployment
Landing lO 873.0
33 297.2
33 683.5
33 669.6
33 401.6
16 153.2
lO 776.6
5 928.6
5 881.5
5 738.0
5 462.5
Lunar module at launch
Separation
Descent orbit insertion
Ignition
Cut-off
Lunar Iandlng
Lunar lift-off
Orbit insertion
Coelliptic sequence
initiation
Docking
Jettison
Product of inertia
Center of gravity, in. Moment of inertia, slug-it 2 s]ug.ft 2
XA YA ZA Ixx lyy Izz Ixy !XZ Iyz
847.0 2.4 3.9 67 960 I 164 828 I 167 323 2586 8 956 3335
807.2 2.6 4.1 67 108 713 136 715 672 4745 II 341 3318
934.0 4.0 6.5 34 445 76 781 79 530 -1789 -126 3141
1236.2 .Z .I 22 299 24 826 24 966 -508 27 37
1038.0 2.7 4.3 57 006 532 219 534 981 -7672 -9 240 330(
1038.l 2.7 4.3 56 902 53l 918 534 766 -7670 -9 219 327(
]038.3 2.7 4.2 56 770 531 482 534 354 -7711 -9 170 3305
1038.4 2.7 4.2 56 667 531 148 534 113 -7709 -9 147 3274
1038.6 2.7 4.2 56 564 530 636 533 613 -7785 -g 063 3310
1079.1 1.7 2.9 44 117 412 855 419 920 -5737 -5 166 382
1079.2 1.8 2.9 44 I02 412 733 419 798 -5745 -5 160 386
I081.5 1.6 2.9 43 539 407 341 413 864 -5403 -5 208 316
I082.4 1.8 2.8 44 762 407 599 414 172 -5040 -5 404 286
943.6 2.8 5,5 20 747 57 181 63 687_ -2094 833 321
1168.3 4.9 -2,4 3 369 2 347 2 8731 -129 54 -354
973.9 3.1 4.5 24 189 113 707 120 677 -1720 j-I 018 -50
972.6 2.9 4.5 24 081 llO 884 lit 804 -2163 -811 -28
943,9 2.9 5.4 20 807 56 91g 63 417 -2003 730 305
943.8 3.0 5.3 20 681 56 775 63 303 -1979 709 336
961.4 -,1 6.8 15 495 49 843 51 454 -824 180 -232
961.6 .0 6.7
896.1 .1 7.2
1040.4 -.2 6.0
1040.5 -.2 5,9
1039.2 -.2 5.9
1039.1 -.I 5.2
I037.1 -.1 5.1
Lunar module
185.7 0.2 0.2
186.5 ,2 ,7
186.5 .2 .B
186,5 ,2 .8
213.5 .4 1,6
243.5 .2 2.9
255.3 .4 5.3
255.0 .4 5.3
254.4 .4 5.4
255.0 .l 3.1
15 406 49 739 51 338 -854
9 143 14 540 16 616 -837
6 260 5 470 4 995 55
6 253 5 463 4 994 55
6 066 5 133 4 690 56
5 933 4 947! 4 631 50
5 866 4 670! 4 336 45
22 304 25 019 25 018
23 658 26 065 25 922
23 649 26 0451 25 899
23 480 25 978 25 871
12 582 13 867 16 204
6 808 3 475 5 971
3 457 3 082 2 273
3 437 3 069 2 246
3 369 3 044 2 167
3 226 3 039 2 216
228
225
224
224
I82
28
17
17
18
Z8
228 -200
885 -153
-403 -47
-400 -47
-375 -48
-312 -28
-322 -27
454 77
705 73
704 71
704 71
555 74
214 45
135 43
137 44
141 50
If9 35
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"-. .--'" visor assembly
.- Remote control unit
Sunglasses pocket ..... --""
_. ........ Oxygen purgesystem actuator
Support straps ........ ""-Penlight pocket
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Figure B-I.- Extravehicular mobility unit.
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Oxygen purge system
..... Actuating cable
................. Istowed position)
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light tyell owl ...... _,,_._. _
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gage -" _ "'"'"-Sto_age plate
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Portable life Support system
Figure B-2.- Portable life support system.
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Passive seismic experiment,
Antenna cable .. ",
Isotope heater, "',.
--Antenna
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•, ".Carry handle
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Figure B-4.- Passive seismic experiment pack-
age deployed configuration showing dust
detector geometry.
Figure B-5.- Geologic sampling handtools.
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APPENDIXC
GLOSSARY
Thefollowing terms are usedin section II.
ablation
albedo
basalt
breccia
clast
diabase
ejecta
euhedral
exfoliation
feldspar
feldspathic
gabbro
gal
gnomon
igneous
induration
lithic
microbreccia
morphologic
olivine
peridotites
removal;wearingaway
ratio of light reflected to light incident ona surface
generally, any fine-grained dark-colored igneousrock
seemicrobreccia
rock composedof fragmentalmaterial of specified types
fine-grained, igneousrock of the compositionof a gabbro,but having
lath-shapedplagioclase crystals enclosedwholly or in part in later
formedaugite
material thrownout (as from a volcano)
havingcrystals whosegrowthhasnot beeninterfered with
processof breakingloose thin concentric shells or flakes from a rock
surface
any of a groupof white, nearly white, flesh-red, bluish, or greenish
minerals that are aluminumsilicates with potassium,sodium,calcium,
or barium
pertaining to feldspar
medium-or coarse-grainedbasic igneousrock, forming intrusive bodiesof
mediumor large size and consisting chiefly of plagioclase andpyrozene
unit of acceleration equivalent to 1 cm/sec2
instrument usedfor size andcolor comparisonwith knownstandards
formedby solidification from a molten or partially molten state
hardening
stonelike
rock consisting of small sharp fragmentsembeddedin any fine-grained
matrix
study of form andstructure in physical geography
mineral; a magnesium-ironsilicate commonlyfound in basic igneousrocks
anyof a groupof granitoid igneousrocks composedof olivine andusually
other ferromagnesianminerals, but with little or no feldspar
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plagioclase
platy
pyroxene
pyroxenites
ray
regolith
terra
vesicle
triclinic feldspar
consisting of plates or flaky layers
family of important rock-forming silicates
igneousrock, free from olivine, composedessentially of pyroxene
anyof the bright, whitish lines seenon the moonandappearingto radiate
from lunar craters
surface soil
earth
small cavity in a mineral or rock, ordinarily producedby expansionof
vapor in the moltenmass
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